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ABSTRACT 
 
We address three topics on the relationship between taxation and corporate decision-making. A 
feature of our study is that we use natural experiments in Japan for identification as well as unique 
data sets of Japanese corporations. This research framework allows us to provide new evidence 
for several research questions that are difficult to be studied under the tax systems or with data sets 
in other countries such as in the U.S. 
The first chapter examine the relationship between corporate tax asymmetries and high-risk 
investments. Economic theory dating to Domar and Musgrave (1944) suggests that the tax 
treatment of gains and losses can affect firms’ incentives to undertake high-risk investments. We 
take advantages of a 2002 tax reform in Japan as a natural experiment to test the theory. This tax 
reform introduced a consolidated taxation system (CTS). The CTS allows business groups to offset 
gains with losses across firms in the business groups. Thus, the CTS can mitigate disincentives in 
high-risk investments. We construct measures of investment risk using information on R&D. We 
estimate dynamic investment models with unique panel data of Japanese firms between 1994 and 
2012. For identification, we use an IV strategy in a difference-in-differences framework or in a 
triple-differences framework. We provide evidence that the CTS increases R&D in line with 
Domar and Musgrave (1944). This finding suggests that mitigating tax asymmetries is an effective 
way to help encourage risk-taking. We also find evidence that the CTS encourages risk-sharing in 
business groups. These findings suggest that the asymmetries in the tax code have particularly 
important implications in countries where business groups are the prevailing organizational 
structures, because mitigating the tax asymmetries help encourage both risk-taking and risk-
sharing. 
The second chapter examines the relationship between stock market listing and corporate tax 
aggressiveness. Recent literature argues that agency conflicts between shareholders and managers 
reduce corporate tax aggressiveness. Although stock market listing is a fundamental source of the 
agency costs, a dearth of widely available data prevents researchers from investigating how 
monitoring from stock markets affects tax aggressiveness. We use unique panel data that cover 
both publicly-traded (listed) companies and privately-held (unlisted) companies in Japan. To 
mitigate endogeneity concerns about the choice to list stocks on public equity markets, we use 
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legal reforms in squeeze out as a quasi-natural experiment. We provide evidence that stock market 
listing decreases tax aggressiveness among companies whose ownership is concentrated. This 
result suggests that minority shareholders’ option to sell stocks in public markets reduces managers’ 
incentives to be tax aggressive. Our findings link a function of capital markets with public finance 
by demonstrating that financial developments can contribute to the effective collection of tax 
revenues. 
The third chapter examines the relationship between dividend taxation and stock selling as well 
as payout policy. A 2011 tax reform in Japan raised the top marginal tax rates on dividend income 
from 10% to 43.6% among individual investors whose ownership ratio is in between 3% to 5%. 
This tax reform creates an incentive for these investors to sell stocks to restrict their ownership 
stakes below 3%. We find clear evidence of such ownership adjustments. 51.9% of these investors 
sell stocks on average. The percentage is 86.1% when the ownership ratio is in between 3% to 
3.1%. We further exploit this tax reform to examine whether investors’ tax preferences affect 
payout policy. In particular, those individual investors who retain stakes of at least 3% after the tax 
reform have an incentive to encourage firms to pay fewer dividends because dividends are less 
valuable for them. We find statistical evidence for this prediction. However, the impacts of taxes 
on dividend policy are not economically large.  
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CHAPTER 1: Corporate tax asymmetries and R&D: Evidence from a tax reform for business 
groups in Japan 
 
1. Introduction 
At least since Domar and Musgrave (1944), it has been understood that the asymmetric tax 
treatment of gains and losses can affect corporate investments. In particular, the ability to deduct 
losses makes those losses less costly to a firm, which in turn should encourage additional risk-
taking relative to a tax system that does not recognize those losses. In this paper, we provide new 
evidence on how taxes affect investments, making use of a change in the tax code in Japan. 
A key component of this paper is business groups.1 In the past, a limitation of the business 
group structures was that firms in business groups were treated as separate tax filing units; thus, 
taxable income was not calculated based on consolidated income across business group members. 
Although individual firms that run losses can carry those losses forward, they cannot receive an 
immediate tax refund. As a consequence, these firms face two tax penalties: loss carryforwards do 
not accrue interest and they can expire if unused for a certain period of time. 
A Japanese consolidated taxation system (CTS) introduced in 2002 changed this tax framework. 
Adoption of the CTS is elective for business groups. If they adopt the CTS, corporate income tax 
is imposed on the aggregated taxable income across the parent companies and their wholly-owned 
subsidiaries. This additional deductibility lowers the probability of receiving the tax penalties. 
Thus, in line with Domar and Musgrave (1944), the CTS can mitigate distortions in investments. 
We use information on R&D as investment risk measures.2 For identification, we take a 
                                                     
1 Business groups refer to a collection of a parent company and its subsidiaries under the parent’s equity control. 
Pyramidal business groups are the predominant form of business organizations in Japan (Morck (2009)). For instance, 
Toyota Motor is the parent company of Toyota Group. Toyota Motor wholly owns Tokyo Toyota, a car dealer in the 
Tokyo area, and partly owns Hino Motors, a manufacturer of trucks and buses among various subsidiaries. 
2 There is ample evidence that supports the assertion of the riskiness of R&D. For example, the Data Book 2015 issued 
by the Japan Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association documents that pharmaceutical companies can bring 0.003% 
of the compounds developed by them to market as a new medicine. A 2007 survey by the Japan Research Industries 
Association reports that the success rate of R&D projects that firms initiate from fundamental research is 11%. The 
survey is available at http://www.jria.or.jp/HP/H19_houkokusho/H19_SUMMARY_doukou.pdf (in Japanese). In 
Section 5.1., we provide evidence for this hypothesis with our data sets. 
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difference-in-differences approach or a triple-differences approach, using the introduction of the 
CTS as a natural experiment. First, we use a within-firm variation with unique panel data (Basic 
Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities). Second, the voluntary nature of CTS 
adoption divides business groups into the treatment group and the control group. These two 
differences allow us to use a difference-in-differences framework to test whether the CTS increases 
R&D. We also examine the impact of the CTS on an “R&D-Capex difference”, which is R&D 
expenses minus capital expenditures, because R&D investments appear to involve higher risk than 
capital investments. An advantage of this triple-differences framework is that we can identify the 
impacts of the CTS after controlling for firm-year level investment opportunities. We estimate 
dynamic investment models because of the high adjustment costs of R&D (Hall (2002)). 
Our empirical strategy seeks to address endogeneity concerns: the choice of whether to adopt 
the CTS is voluntary, which creates a selection problem. We take an instrumental variable approach 
to address this problem. We construct instruments so that they reflect future tax benefits from CTS 
adoption.3 We use data of Japanese firms between 1994 and 2012. The data have distinctive 
advantages for studying R&D. For example, the data report information on physical capital 
investments in R&D and human capital investments in R&D, in addition to the firms’ total R&D 
expenses. These unique data items allow us to test additional hypotheses as we will discuss below. 
We find that the CTS increases both R&D-Capex difference and R&D expenses especially 
among parents. We also show that the CTS increases the aggregated R&D expenses across the 
business group members. This result suggests that the CTS relaxes the intertemporal budget 
constraints for the business groups. The impacts of the CTS are economically significant as well. 
The estimates from our main empirical model imply that the CTS increases business groups’ R&D 
expenses-to-assets ratio by at least 0.429 percent points. A back-of-the-envelope calculation shows 
that the CTS reduces taxable income-to-assets ratio by 0.75 percent points. Thus, the impacts of 
the CTS on R&D correspond to 57.2% of the impacts of the CTS on consolidated taxable income. 
The 2002 tax reform allows us further to test the risk-sharing hypothesis in business groups.4 
                                                     
3 For instance, one of the instruments is a dummy variable that takes one when the parents own tax losses and one of 
their wholly-owned subsidiaries reports positive income. Business groups can offset the parent’s losses against the 
subsidiaries’ gains only when they adopt the CTS. 
4 Khanna and Yafeh (2005) find that risk-sharing is a central motivation behind the existence of business groups. 
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The group loss offset provision of the CTS should be particularly effective to encourage risk-
sharing, because the CTS can smooth income without incurring transaction costs to allocate 
resources in the business groups. First, we find that the CTS magnifies the disparity in R&D 
intensity between parents and their subsidiaries. An implication of this finding is that the CTS 
increases R&D either among parents or among subsidiaries to diversify risks from R&D. We also 
find that this risk-sharing effect of the CTS is especially clear for R&D human capital investments. 
This finding can be explained by knowledge spillover because it is more effective to concentrate 
knowledge in one unit in the business groups. Second, we provide evidence that the CTS tends to 
increase either R&D physical capital or R&D human capital. This evidence suggests that business 
groups engage in risk-sharing by increasing either factor of R&D investments. Thus, our findings 
suggest that the CTS encourages risk-sharing both in business groups and in asset types. 
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we provide direct evidence that 
tax asymmetries discourage high-risk investments. The key difference with the previous literature 
is that we use natural experiments for identification.5 Second, the public goods nature of R&D 
creates a gap between the social returns and the private returns.6 We suggest that mitigating tax 
asymmetries is an effective way to encourage R&D. Third, our paper is related to the recent 
literature that emphasizes that patience regarding failure is an important factor to encourage high-
risk activities.7 Our paper suggests that tax systems that are impatient regarding losses can have 
adverse effects on risk-taking. 8  Fourth, various papers discuss the relationship between 
                                                     
5 Relevant studies include Auerbach (1986), Auerbach and Poterba (1987), Altshuler and Auerbach (1990), Devereux, 
Keen, and Schiantarelli (1994), Edgerton (2010), and Dreβler and Overesch (2013). 
6 Providing tax credits or subsidies is a common fiscal policy measure to fill this gap (Hall and Van Reenen (2000)). 
7 Manso (2011) theoretically shows that optimal contracts should not punish short-run failure to motivate innovation. 
Tian and Wang (2014) provide evidence that failure-tolerant venture capitalists spur innovation. 
8 Dreβler and Overesch (2013) explore the relationship between tax systems and German multinationals’ investments. 
One of their focuses is the impact of business group taxation on capital expenditures. They find that group loss 
provisions increase capital expenditures of the multinationals’ subsidiaries. Four differences between Dreβler and 
Overesch (2013) and our paper are worth emphasizing. First, they use capital expenditures as the investment risk 
measure, while we use data concerning R&D. Second, subsidiaries in their paper are located abroad, while we use 
data of domestic business groups. Third, the unit of analysis in their paper is subsidiaries, while our units of analysis 
include parents and the entire business groups as well. Fourth, they treat the existence of the business group taxation 
as given, while we use an experimental framework. 
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organizational structures and R&D.9 We link business groups’ R&D with taxation. Our findings 
suggest that the group loss offset provisions can be desirable because it encourages both risk-taking 
and risk-sharing. This policy proposal sheds new light on the wide-raging discussion on whether 
business groups are beneficial or harmful to the economy, by showing that the tax systems are a 
consideration in this discussion.10 Fifth, we provide evidence that the CTS helps business groups 
restructure R&D human capital investments so that the CTS magnifies the spillover effects.11 Our 
findings suggest that knowledge spillover plays important roles within firms in business groups. 
The remaining sections are organized as follows. Section 2 provides background information. 
Section 3 explains the hypotheses and the research design. Section 4 describes the data. We conduct 
preliminary tests in Section 5. We show the estimation results in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Background information 
We provide an overview of the Japanese corporate tax systems and the consolidated taxation 
system (CTS) in the first subsection. We explain costs and benefits of CTS adoption in the second 
subsection. In the third subsection, we briefly discuss the relationship between CTS adoption and 
endogeneity. 
2.1. Tax systems in Japan and the CTS 
Corporations in Japan pay both national corporate income taxes and local corporate taxes.12 The 
                                                     
9 Seru (2014) shows that a conglomerate is an organizational form that is detrimental to innovation. In contrast, 
Belenzon and Berkovitz (2010) provide evidence that business group affiliation encourages innovation. 
10 Several papers find evidence on the positive aspects of business groups. Almeida, Kim, and Kim (2015) find that 
internal capital markets helped Korean business groups maintain their investment levels during the 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis. Masulis, Pham, and Zein (2011) show that the business group structures emerge to complement 
underdeveloped capital markets. Gopalan, Nanda, and Seru (2007) document that business groups in India use intra-
group loans to support group members. In contrast, several studies find evidence on negative aspects of the business 
groups structures in terms of tunneling, using data in India (Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan (2002)) or data in 
Korea (Bae, Kang, and Kim (2002); Baek, Kang, and Lee (2006)). Onji (2013) examines business groups’ participation 
decision in the Japanese CTS. The author shows that business groups’ characteristics such as the amount of 
accumulated losses among parents are associated with the likelihood of CTS adoption. 
11 Knowledge spillover is often emphasized in the geographical context (Audretsch (1998)). Several papers examine 
the impacts of alliances on knowledge sharing (Gomes-Casseres, Hagedoorn, and Jaffe (2006); Jiang and Li (2009)). 
12 The national corporate income tax rates are 28.05% in 2012. The tax rates were 30% between 1999 and 2011, 34.5% 
in 1998, and 37.5% between 1990 and 1997. The local corporate tax rates are approximately 10% in 2012 in Tokyo. 
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Japanese corporate tax systems treat positive income and negative income asymmetrically like in 
many other countries. Corporations that earn positive income need to pay corporate income taxes. 
In contrast, corporations that report losses do not receive immediate tax refunds. Limited tax relief 
is available for the reported losses in the form of tax loss carryforwards. Under the tax system that 
is effective in 2012, firms can carry losses forward up to nine years.13 
   Tax penalties are typically discussed in the intertemporal context. Policy discussions in this 
context focus mostly on how governments design tax policy concerning loss carryforwards or loss 
carrybacks. In contrast, the CTS deals with loss offset in the cross sectional sense, because the 
CTS allows business groups to offset losses with gains across different corporations in the same 
year. From the economic perspectives, business groups undertake economic activities as one unit. 
From the tax perspectives, however, business groups were not treated as one unit. In other words, 
individual firms in the business groups are treated as separate tax filing units. Thus, there exists a 
loss-offset constraint among companies in the business groups. 
The 2002 tax reform in Japan introduced the CTS.14 The introduction of the CTS provides 
business groups an option to alleviate this loss-offset constraint. Adoption of the CTS is a voluntary 
                                                     
The CTS does not apply to local corporate taxes, and the CTS applies only to the national corporate income taxes. 
Therefore, corporate taxes in this paper refer to national corporate income taxes. Our data sets cover year periods 
between 1994 and 2012. Thus, the corporate income tax rates are about 30% during the year periods of our interest. 
The tax rates are essentially flat with some special treatments for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). Firms 
whose paid-in capital are 100 million yen or below are classified as SMEs. 
13 The time span for loss carryforwards varied across time as follows: nine years from 2011 to 2014; seven years from 
2004 to 2010; and five years up to 2003. The time span for loss carryforwards is shorter in Japan than in the U.S. (20 
years). Therefore, we expect that tax penalties are severer in Japan than in the U.S. Cooper and Knittel (2010) show 
that the real value of tax losses erodes by more than one-half using tax return data in the U.S. Given the shorter time 
span for tax loss carryforwards in Japan, the value of tax loss carryforwards would depreciate more rapidly in Japan 
than in the U.S. Thus, tax penalties have the greater potential to affect managerial incentives in Japan. 
14 The CTS is unrelated to consolidated financial statements, and the CTS affects only tax incentives of business 
groups. In addition, The CTS does not change the limited liability constraints of individual firms in the business groups. 
One possibility is that business groups that adopt the CTS change their ownership structures so that they can obtain 
more benefits from the limited liability constraints. We will later provide evidence that we observe almost no changes 
in ownership structures of the business groups after they adopt the CTS. Therefore, the limited liability constraints do 
not appear to play an important role for our paper. 
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decision of the business groups. If the business groups adopt the CTS, corporate taxes are imposed 
on the consolidated income across the parents and their wholly-owned subsidiaries. The wholly-
owned subsidiaries include both directly, wholly-owned subsidiaries and indirectly, wholly-owned 
subsidiaries.15 The CTS is a domestic tax system. In other words, foreign subsidiaries are not 
included in the consolidated tax filing. All wholly-owned subsidiaries must be subject to the CTS 
if the business groups adopt the CTS. In other words, business groups cannot selectively include 
some wholly-owned subsidiaries in the consolidated tax filing. If business groups adopt the CTS, 
they cannot abolish the CTS in principal.16 Therefore, the CTS adoption is an irreversible decision. 
2.2. Cost of CTS adoption 
CTS adoption has a clear tax advantage as long as there exist both corporations that report positive 
income and corporations that report negative income in the business groups.17 However, not all 
business groups have adopted the CTS as we will describe in Section 4.2. The adoption rate is 
about 17% in 2012 in our sample. This observation suggests that there should exist costs associated 
with CTS adoption. A report issued by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry surveys tax 
reform requests from various trade associations.18 This report summarizes factors that provide 
disincentives for business groups to adopt the CTS. 
The report reveals that the CTS is inflexible for business groups. Some trade associations 
                                                     
15 Directly, wholly-owned subsidiaries refer to subsidiaries whose parent’s ownership stakes are 100%. Indirectly, 
wholly-owned subsidiaries refer to a firm like Firm S in the following example. Suppose that 60% of the stakes of 
Firm S are owned by Firm P1, and the rest of 40% of the stakes are held by Firm P2. If Firm P1 wholly owns Firm 
P2, then Firm P1 wholly owns Firm S indirectly. In this case, Firm S is not a directly, wholly-owned subsidiary, but 
Firm S is an indirectly, wholly-owned subsidiary. If Firm P1 adopts the CTS, Firm S is included in the consolidated 
tax filing. 
16 Although the system allows the possibility of abolishment of the CTS under the approval of Commissioner of the 
National Tax Agency, being able to obtain an approval is the exception. 
17 To see this tax benefit in a simple example, suppose that a parent incurs losses of -80 billion yen and one of its 
wholly-owned subsidiaries reports gains of 100 billion yen. Assume that corporate tax rates are 30%. Without the CTS, 
the parent does not pay positive corporate taxes, and the wholly-owned subsidiaries pay 30 billion yen of taxes. This 
30 billion yen represents the total tax burden for the business group. If the business group adopts the CTS, total tax 
payments are reduced to 6 billion yen, which is one fifth of the original tax payments. In this case, the business group 
can save 24 billion yen of corporate tax payments. 
18 The report is available at http://www.meti.go.jp/main/downloadfiles/zeisei24/youbou_all.pdf (in Japanese). 
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request that business groups should have the right to selectively include some wholly-owned 
subsidiaries in the consolidated tax filing. This is possibly because small wholly-owned 
subsidiaries can bring small tax benefits relative to the associated administrative costs for tax 
filing.19 In contrast, some other industry groups request that the scope of the CTS should not be 
restricted to wholly-owned subsidiaries and that it should include some partly owned subsidiaries 
whose ownership stakes are over 80% or 66.6% as well.20  
CTS adoption has ambiguous implications on the R&D tax credit.21 The R&D tax credit 
applies to all firms. However, there is a difference in the calculation of the tax credit limit between 
CTS business groups and non-CTS business groups. When business groups adopt the CTS, the tax 
                                                     
19 Administrative costs to start and manage the CTS would not be negligible. Business groups might need to introduce 
internal administration systems across business group members. In addition, business groups might need to educate 
or hire workers who engage in tax matters, and they might need to make a contract with accounting firms. Furthermore, 
the restriction that the CTS applies only to national taxes is especially burdensome when the fiscal year differs between 
the parent and some of its wholly-owned subsidiaries. This is because these subsidiaries might need to prepare their 
own tax returns, tax returns for the CTS, and their financial statements separately in different months. 
20 Another disadvantage explained in this report is that business groups that adopt the CTS must abandon their wholly-
owned subsidiaries’ loss carryforwards that were recognized before CTS adoption. In other words, business groups 
can share their wholly-owned subsidiaries’ losses only when the losses are recognized after the business groups adopt 
the CTS. This treatment is in contrast to the tax treatment of parents’ loss carryforwards: parents’ losses that are 
generated before CTS adoption can be used to offset losses across the group members after CTS adoption. A legal 
reform was implemented in 2010 so that business groups need not abandon at least some of the past tax losses of 
subsidiaries. However, business groups can only use these tax losses to offset the subsidiaries’ own income. Business 
groups cannot use these losses to offset other business group members’ income. In other words, the 2010 tax reform 
mitigated only the intertemporal constraint on loss offset, and this tax reform does not affect the loss offset across 
group members. 
21 The Japanese R&D tax credit system that is effective in 2012 consists of the following two systems. The first system 
is a volume system. This system allows firms to subtract 8-10% of R&D expenses from the corporate tax liabilities. 
The credit limit of the volume system is 20% of the tax liability. The second system is an incremental system. This 
system gives an additional tax incentive in R&D. The credit limit is 10% of the corporate income tax payments. Thus, 
the total credit limit is 30% of the corporate tax payments. Firms are eligible for an incremental credit if they increase 
R&D expenses compared to those in previous years. The calculation methods of the eligible expenses for the 
incremental system are relatively complicated. The details on the current Japanese R&D tax credit system is described, 
for example, in 2014 Global Survey of R&D Tax Incentives issued by Deloitte. 
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credit limit is calculated as if the groups (parents and their wholly-owned subsidiaries) were one 
tax filing unit. This tax treatment implies that the aggregated tax credit limit can decrease when 
the tax burden is considerably reduced by the CTS. On the other hand, CTS adoption is 
advantageous in utilizing the R&D tax credit when the individual firms’ tax credit limit is binding, 
because these firms can use the aggregated quota of R&D tax credit of the business groups. Thus, 
CTS adoption has ambiguous effects on the utilization of R&D tax credit. 
2.3. Endogeneity concern and the CTS 
The discussion in the previous subsections suggests that there are several potential sources of 
endogeneity concerns. First and most important, the voluntary nature of CTS adoption creates a 
selection problem. For example, parents might adopt the CTS because they anticipate 
unobservable, high-risk investment opportunities. This situation can cause an upward bias in OLS 
estimates when we regress investment risk measures on CTS adoption. Alternatively, parents 
might adopt the CTS because they anticipate substantial losses in the near future. This situation 
might cause a downward bias in the OLS estimates if firms suffer financial distress as a result of 
these losses. 
   Second, the CTS has several rules that can affect incentives to adopt the CTS as we discussed 
in the previous subsection. These factors might be a source of biases in OLS estimates. To mitigate 
these concerns, we use an IV strategy to identify the causal impacts of CTS adoption on investment 
behavior induced by the loss offset provision in a difference-in-differences framework or in a 
triple-differences framework. We discuss our research design in Section 3.2. 
3. Hypotheses and estimation 
We explain our hypotheses in the first subsection of this section. We present our research design 
in the second subsection. In this subsection, we discuss how we address the endogeneity associated 
with CTS adoption in detail. 
3.1. Hypotheses 
Before turning to our empirical strategy to address the endogeneity concerns, we highlight the 
hypotheses. Our prediction is based on the theory by Domar and Musgrave (1944) on how taxes 
affect risk-taking. CTS adoption allows business groups to use losses of one member company to 
offset gains elsewhere in the business groups. Therefore, CTS adoption reduces the possibility of 
receiving the tax penalties on losses, and thereby lowers the costs of risk-taking. Thus, business 
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groups can shift towards more risk-taking after CTS adoption than before CTS adoption. 
We use R&D as the risk measure of investment behavior.22 The main analysis compares the 
impacts of the CTS on R&D expenses or on an “R&D-Capex difference”. The R&D-Capex 
difference is defined by R&D expenses minus capital expenditures. There exists evidence that 
supports the assumption that the R&D investments involve higher risk than capital investments.23 
We test the validity of this assumption using our data sets in Section 5.1. 
An advantage of the R&D-Capex difference as the risk measure over other risk measures24 is 
that we can control for unobservable firm-year level investment opportunities in addition to the 
investment opportunities proxied by the market to book ratio. The availability of the firm-year 
level variation is helpful to identify the impacts of the CTS on investments, compared to the 
commonly used difference-in-differences framework in which we can separately include the firm 
fixed effect and the year fixed effect. We also use R&D expenses or capital expenditures as the 
regressand in the difference-in-differences framework. This regression allows us to test whether 
an increase in the R&D-Capex difference is caused by an increase in R&D expenses or a decrease 
in capital expenditures. We predict that the CTS increases both the R&D-Capex difference and 
R&D expenses, but the CTS does not have clear effects on capital expenditures. 
In addition to total R&D expenses of individual firms, we use more detailed information of 
R&D with unique data sets described in the next section. The data cover information that is not 
disclosed on publicly available financial statements in Japan or in most other countries. We 
investigate the impacts of the CTS on capital expenditures that are used for R&D as well as the 
number of employees engaging in R&D. The former represents physical capital investments in 
R&D and the latter represents human capital investments in R&D. We expect that the CTS 
                                                     
22 R&D also appears as investment risk measures in the literature (Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006); Kim and Lu 
(2011); Ryan and Wiggins (2002)). 
23 For example, Kothari, Laguerre, and Leone (2002) provide evidence that R&D investments are associated with 
greater earnings volatility than capital investments. 
24 Alternative risk measures used in the literature include the followings: leverage (Acharya, Amihud, and Litov 
(2011); Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006)); business focus (Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006)); presence of business 
losses (Cullen and Gordon (2007)); volatility of business earnings (John, Litov, and Yeung (2008)); diversifying 
acquisitions (Acharya, Amihud, and Litov (2011)); and an imputed measure constructed from the Fama-French three 
factor model (Armstring and Vashishtha (2012)). 
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increases both physical capital in R&D and human capital in R&D.  
We also test the hypothesis that the CTS encourages risk-sharing among firms in the business 
groups. The literature documents that the central advantage of the business group structures is that 
firms in the business groups can engage in risk-sharing.25 A relative strength of the CTS over other 
mutual insurance devices is that business groups need not incur transaction costs to shift income 
across firms in the business groups, because the CTS mechanically smooths income across 
business group members by offsetting gains with losses. Thus, we predict that the CTS encourages 
risk-sharing in business groups. 
We use two measures of risk-sharing. The first measure is the disparity in R&D variables such 
as R&D expenses-to-assets ratio between parents and their subsidiaries. We regard that the CTS 
enhances risk-sharing if the CTS increases this disparity, because business groups concentrate 
high-risk activities either among the parents or among the subsidiaries to diversify risk from R&D. 
In this case, one unit in the business groups faces high earnings volatility and another unit faces 
low earnings volatility. This diversification is likely to lead to the situation that business groups 
offset gains with losses, which makes income stream relatively stable ex post. Second, we examine 
the differences in the impacts of the CTS between on R&D physical capital investments and on 
R&D human capital investments. We examine whether the CTS increases both of them or either 
of them. If we observe that the CTS increases only either of the R&D investments, we interpret 
that the business groups diversify risks in terms of the type of investments. 
3.2. Research design 
We use a difference-in-differences approach and a triple-differences approach. We first divide 
business groups into a treatment group and a control group. The treatment group consists of 
business groups that adopt the CTS, and the control group consist of business groups that do not 
adopt the CTS. The second difference comes from the panel structures of our data sets. In other 
words, we compare the impacts of the CTS on investments between before-CTS adoption and 
after-CTS adoption. The availability of a difference-in-differences framework is advantageous 
compared to other studies that examine the effects of tax incentives. This is because it is generally 
                                                     
25 For example, Khanna and Yafeh (2005) show that business group affiliation reduces profit volatility. Gopalan, 
Nanda, and Seru (2007) show that business groups support distressed firms by utilizing internal capital markets 
through intra-group loans. 
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difficult to have a clear separation of a treatment group and a control group. Furthermore, we 
compare the impacts of the CTS on the R&D-Capex difference. This third comparison allows us 
to control for firm-year level investment opportunities. This comparison is not feasible in studies 
in which firm-fixed effects and year-fixed effects are included separately. There is a concern in our 
research design regarding the first difference: given that CTS adoption is an individual business 
group’s choice, there exists a selection problem. We use an IV strategy to address the endogeneity. 
We discuss our identification strategy later in this subsection. 
   We have three units of analysis: parents, subsidiaries, and business groups. When the unit of 
analysis is business groups, we aggregate individual data items such as R&D expenses or assets 
across the parents, their partly-owned subsidiaries, and their wholly-owned subsidiaries. If we 
observe the impacts of the CTS on the total R&D of the business groups, a resource reallocation 
across business group members is not a major factor behind the impacts of the CTS on investments. 
In this case, we can argue that the CTS mitigates the loss offset constraint and in turn the 
investment distortions. Although we separately run regression using observations that consist of 
one of these three units in some analyses, business groups are the main unit of analysis in our paper. 
We construct two dummy variables to capture the impacts of CTS adoption: a CTS adoption 
dummy variable and a CTS effective adoption dummy variable. When the unit of analysis is 
subsidiaries or business groups, the dummy variable reflects the adoption decision of their parent 
companies. The CTS adoption dummy is a variable that indicates whether the firm or its parent 
has adopted the CTS. This variable captures the basic idea that business groups change investment 
behavior after adopting the CTS. 
Although the CTS adoption dummy appears to be a natural candidate of the regressor to 
examine the impacts of the CTS, there are two potential problems for using this variable. The first 
problem is that the CTS adoption dummy is directly related to the business group’ decision. 
Therefore, use of this variable causes endogeneity concerns. Second, business groups that are 
going to adopt the CTS in the near future might begin to restructure their investment plans before 
they actually adopt the CTS. In particular, high-risk activities are likely to be preceded by CTS 
adoption because it can take several years before those activities turn out to be unsuccessful and 
experience losses. In other words, it is necessary to capture the potential impacts of CTS adoption. 
We construct a CTS effective adoption dummy variable to capture the potential impacts of the 
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CTS. The CTS effective adoption dummy variable takes one in 2002 and afterwards if the firm or 
its parent adopts the CTS in any of the years between 2002 and 2012.26 Therefore, the CTS 
effective adoption dummy can capture the potential impacts of the CTS on investments in addition 
to the impacts from the actual adoption of the CTS on investments. In other words, the CTS 
effective adoption dummy assumes that the CTS is potentially effective from 2002 for all business 
groups that adopt the CTS in any of the years between 2002 and 2012. The CTS effective adoption 
dummy is not completely related to individual firms’ decisions to adopt the CTS. Therefore, we 
expect that the CTS effective adoption dummy is more exogenous than the CTS adoption dummy. 
   There remains a concern about endogeneity even when we use the CTS effective adoption 
dummy variable, because this variable reflects the business groups’ decisions. Therefore, the 
separation of the treatment group and the control group based on the CTS effective adoption 
dummy can be subject to a selection problem. 
We use an IV strategy to deal with the endogeneity. We construct instruments that reflect the 
likelihood of utilizing the loss offset provisions of the CTS as follows. We construct four dummy 
variables as instruments. Three of the instruments are dummy variables that take one if either of 
the following conditions are satisfied: i) the parents have positive income and at least one of their 
wholly-owned subsidiaries has past losses (PPSN dummy); ii) the parents have past losses and at 
least one of their wholly-owned subsidiaries has positive income (PNSP dummy); and iii) one of 
the business group’s wholly-owned subsidiaries has positive income and one of the business 
group’s wholly-owned subsidiaries has past losses (SPSN dummy). In addition to these three 
instruments, we construct the fourth instrument to capture the asymmetric treatment of past losses 
between parents and subsidiaries. We expect that parents’ past losses themselves are determinants 
of CTS adoption because past losses incurred before CTS adoption can be carried forward only 
when those losses are reported by parents. Therefore, iv) the fourth instrument is a dummy variable 
that takes one when the parents have past losses (PN dummy). We expect that these four 
instruments are positively associated with CTS adoption. 
   We evaluate these four dummy variables in 2001 in our main regression. Alternatively, we 
evaluate them in 2000 or 1999 to check the sensitivity of our findings in Section 6.3.1. The 
                                                     
26 For example, if the business group adopts the CTS in 2007, the CTS adoption dummy takes one in 2007 and 
afterwards, and the CTS effective adoption dummy takes one in 2002 and afterwards. 
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instruments take the value evaluated in 2001, which is zero or one, in 2002 and afterwards. In other 
words, all the instruments take zero up to 2001, and the instruments can take one in 2002 and 
afterwards. Note that the instruments constructed in this way do not explain the variation in the 
year of CTS adoption. This is a valid argument because the instruments are constructed so that 
they can explain the cross sectional variation in the control group and the treatment group to 
mitigate the selection problem. To construct the instruments, we use information of tax loss 
carryforwards for the parents’ past losses. We use after-tax profits aggregated across the previous 
five years to calculate the subsidiaries’ past losses because of a lack of data on tax losses at the 
subsidiaries’ level. We assume that the subsidiaries own past losses if the aggregated after-tax 
profits are negative. We also classify that the firms have positive income when the firms’ 
accumulated after-tax profits across the previous five years are positive. 
Potential concerns for the IV strategy are the weak instruments and the violation of the 
exclusion restriction. We examine the strength of the instruments by regressing the CTS effective 
adoption dummy concerning the instruments. For the concern on the exclusion restriction, we 
conduct overidentification tests. The null of the test is that the overidentifying restrictions are valid. 
In addition, we conduct a falsification test to address the concern that the instruments might capture 
factors that directly affect future high-risk investments. We use the data periods before the 
introduction of the CTS to examine whether the instruments predict future R&D activities. 
Insignificant estimates of the coefficients on the instruments suggest that these variables are not 
correlated with future high-risk investments except through their interaction with the tax treatment. 
As an additional robustness check against the exclusion restriction, we exclude some year periods 
after CTS adoption or the introduction of the CTS. The idea behind this test is that if firms adopt 
the CTS because they anticipate negative or positive future investment opportunities, the 
investments should be made in a relatively short time horizon. Therefore, we exclude observations 
in the year of the CTS adoption or the CTS introduction (i.e., year 2002), as well as those 
observations one year after the CTS adoption or the CTS introduction. 
   We turn to the explanation of regressands that measure investment risk. One of the main 
regressands is an R&D-Capex difference-to-assets ratio. The R&D-Capex difference is defined by 
R&D expenses minus capital expenditures. An increase in the R&D-Capex difference implies that 
the observations take higher risk in investments. We also use R&D expenses-to-assets ratio or 
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capital expenditures-to-assets ratio to test whether an increase in the R&D-Capex difference-to-
assets ratio is caused by an increase in R&D expenses or a decrease in capital expenditures. 
Furthermore, we use other R&D related variables as the regressand, taking advantages of unique 
data sets described in the next section. Specifically, we use expenditures for fixed tangible assets 
used for R&D and the number of employees engaging in R&D. The former captures physical 
capital investments in R&D and the latter captures human capital investments in R&D. Each of 
them is a component of R&D expenses. Using this detailed information on R&D, we can evaluate 
whether the CTS helps encourage high-risk investments through an increase in R&D physical 
capital or an increase in R&D human capital. The number of employees engaging in R&D is 
divided by the lagged number of total employees to interpret this variable as R&D human capital 
investment ratio. Other investment variables are normalized by lagged assets.  
We include cash flow and market to book ratio as control variables following the literature in 
the investment equation (Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988)). Cash flow or internal finance 
can be a determinant of investments when firms face financial constraints.27 The cash flow is 
normalized by lagged assets. Market-to-book ratio is defined by the sum of the firm’s market value 
of stocks and total liabilities divided by lagged assets. This variable measures investment 
opportunities that are observable to market participants. When the unit of analysis is subsidiaries, 
we do not observe their market to book ratio because most of them are unlisted. Thus, we include 
their parents’ market to book ratio in regression. Similarly, when the unit of analysis is the business 
groups, we use the parents’ market to book ratio as the regressor. We also include firm fixed effect 
to use a within-firm variation. We include year dummies to control for year-level macro shocks.28 
We use dynamic panel estimation techniques following the recent literature that recognizes 
high adjustment costs of R&D investments.29 We use the one-step system estimator (Arellano and 
                                                     
27 Brown, Martinsson, and Petersen (2012) report positive cash flow sensitivity of R&D investments. Our cash flow 
measure includes R&D expenses in addition to after-tax profits and depreciation to avoid a mechanical correlation 
between the R&D-Capex difference or R&D and the cash flow (Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen (2009)). 
28 When we instead include industry-year dummies, the estimates are almost the same with some signs of model 
misspecification based on Hansen test. Thus, we only include aggregated year dummies. 
29 For example, dynamic panel estimation is used in Bloom, Griffith, and Van Reenen (2002), Brown, Fazzari, and 
Petersen (2009), and Brown, Martinsson, and Petersen (2012). Survey articles also emphasize dynamic aspects of 
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Bover (1995); Blundell and Bond (1998)).30 We instrument the lagged level dated t-3 and t-4 with 
differences and instruments the lagged differences dated t-2 with levels. We also use lagged level 
dated t-4 and t-5 for the differenced equation and the lagged differences dated t-3 for the level 
equation to examine the sensitivity of our findings to different GMM lag structures. 31  We 
instrument both cash flow and market to book ratio in the same way. We report Hansen test statistic 
for overidentifying restrictions to examine the joint validity of instruments. We also report 
difference-in-Hansen statistic for the four instruments to examine the validity of this subset of 
instruments. We use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. The empirical specification 
is represented by equation (1) below when the unit of analysis is parents or business groups, and 
it is represented by equation (2) below when the unit of analysis is subsidiaries. 
 
𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑢𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡     (1) 
 
𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 × 𝑊𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑊𝑆𝑖𝑡 
                                          +𝛽5𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑢𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡     (2)  
 
where subscript i refers to firm, subscript t refers to year, invest represents investment variables 
(R&D expenses-to-asset ratio, R&D-Capex difference-to-assets ratio, capital expenditures-to-
assets ratio, R&D physical capital-to-assets ratio, or R&D employees-to-employees ratio), CTS 
represents either the CTS adoption dummy or the CTS effective adoption dummy, MB represents 
market-to-book ratio, CF represents cash flow, WS represents a wholly-owned subsidiary dummy, 
α represents firm fixed effect, u represents year fixed effect, and ε represents error term. 
   We instrument CTS dummies with the four instruments as we have explained in this subsection. 
                                                     
R&D (Hall (2002)). On the other hand, several related papers use a static framework to study R&D or innovation 
(Seru (2014); Tian and Wang (2014)). 
30 The system GMM jointly estimates the original (i.e., level) equation and the differenced equation, instrumenting 
levels with differences and instrumenting differences with levels. This framework allows us to address the dynamic 
panel biases that stem from the inclusion of the lagged dependent variables. 
31 Use of this lag length is common in the literature that concerns that the error terms can be serially correlated of 
order one as well as too many instruments problems (Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen (2009); Brown, Martinsson, and 
Petersen (2012)). 
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When the unit of analysis is subsidiaries, we treat the ownership structures as exogenous. 
Therefore, we instrument CTS×WO with the interaction of the four instruments with the wholly-
owned subsidiary dummy.32 
4. Data 
We describe our data sets in the first subsection of this section. In the second subsection, we present 
the summary statistics. 
4.1. Description of the data 
We use three data sets that cover information of Japanese corporations: the Basic Survey of 
Japanese Business Structure and Activities (BS data) collected annually by the Ministry of 
Economy, Trade, and Industry; Nikkei NEEDS FinancialQUEST (FQ data) collected by Nikkei 
Inc.; and hand-collected data concerning the CTS. 
Our primary data source is the BS data. We use the data between 1994 and 2012.33 The BS 
data have distinctive features for studying R&D. The data set covers publicly unavailable 
information about R&D activities. More specifically, the data report expenses for physical capital 
investments in R&D and the number of researchers firms hire. These pieces of information are not 
available in other widely used data sets such as Compustat.34 
   The BS data report the parent company’s stock code if the observation has a parent. In other 
                                                     
32 One might be concerned if this assumption on the exogeneity of ownership structures is justifiable, because business 
groups can have incentives to adjust ownership stakes to obtain tax benefits from the CTS. However, our data do not 
provide evidence that the CTS affects ownership structures. For example in 2012, the ratio of wholly-owned 
subsidiaries to total subsidiaries is 69.9% among CTS business groups, and it is 69.5% among non-CTS business 
groups. Because these two numbers are close each other, this observation suggests that the decision to adopt the CTS 
is not related to ownership structures. In other words, ownership structures are exogenously determined in relation to 
CTS adoption. Thus, we maintain the assumption that ownership is exogenous throughout this paper. 
33 The target of the BS data is firms with over 50 employees and 30 million yen of paid-in capital. The Ministry 
directly sends questionnaires to firms. Therefore, the data can cover information that is not disclosed on publicly-
available financial statements. In addition, the data cover both listed companies and unlisted companies. Data of 
unlisted firms are necessary for our study because wholly-owned subsidiaries cannot be listed companies. 
34 In addition, the BS data provide comprehensive information on R&D. According to the Survey of Research and 
Development conducted by the Japanese government, total R&D expenses spent by the corporate sector in 2012 are 
12.2 trillion yen. Total R&D expenses recoded in the BS data are 10.4 trillion yen in 2012, which takes account of 
85.2% of the total R&D expenses of this year. This high ratio helps us provide macro implications using the BS data. 
  
17 
 
 
words, the data sort out the parent-subsidiary relation based on the parents’ stock code. The BS 
data also report information on the ownership ratio of the parent companies when the observation 
has a parent. A caveat is that the data report only direct ownership ratio of the parent company. 
This data limitation can cause an analytical problem because the CTS applies to both directly, 
wholly-owned subsidiaries and to indirectly, wholly-owned subsidiaries. This limitation in data on 
indirect ownership is problematic when the unit of analysis is subsidiaries. However, this 
classification does not cause a problem when the unit of analysis is the entire business groups 
because we aggregated variables across parents and all of their subsidiaries. Because our main 
focus is the impacts of the CTS on business groups’ R&D, this potential misclassification in 
wholly-owned subsidiaries is not a major problem for our paper.  
The BS data lack some financial information. The FQ data provide complementary information 
of listed firms about stock price, stock outstanding, and tax loss carryforwards. The FQ data also 
provide information concerning whether the parent has adopted the CTS. However, the FQ data 
do not tell in which year the parent adopted the CTS. We look into individual firms’ financial 
statements to find the year of the individual firm’s CTS adoption. 
We describe the data screening process.35 We remove unlisted parents because we use their 
market value of stocks in the main analysis. Note that we do not remove unlisted subsidiaries. We 
eliminate firms in the financial industries since their investment behavior appears to be largely 
different from that of non-financial firms. All variables are winsorized at the 1% level and the 99% 
level year by year. 
4.2. Summary statistics 
We report the number of each type of firms in Table 1. Individual firms are classified into either 
parents or subsidiaries. We also separately report the number of wholly-owned subsidiaries. 
Parents are observations that own at least one subsidiary, and that are not another firm’s 
subsidiaries. In other words, parent companies in our analysis are located at the top of the business 
groups. Subsidiaries are observations that have parents that list their stocks. We define a CTS 
parent as a parent company that has adopted the CTS. We also define a CTS effective parent as a 
                                                     
35 We treat missing values as follows. We replace missing values with zero when the firms report only either missing 
values or zero during the entire data periods. We replace missing values or zeros with the average of the previous 
period’s value and the next period’s value. We treat the remaining zeros as missing values. 
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parent company that adopts the CTS in any of the years between 2002 and 2012.36 We use the 
terms CTS subsidiary, CTS effective subsidiary, CTS wholly-owned subsidiary, CTS effective 
wholly-owned subsidiary, CTS business group, and CTS effective business group in the same way. 
   Table 1 describes the number of each type of the firm-year observations. The first column 
reports the number of observations across the entire data periods. The second column reports the 
number of observations in 2002 and afterwards. Table 1 shows that average parents own 3.27 
(40383/12356) subsidiaries and average CTS parents own 10.16 (7119/701) subsidiaries. This 
comparison shows that CTS business groups are larger than non-CTS business groups. This 
observation is consistent with an argument that it is more likely for large business groups to have 
opportunities to offset losses with gains, and therefore these business groups are more likely to 
adopt the CTS. This table also shows that there is a considerable cross sectional variation in CTS 
adoption. When we restrict observations to those after 2002, the ratio of CTS effective parents to 
total parents is 16.8% and that of CTS effective subsidiaries to subsidiaries is 44.2%. Thus, this 
table suggests that the tax reform provides an experimental environment where we have a treatment 
group and a control group. 
Table 2 reports the summary statistics of individual variables by the unit of analysis.37 The 
first row of the table shows that R&D expenses-to-assets ratio among parents is over twice as large 
as that among subsidiaries.38 In contrast, subsidiaries are more capital intensive than parents. This 
finding about the comparison concerning capital expenditures between parents and subsidiaries is 
consistent with Masulis, Pham, and Zein (2011). In contrast, they provide evidence that 
subsidiaries face higher idiosyncratic risks. Their finding appears to be in contrast to ours, because 
we find that subsidiaries are less R&D intensive and therefore subsidiaries face lower idiosyncratic 
risks. The last row shows that parents are 19.3 times larger than subsidiaries on average. Therefore, 
parents are more R&D active than subsidiaries in the absolute sense as well as in the relative sense 
                                                     
36 For example, a parent that adopts the CTS in 2005 becomes a CTS parent in 2005, but the parent becomes a CTS 
effective parent in 2002, which is the year of the introduction of the CTS. 
37 The number of observations of R&D physical capital-to-assets ratio is smaller than that of others because the 
information of R&D physical capital is covered in the BS data only after 1997. Note also that the capital expenditures 
in our data set include only those in tangible assets, and they do not include expenditures in intangible assets. 
38 In addition, parents are more R&D intensive than subsidiaries according to other three measures of R&D: R&D-
Capex difference; R&D physical capital; and R&D human capital. 
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adjusted by firm size. This observation also implies that business groups’ total R&D intensity is 
mostly explained by the parents’ R&D intensity. Thus, from the economic perspective, 
investigating the impacts of the CTS on R&D among parents is more important than investigating 
the impacts among subsidiaries. 
5. Preliminary tests 
The following subsections provide four preliminary results to support our assumptions. In the first 
subsection, we provide evidence that R&D is associated with high-risk. This is an essential 
assumption to exploit the CTS as a test of the theory by Domar and Musgrave (1944). In the second 
subsection, we provide descriptive statistics to demonstrate that it is likely that the loss offset 
provisions of the CTS affect the groups’ total corporate tax liabilities. In other words, this 
subsection documents that the CTS can sufficiently mitigate the asymmetries in the tax code. In 
the third subsection, we provide evidence that the instruments explain the decision to adopt the 
CTS, by regressing the CTS effective adoption dummy on the instruments. In the fourth subsection, 
we provide evidence that the instruments do not violate the exclusion restriction in the framework 
of a falsification test. We use the data periods before the CTS introduction for this purpose. 
5.1. The riskiness of R&D 
This subsection tests our assumption that R&D involves high-risk. We follow estimation procedure 
by Kothari, Laguerre, and Leone (2002). The regressand is earnings volatility. This variable is 
defined by the standard deviation of after-tax ROA across the future five years. We include the log 
of assets and leverage as control variables following Kothari, Laguerre, and Leone (2002).39 We 
also include the industry-year dummy to absorb the economic shocks that are common at the 
industry-year levels. We use robust standard errors clustered at the industry-year levels. The 
empirical specification is represented by 
 
𝑆𝐷(𝐸𝑣𝑜𝑙)𝑖𝑡+1,𝑡+5 = 𝛽1𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑗𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡, 
 
                                                     
39 A rationale for including these two variables is that they can capture financing environments for firms. For example, 
large, less-leveraged firms can have better access to external capital markets, which in turn can reduce earnings 
volatility. Kothari, Laguerre, and Leone (2002) use the log of market capitalization to control for firm size. We use the 
log of assets instead because our data include unlisted companies. 
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where subscript i refers to firm, subscript t refers to year, subscript j refers to industry, SD(Evol) 
refers to future earnings volatility, invest represents investment variables in percentage (R&D 
expenses-to-assets ratio, R&D-Capex difference-to-assets ratio, capital expenditures-to-assets 
ratio, R&D physical capital-to-assets ratio, or R&D employees-to-employees ratio), lnast 
represents the natural log of assets, lev represents leverage, u represents industry-year fixed effect, 
and ε represents error term. 
Table 3 reports the estimation results. The unit of analysis is business groups. Each column 
uses a different investment ratio as the regressor. This table shows that both the R&D expenses-
to-assets ratio coefficients and the R&D-Capex difference-to-assets ratio coefficients are positive 
and significant. This result supports our premise that we can use these two variable as high-risk 
investment measures. In contrast, the capital expenditures-to-assets ratio coefficients are negative. 
This finding suggests that capital expenditures are not appropriate as investment risk measures. 
Both R&D physical capital-to-assets ratio coefficients and R&D employees-to-employees ratio 
coefficients are positive and significant as well. In terms of the economic significance, there exists 
a difference between them. Economic significance measured by the impact of one standard 
deviation change in R&D human capital investments is about twice as large as that in R&D 
physical capital investments. This result suggests that R&D human capital investments involve 
higher risk than R&D physical capital investments. This argument appears to be plausible given 
that hiring high-skilled workers require considerable commitments regarding wage payments as 
fixed costs, which in turn lead to higher earnings volatility.  
5.2. Loss offset provisions and corporate tax liabilities 
The CTS is a tax system that allows loss offsetting in business groups. It might be questionable, 
however, whether the loss offset provision can sufficiently reduce consolidated income so that the 
CTS can affect corporate risk-taking.40 
   According to tax statistics issued by the National Tax Agency, the consolidated taxable income 
in 2012 is 5.21 trillion yen across all the business groups that have adopted the CTS.41 If the 
                                                     
40 For example, one might be concerned that parents are considerably larger than subsidiaries in firm size, and 
therefore the absolute value of income between these two units is totally different. In this case, the impacts of loss 
offset across the parent and the subsidiaries is limited. 
41 The statistics are available at https://www.nta.go.jp/kohyo/press/press/2013/hojin_shinkoku/02.htm (in Japanese). 
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business groups were to file tax returns individually, the taxable income is 6.82 trillion yen 
according to the statistics. Therefore, the CTS reduces taxable income by 23.6% in 2012. Similarly, 
the CTS reduces taxable income by 39.2% (3.04 divided by 5.00) in 2011. 
   In our data sets, the average pre-tax ROA is 2.55% before the introduction of the CTS.42 
Therefore, the reduction in taxable income from the CTS-to-assets ratio is 0.602 (2.55×0.236) in 
2012, and it is one (2.55×0.392) in 2011. The average of these two numbers is 0.75. We use this 
value of 0.75% for a back-of-the-envelope calculation to provide an economic interpretation 
concering estimation results in the next section. For example, if the coefficients of R&D expenses-
to-assets ratio are close to 0.75, the reduction in taxable income of the CTS is almost identical to 
the increase in R&D expenses by the CTS.43 
5.3. The instruments and CTS adoption 
This subsection examines whether the instruments explain the cross sectional variation of the 
business groups’ decision to adopt the CTS. In other words, this section explores whether the 
instruments can effectively divide firms into the treatment group and the control group. We use the 
Probit model to examine the relationship between the CTS effective dummy and the four 
instruments. We restrict our observations in 2002 to test whether the instruments explain the cross 
sectional variation of CTS adoption. We use robust standard errors. 
 
𝐶𝑇𝑆𝑖 = 𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑁𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑁𝑆𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑁𝑆𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑁𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖    
 
where subscript i refers to firm, CTS represents the CTS effective adoption dummy, PPSN 
represents a dummy variable that takes one if the parents have positive income and one of their 
wholly-owned subsidiaries has past losses, PNSP represents a dummy variable that takes one if 
the parents have past losses and one of their wholly-owned subsidiaries has positive income, SNSP 
                                                     
42 We replace negative ROA with zero in this calculation of pre-tax ROA because the CTS reduces taxable income 
when the business groups report positive income. 
43 Suppose that the CTS reduces taxable income by100. This business group can receive a tax refund of 30 because 
of the CTS when the tax rate is 30%. If this business group spends 100 for R&D and this project turns out to be a 
failure ex post, the ex post tax refund from the CTS is 30. In this case, we can interpret that the CTS works as a subsidy 
for R&D. 
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represents a dummy variable that takes one if one of the business group’s wholly-owned 
subsidiaries has positive income and one of the business group’s wholly-owned subsidiaries has 
past losses, PN represents a dummy variable that takes one if the parents have past losses, and ε 
represents error term. 
   Table 4 reports the estimation results. Columns (1) – (4) include each instrument separately, 
and column (5) includes all the four instruments simultaneously. Column (1) – (4) show that all 
the coefficients are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. Column (5) shows that the 
statistical significance disappears for the PPSN dummy and the PNSP dummy, but these four 
coefficients are jointly significant with the F-statistics of 64.35. Therefore, the instruments are 
sufficiently strong to explain the variation in the decision to adopt the CTS, which enables us to 
use an experimental research design. 
5.4. Evidence that the instruments do not violate the exclusion restriction 
We turn to a discussion on the exclusion restriction. If the instruments capture some fundamental 
factors that directly affect future high-risk investments, the instruments are invalid. We conduct a 
falsification test by using the data periods before the introduction of the CTS. As long as business 
groups do not anticipate the legislation of the CTS, we can isolate the relationship between the 
instruments and future high-risk investments using these data periods. Therefore, this estimation 
works as a test to examine the exclusion restriction if this assumption is supported. 
We first provide descriptive evidence that it is unlikely that business groups anticipated the 
introduction of the CTS in some years before its legislation. We cite several newspaper articles 
from the Nikkei, which is a leading economic newspaper in Japan. The Nikkei reported on 
December 11, 1999 that the Japanese Government Tax Commission decided that they would not 
introduce the CTS before 2002. The Nikkei on November 22, 2001 reported an interview with the 
Minister of Finance that the Japanese government would aim to introduce the CTS in 2003. 
However, the Nikkei on November 27, 2001 reported that the Minister of Finance retracted his 
previous statement, and stated that the Japanese government might introduce the CTS in 2002. The 
Nikkei on December 15, 2001 reported that the ruling party decided to introduce the CTS in 2002. 
These statements demonstrate that it was difficult for business groups to anticipate CTS legislation 
before 2002. Because the legislation in 2002 was approved just before 2002, we can isolate the 
direct impacts of the instruments on high-risk investments using the data periods before CTS 
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legislation in this framework of falsification test. 
We use data periods up to 2001 for this test. The empirical specification basically follows 
model (1) in Section 3.2. The difference with this specification is that we replace the CTS dummy 
with the four instruments. The empirical specification is represented by 
 
𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑁𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑁𝑆𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑁𝑆𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑁𝑖𝑡−1 
+𝛽6𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑢𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡   
 
where subscript i refers to firm, subscript t refers to year, invest represents investment variables 
(R&D expenses-to-asset ratio or R&D-Capex difference-to-assets ratio), PPSN represents a 
dummy variable that takes one if the parents have positive income and one of their wholly-owned 
subsidiaries has past losses, PNSP represents a dummy variable that takes one if the parents have 
past losses and one of their wholly-owned subsidiaries has positive income, SNSP represents a 
dummy variable that takes one if one of the business group’s wholly-owned subsidiaries has 
positive income and one of the business group’s wholly-owned subsidiaries has past losses, PN 
represents a dummy variable that takes one if the parents have past losses, MB represents market-
to-book ratio, CF represents cash flow, α represents firm fixed effect, u represents year fixed effect, 
and ε represents error term.44 
Table 5 shows the estimation results. The unit of analysis is business groups. The regressand 
is R&D expenses-to-assets ratio in columns (1) – (2), and it is R&D-Capex difference-to-assets 
ratio in columns (3) – (4). The odd numbered models and the even numbered models are different 
in terms of the GMM lag length. 
All the coefficients on the instruments are insignificant when the regressand is R&D expenses-
to-assets ratio. In addition, the test for joint significance of the instruments provides evidence that 
the instruments do not jointly affect R&D, either. These results mitigate our concern on 
endogeneity in our main analysis. In column (3), the lagged PNSP dummy coefficient is 
statistically significant. However, the statistical significance disappears in column (4). These 
results from Table 5 provide support that the instruments are valid. We further discuss the validity 
                                                     
44 For parents’ past losses, we use accumulated accounting losses across the past five years instead of tax loss 
carryforwards due to a lack of the information data before 1999. 
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of the instruments in Section 6.3. 
6. Result 
This section presents the estimation results. The first two subsections respectively test whether the 
CTS encourages risk-taking and risk-sharing. In the third subsection, we conduct tests to provide 
further evidence that endogeneity does not cause a bias in the estimates. We also discuss the 
relationship between the CTS and R&D tax credit in this third subsection. 
6.1. Tax asymmetries and risk-taking 
6.1.1. R&D expenses 
Table 6 shows the estimation results when the regressand is the R&D expenses-to-assets ratio. The 
units of analysis of Panels A, B, and C are parents, subsidiaries, and business groups, respectively. 
Columns (1) – (4) use the CTS adoption dummy as the main regressor, and columns (5) – (8) use 
the CTS effective adoption dummy as the main regressor. The odd numbered models do not 
instrument the CTS dummies, and the even numbered models use the instruments for the CTS 
dummies. 
Panels A and C of Table 6 show that the coefficients on both the CTS adoption dummy and the 
CTS effective adoption dummy are positive and statistically significant among parent companies 
and business groups.45 This result implies that the CTS increases high-risk investments measured 
by R&D. 
   In Panel B, we observe positive coefficients of the CTS dummy among subsidiaries as well. 
However, we do not observe differences in the impacts between partly-owned subsidiaries and 
wholly-owned subsidiaries in most empirical specifications. This result appears to be inconsistent 
with the institutional details of the CTS, because the CTS applies to wholly-owned subsidiaries 
but does not apply to partly-owned subsidiaries.46 Note that if we include only the CTS dummies 
without the interaction term of the CTS dummies with the wholly-owned subsidiary dummy, we 
obtain positive and significant coefficients on the CTS dummies. Therefore, we find positive 
impacts of the CTS on R&D among subsidiaries as a whole. 
                                                     
45 The CTS effective adoption dummy coefficients are significant in both Panels A and C. This result suggests that 
business groups utilize the potential availability of the CTS as well as the actual loss offset effect of the CTS. 
46 This result might be attributable to the data limitation that we do not make a distinction between partly-owned 
subsidiaries and indirectly, wholly-owned subsidiaries. 
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The magnitude of the CTS dummy coefficients are economically significant as well.47 The 
smallest coefficients in Panel C when we instrument the CTS dummy are 0.429 in column (4).48 
This magnitude equals to 57.2% of the reduction in taxable income of the CTS-to-assets ratio 
(0.75%). This argument implies that mitigating tax asymmetries is an effective fiscal policy 
measures to encourage R&D. 
In all the columns in Table 6, the lagged R&D expenses-to-assets ratio coefficients are positive 
and significant. This finding suggests that it is important to consider adjustment costs of R&D to 
avoid an omitted variable bias as discussed by Hall (2002). We find positive cash flow sensitivity 
of R&D in all the columns. This is consistent with the finding by Brown, Martinsson, and Petersen 
(2012) that R&D investments are susceptible to financial constraints. Market to book ratio 
coefficients are positive and significant in some columns among parents, but the results are 
sensitive to the GMM lag structures.49 Mixed evidence about the impacts of market to book on 
R&D is also reported in Brown, Martinsson, and Petersen (2012).50 
6.1.2. R&D-Capex difference 
                                                     
47 Note that the magnitude of the CTS dummy coefficients in Panels A and C are close each other. This observation 
suggests that the impacts of the CTS are mostly determined by the impacts at the parents’ level. This result appears to 
be intuitive given that parents are considerably larger than subsidiaries, and therefore the impacts of the CTS among 
parents are a dominant factor to consider the impacts among business groups. 
48 The magnitude of the coefficients is smaller when we do not instrument the CTS dummies. For example, in Panel 
C, the CTS dummy coefficient is 0.212 in column (5) and it is 0.675 in column (6). This might be a consequence of 
the attenuation bias in OLS estimates because of measurement errors. A potential source of the measurement errors 
could be that business groups adopt the CTS because of a motivation that is not necessarily related to the loss offset 
provisions of the CTS such as relatively low administrative costs for filing consolidated tax returns. 
49 This unclear result on market to book ratio might be because it is not an adequate measure for investments in 
intangible assets. Alternatively, this might be a consequence of mismeasurement in investment equations (Almeida, 
Campello, and Galvo (2010)). 
50 We turn to a discussion on diagnostic tests. Although the tests do not support that all the empirical models are 
correctly specified, we argue that it does not cause a bias in estimates. For example, the diagnostic tests in column (8) 
across all the three panels in Table 6 report that both the Hansen test and the difference-in-Hansen test do not reject 
the validity of the overidentification restrictions. In addition, the test for autocorrelation does not reject the null of no 
third-order autocorrelation. Although we detect signs of model misspecification in some models, we argue that it is 
not a critical problem, because the CTS dummy coefficients are broadly comparable across all the columns when we 
instrument the CTS dummies. 
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The first three columns of Table 7 report the estimation results when the regressand is the R&D-
Capex difference-to-assets ratio. We only report the estimation results when we instrument CTS 
dummies and use the CTS effective adoption dummy as the main regressor. Columns (1) – (3) of 
this table show that all the CTS dummy coefficients are positive and significant.51 These results 
provide an additional support for our predication that the CTS encourages risk-taking among 
business groups, by showing that firm-year level investment opportunities do not affect our 
findings in Table 6.52 
The lagged dependent variable affects its current level of the R&D-Capex difference in all 
these three columns. Thus, the dynamic specification is appropriate. Neither the cash flow nor the 
market to book ratio has robust impacts on the R&D-Capex difference among parents or business 
groups. Among subsidiaries, cash flow is negatively associated with the R&D-Capex difference. 
These findings can be explained by the argument that cash flow increases both R&D and capital 
expenditures, but the relative impacts on these two types of investments are heterogeneous among 
different units of analysis. We discuss this possibility in the next subsection. 
6.1.3. Capital expenditures 
Columns (4) – (6) of Table 7 show the estimation results when the regressand is the capital 
expenditures-to-assets ratio. The table shows that none of the CTS dummy coefficients are positive 
and significant.53 This result provides support that the CTS affects only high-risk activities, given 
                                                     
51  In column (2), we do not observe significant differences in the impacts of the CTS between partly-owned 
subsidiaries and wholly-owned subsidiaries. 
52 Our estimation shows that the magnitude of CTS dummy coefficients is considerably larger in Table 7 than in Table 
6. When the unit of analysis is business groups, the magnitude of the CTS effective adoption dummy coefficient in 
column (3) of Table 7 is 2.48 times larger than that in column (6) of Table 6. This difference would reflect the 
difference in standard deviation of each variable. The standard deviation of R&D expenses-to-assets ratio is 2.22 and 
that of R&D-Capex difference-to-assets ratio is 4.16 among business groups. Therefore, the latter is 1.87 times larger 
than the former. Another possibility is that the CTS increases R&D and decreases capital expenditures at the same 
time. We provide support for this second argument in the next subsection. 
53 Although the CTS dummy coefficients in columns (4) - (6) are insignificant, the coefficients are negative. This 
finding provide an explanation concerning the large impacts of the CTS on the R&D-Capex difference, because the 
CTS can increase this difference by decreasing capital expenditures. In column (5), the coefficient of the interaction 
term of the CTS dummy with the wholly-owned dummy is negative and significant at the 10% level. An explanation 
of this finding is that subsidiaries use the budgets for capital expenditures to increase their R&D expenses. 
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that capital expenditures are not associated with earnings volatility in Table 3. 
   We find that lagged capital expenditures affect the current level of capital expenditures. The 
impacts of the lagged dependent variable are generally smaller in capital expenditures than in R&D 
expenses.54 This comparison suggests that adjustment costs are more important considerations in 
R&D investments than capital investments. The persistence in R&D across time is likely to be 
caused by the fact that a considerable portion of R&D expenses are used for wage payments for 
researchers. According to the Survey of Research and Development conducted by the Statistics 
Bureau of Japan in 2012, 42.4% of R&D expenses are used for labor costs. Because it is relatively 
difficult to frequently change wage payments or the number of employees engaging in R&D, R&D 
activities involve high adjustment costs. We provide support for this argument in the next section.55 
6.1.4. R&D physical capital and R&D human capital 
Columns (1) – (3) and (4) – (6) of Table 8 respectively report the estimation results when the 
regressand is the R&D physical capital-to-assets ratio or the R&D employees-to-employees ratio. 
Among parents, the CTS adoption has significant impacts on both of these two types of the R&D 
investments. Among business groups, the impacts of the CTS on R&D physical capital are 
statistically clear relative to those on R&D human capital. Among subsidiaries, the impacts of the 
CTS on both of the R&D investments are not clear. These results demonstrate that the impacts of 
the CTS on these two types of the R&D investments are different among different units of analysis. 
We further examine this aspect of the CTS in Section 6.2. 
                                                     
Alternatively, business groups might transfer the subsidiaries’ budgets for capital expenditures to their parents so that 
the parents can spend more expenses for R&D. This resource reallocation can be interpreted as evidence that business 
groups utilize internal capital markets in the business groups. This interpretation is consistent with the recent findings 
that business groups transfer resources in the business groups for investments (Almeida, Kim, and Kim (2015)). 
54 For example, the lagged dependent variable coefficient is 0.808 in column (6) of Panel C of Table 6, and it is 0.450 
in column (6) of Table 7. 
55 Table 7 shows that cash flow is positively associated with capital expenditures. The coefficient is particularly large 
among subsidiaries. This finding can explain that cash flow coefficient is negative in column (2) of Table 7. If the 
positive impacts of cash flow on capital expenditures are larger than that on R&D expenses, we observe negative 
coefficients on the R&D-Capex difference. In Table 7, there is a concern in the Hansen test statistics, because the test 
rejects the validity of the overidentification restrictions. Given that the main regressand in our paper is R&D expenses, 
we argue that this potential model misspecification does not affect our key findings. 
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   Another difference between Columns (1) – (3) and (4) – (6) is the magnitude of the lagged 
dependent variable coefficients. Among business groups, the coefficient of lagged R&D physical 
capital is 0.471 and that of lagged R&D human capital is 0.907. This contrast suggests that R&D 
human capital is more persistent than R&D physical capital. This argument is consistent with our 
argument that R&D human capital involves high adjustment costs. This finding provides rationale 
for the argument by Hall (2002) that R&D investments are persistent, given that a half of R&D 
expenses typically consists of those for human capital. 
6.2. Tax asymmetries and risk-sharing 
The previous subsection examines the impacts of the CTS on risk-taking based on the theory by 
Domar and Musgrave (1944). In this subsection, we test the possibility that the CTS enhances risk-
sharing. The first subsection examines risk-sharing among business group members. The second 
subsection explores risk-sharing by asset type. 
6.2.1. Risk-sharing among business group members 
In this subsection, we examine whether the CTS has heterogeneous impacts on risk-taking among 
business group members, which can be interpreted as risk-sharing in business groups. Specifically, 
we expect that the CTS has stronger impacts in one unit of business groups to diversity risk from 
R&D. Thus, we estimate model (1) using the disparity in investment ratio between the parents and 
their subsidiaries as the regressand. A larger disparity implies that business groups diversify risk. 
   Table 9 shows the estimation results. The unit of analysis is business groups. Column (1) shows 
that the CTS increases the disparity between R&D expenses-to-assets ratio between parents and 
subsidiaries. This finding supports that the CTS encourages business groups to share risks incurred 
through R&D. In contrast, column (2) shows that the CTS does not necessarily encourage risk-
sharing measured by the R&D-Capex difference. As column (3) shows, this result is caused by the 
effect of the CTS narrowing the difference in capital expenditures-to-assets ratio between parents 
and their subsidiaries. 
   Columns (4) - (5) show a contrasting result. Column (5) provides clear evidence that the CTS 
widens the disparity in R&D human capital, while column (4) shows that the impacts on the 
disparity in R&D physical capital are not statistically clear. There are several possible explanations 
behind this difference. First, from Table 3, R&D human capital involves higher-risk than R&D 
physical capital. Therefore, the CTS can have stronger effects on the former than on the latter, 
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because this change in investment policy allows business groups to have more opportunities to 
offset losses with gains. Second, this finding can be explained by the spillover effects of knowledge. 
Because knowledge spillover is largest within firms (Gomes-Casseres, Hagedoorn, and Jaffe 
(2006)), it is more effective for business groups to concentrate human capital in single units within 
the business groups. This factor leads to a wider disparity in R&D employees-to-employees ratio. 
6.2.2. Risk-sharing by asset types 
We examine whether the CTS encourages risk-sharing by asset types in this subsection. Our test 
takes advantages of time-series correlation of R&D physical capital investments and R&D human 
capital investments. Suppose that when one of them increases. If another of them also increases, 
we observe a positive time-series correlation between these two types of investments. On the other 
hand, if another type of investment decreases or it is unchanged, we observe a weakly negative 
correlation. We interpret the negative correlation as evidence of risk-sharing. We use year of 2002 
as the base year. For example, suppose that the average value of the R&D physical capital-to-assets 
ratio across the year periods up to 2001 is smaller than the average of the R&D physical capital-
to-assets ratio across the year periods after 2001, we make an interpretation that the business 
groups increase R&D physical capital-to-assets ratio. 
Columns (1) - (2) of Table 10 report the estimation results when the regressand is R&D 
physical capital-to-assets ratio. Column (1) shows the results when the business groups increase 
the R&D employees-to-employees ratio. The CTS dummy coefficient is not significant. Column 
(2) shows the results when business groups increase the R&D employees-to-employees ratio. The 
CTS dummy coefficient is statistically significant. These results suggest that business groups 
engage in risk-sharing by the asset types. Columns (3) - (4) of Table 10 confirms this result when 
the regressand is the R&D employees-to-employees ratio. We observe a positive coefficient of the 
CTS dummy in column (4) but not in column (3). This result also supports that the CTS encourages 
risk-sharing by asset types. 
6.3. Robustness and R&D tax credit 
A central concern of our research design is regarding the choice of the instruments for the CTS 
dummies. In the first subsection, we provide an additional support for our research design. We run 
regression excluding several year periods after the adoption of the CTS or the introduction of the 
CTS. In addition, we use years that are different from 2001 to evaluate the instruments. In the 
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second subsection, we discuss the relationship between the CTS and R&D tax credit. 
6.3.1. Robustness 
Table 11 shows the estimation results when we exclude some year periods. The regressand is R&D 
expenses-to-assets ratio. We report only the coefficients of the CTS dummies for brevity. The first 
row represents the original model from Table 6.56 The second row represents models that exclude 
the year of CTS adoption (columns (1) and (2)) or the year of the CTS introduction (columns (3) 
and (4)). The third row represents models that exclude one more year after the CTS adoption or 
the CTS introduction as well. 
   Table 11 demonstrates that all the coefficients are statistically significant. In addition, the 
magnitude of the coefficients is broadly comparable across all the models: the minimum coefficient 
is 0.429 and the maximum coefficient is 0.837. This finding from Table 11 supports that it is 
unlikely that unobservable high-risk investment opportunities are the factor that causes the 
correlation between the CTS and R&D, which mitigates our concern in endogeneity.  
   Table 12 reports the estimation results when we use another year as the base year to evaluate 
the instruments. Like Table 11, we only report coefficients of CTS dummies. The first row 
represents the original model from Table 6 where we construct instruments using information 
evaluated in 2001. The second row and the third row respectively use 2000 or 1999 as the year to 
evaluate the instruments. 
   Table 12 shows that all the coefficients are statistically significant. It is noteworthy that the 
magnitude of the coefficients are smaller when we use older lag. The smallest coefficient of R&D 
expenses-to-assets ratio is 0.289 in column (2). Even this smallest coefficient amounts to 38.5% 
of the reduction in taxable income from the CTS-to-assets ratio (0.75%). Therefore, we obtain 
robust evidence that the CTS increases R&D and the impacts are economically significant. 
6.3.2. R&D tax credit 
A potential concern in our estimation results is that these findings are not caused by the CTS but 
they are attributable to the R&D tax credits. This concern is mitigated by the tax design where the 
R&D tax credit is applied to all firms and we include year-fixed effect in the regression. Therefore, 
we need not worry about the influence of the R&D tax credit as long as its impacts are homogenous 
                                                     
56 Columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) in Panel C of Table 6 respectively correspond to columns (1), (2), (3), and (4) in Table 
11. 
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across firms in the same year. However, this may not be a valid argument because CTS adoption 
affects the calculation of the tax credit limit. As previously discussed, when business groups adopt 
the CTS, the tax credit limit is calculated based on the consolidated tax payments across the parents 
and their wholly-owned subsidiaries. Thus, CTS adoption can have impacts that are interacted with 
the R&D tax credits. In this subsection, we examine this issue. 
The R&D tax credit system in Japan exhibits a time-series variation. However, between 2006 
and 2012, the credit rate of both the incremental system and the volume system are unchanged. In 
contrast, the credit limit experienced changes during these year periods. The credit limit is 20% of 
corporate tax liabilities in 2006-2007, 30% in 2008 and 2012, and 40% in 2009-2011. Since only 
credit limit is affected by CTS adoption, we can examine whether the CTS has interacted impacts 
with the R&D tax credit by comparing the impacts of the CTS across years. If this interacted 
impact is observed, the order of its magnitude should be as follows: 2009-2011; 2008 and 2012; 
and 2006-2007. 
We test this prediction by including interaction terms of the CTS dummy variables with a credit 
limit 20% dummy, a credit limit 30% dummy, and a credit limit 40% dummy, where each of the 
credit limit dummies takes one during the relevant year periods. We instrument each of the 
interaction terms by the interaction of the four instruments with the relevant year period dummies. 
The empirical specification is represented by the following equation. 
 
𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 × 𝐶𝐿20𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 × 𝐶𝐿30𝑡 
+𝛽5𝐶𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 × 𝐶𝐿40𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑢𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡  
 
where subscript i refers to firm, subscript t refers to year, invest represents R&D expenses-to-assets 
ratio, CTS represents the CTS effective adoption dummy, CL20-CL40 represent dummy variables 
that take one in the year periods when the credit limit is the number indicated after CL (for example 
20), MB represents market-to-book ratio, CF represents cash flow, α represents firm fixed effect, 
u represents year fixed effect, and ε represents error term. 
   Table 13 reports the estimation results. Most of the coefficients of the interaction terms are not 
different from the base coefficients of the CTS effective dummy. This result suggests that the 
different treatment in the R&D tax credit between CTS business groups and non-CTS business 
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groups do not affect R&D. The interaction term with the credit limit of 40% dummy coefficients 
are smallest compared to other interaction terms. A reason behind this finding may be that the CTS 
considerably reduces the consolidated corporate tax liabilities of the business groups. As a result, 
the credit limit of the business groups is reduced. These findings suggest that the loss offset 
provisions rather than R&D tax credit are the reason behind the impacts of the CTS on R&D. 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we test whether mitigating corporate tax asymmetries reduces disincentives in high-
risk investments. Although considerable research has been devoted to the examination of 
theoretical aspects, few studies provide direct evidence for this theory. We use the Japanese 
consolidated taxation system (CTS) in 2002 as a natural experiment. The CTS provides business 
groups the rights to offset losses with gains in the business groups, which in turn can mitigate the 
tax asymmetries. Thus, the CTS can reduce investment distortions in high-risk activities. 
   We use a difference-in-differences approach and a triple-differences approach for identification. 
We also instrument the decision to adopt the CTS based on individual business groups’ past 
information that captures potential tax benefits from adopting the CTS. We provide evidence that 
the CTS increases high-risk investments measured by information on R&D. This finding is 
consistent with the theoretical predictions since Domar and Musgrave (1944). 
   We use this tax reform to further test the prediction that the CTS enhances risk-sharing among 
the business group members. We first find that the CTS widens the disparity in R&D between the 
parents and their subsidiaries. We also find that the CTS tends to increase either R&D physical 
capital investments or R&D human capital investments. We interpret this finding as evidence that 
business groups engage in risk-sharing, taking advantages of the loss offset provisions of the CTS. 
Our findings suggest that mitigating corporate tax asymmetries is an effective policy to 
encourage R&D. This proposal provides a new insight on the policy debate concerning how 
governments can encourage R&D. Our findings also provide a rationale for the group loss offset 
provisions because these provisions can encourage both risk-taking and risk-sharing. Dreβler and 
Overesch (2013) report that 22 of the 41 countries in their data sets introduced business group 
taxation in 1996, and the number increased to 27 in 2007. Thus, our findings have broad 
implications on policy discussions about business group taxation in other countries as well. 
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Table 1 
The number of observations 
This table reports the number of observations of each type of firms. The data periods are between 1994 and 2012. We 
report the total number of observations and those observations after 2002 separately. Parents are observations that own 
at least one subsidiary, and that are not another firm’s subsidiaries. Subsidiaries are observations that have parents that 
list their stocks. Wholly-owned subsidiaries are subsidiaries whose stakes are completely held by their parents. 
Business groups consist of parents and their subsidiaries. CTS parents are parents that have adopted the CTS. CTS 
effective parents are parents that adopt the CTS in any of the years between 2002 and 2012. For example, a parent that 
adopts the CTS in 2005 becomes a CTS parent in 2005, but the parent becomes a CTS effective parent in 2002, which 
is the year of the introduction of the CTS. We use the terms CTS subsidiary, CTS effective subsidiary, CTS wholly-
owned subsidiary, CTS effective wholly-owned subsidiary, CTS business group, and CTS effective business group in 
the same way. 
  Total After 2002 
Parent (Business group) 12356  8301  
CTS parent (business group) 701  
CTS effective parent (business group) 1395  
Subsidiary 40383  27625  
Wholly-owned subsidiary 25769  18398  
CTS subsidiary 7119  
CTS effective subsidiary 12205  
CTS wholly-owned subsidiary 4649  
CTS effective wholly-owned subsidiary 8199  
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Table 2 
Summary statistics 
This table separately reports the summary statistics among parents, among subsidiaries, and among business groups. The data periods are between 
1994 and 2012. R&D expenses-to-assets ratio is R&D expenses divided by lagged assets in percentage, R&D-Capex difference-to-assets ratio 
is R&D expense minus capital expenditures divided by lagged assets in percentage, R&D physical capital-to-assets ratio is expenses for physical 
capital investments in R&D divided by lagged assets in percentage, R&D employees-to-employees ratio is the number of employees engaging 
in R&D divided by the lagged number of total employees in percentage, capital expenditures-to-assets ratio is capital expenditures divided by 
lagged assets in percentage, CTS adoption dummy is a dummy variable that takes one when the firms or the firms’ parents adopt the CTS, CTS 
effective adoption dummy is a dummy variable that takes one in 2002 and afterwards if the firms or the firms’ parents adopt the CTS in any of 
the years between 2002 and 2012, market to book ratio is market value of stock plus total liabilities divided by lagged assets, cash flow is after-
tax profits plus depreciation expenses plus R&D expenses divided by lagged assets in percentage, and asset value is the book value of total assets. 
We use the parent’s market to book ratio when the unit of analysis is subsidiaries or business groups. 
  Parent Subsidiary Business group 
  Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N 
R&D expenses-to-assets ratio 2.09  2.29  12356 0.97  2.33  40383 2.00  2.22  12356 
R&D-Capex difference-to-assets ratio -1.52  4.07  12193 -3.78  7.37  37469 -1.75  4.16  12193 
R&D physical capital-to-assets ratio 0.20  0.35  8467 0.06  0.23  26537 0.19  0.33  8467 
R&D employees-to-employees ratio 8.50  10.72  11960 3.27  7.59  38398 7.24  8.71  11960 
Capital expenditures-to-assets ratio 3.61  3.60  12193 4.81  7.16  37469 3.75  3.82  12193 
CTS adoption dummy (after 2002) 0.08 0.28 8301 0.26  0.44  27625 0.08 0.28 8301 
CTS effective adoption dummy (after 2002) 0.17 0.37 8301 0.44  0.50  27625 0.17 0.37 8301 
Market to book ratio 1.15  0.52  12356 1.31  0.50  40383 1.15  0.52  12356 
Cash flow 6.32  5.28  12356 6.72  8.01  40383 6.37  5.38  12356 
Asset value (billion yen) 289  822  12356  15  45  40383 344  1002  12356  
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Table 3 
The riskiness of R&D 
This table presents the estimation results to examine whether R&D is associated with future earnings volatility. The data periods are between 
1994 and 2012. The unit of analysis is business groups. We use OLS for estimation. The regressand is earnings volatility that is the standard 
deviation of after-tax ROA across the future five years. The regressors are either R&D expenses-to-assets ratio that is R&D expenses divided by 
lagged assets in percentage, R&D-Capex difference-to-assets ratio that is R&D expense minus capital expenditures divided by lagged assets in 
percentage, R&D physical capital-to-assets ratio that is expenses for physical capital investments in R&D divided by lagged assets in percentage, 
R&D employees-to-employees ratio that is the number of employees engaging in R&D divided by the lagged number of total employees in 
percentage, or capital expenditures-to-assets ratio that is capital expenditures divided by lagged assets in percentage. All the columns include 
Ln(assets) that is natural log of assets and leverage that is total liabilities divided by lagged assets in percentage as regressors. We include 
industry-year dummy in all columns. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the industry-year-level. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Volatility of future five-year after tax profit 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
R&D expenses-to-assets ratio 
0.109***     
(0.025)     
R&D-Capex difference-to-assets ratio 
 0.036***    
 (0.010)    
R&D physical capital-to-assets ratio 
  0.240**   
  (0.118)   
R&D employees-to-employees ratio 
   0.018***  
   (0.006)  
Capital expenditures-to-assets ratio 
    -0.019* 
    (0.011) 
Ln(assets) 
-0.222*** -0.193*** -0.137*** -0.183*** -0.187*** 
(0.029) (0.028) (0.031) (0.029) (0.028) 
Leverage 
0.007*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Industry-year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7464 7423 5796 7241 7423 
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Table 4 
The instruments and CTS adoption 
This table presents the estimation results to examine whether the instruments can explain the business groups’ decision 
to adopt the CTS. We use the data in 2002. The unit of analysis is business groups. We use the Probit model for 
estimation. The regressand is the CTS effective adoption dummy that is a dummy variable that takes one if the business 
groups adopt the CTS in any of the years between 2002 and 2012. The regressors are PPSN dummy that is a dummy 
variable that takes one if the parents have positive income and one of their wholly-owned subsidiaries has past losses, 
PNSP dummy that is a dummy variable that takes one if the parents have past losses and one of their wholly-owned 
subsidiaries has positive income, SNSP dummy that is a dummy variable that takes one if one of the business group’s 
wholly-owned subsidiaries has positive income and one of the business group’s wholly-owned subsidiaries has past 
losses, and PN dummy that is a dummy variable that takes one if the parents have past losses. We classify that the 
firms have positive income when these firms’ accumulated after-tax profits across the previous five years are positive. 
We use information of tax loss carryforwards for the parents’ past losses. We use after-tax profits aggregated across 
the previous five years to calculate the subsidiaries’ past losses. These four dummy variables used as regressors are 
evaluated in 2001. We use robust standard errors that are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  CTS effective adoption dummy 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
PPSN dummy 
0.586***    0.130 
(0.125)    (0.170) 
PNSP dummy 
 0.752***   0.192 
 (0.111)   (0.170) 
SPSN dummy 
  0.867***  0.632*** 
  (0.116)  (0.189) 
PN dummy 
   0.653*** 0.467*** 
   (0.131) (0.154) 
Observations 762 762 762 762 762 
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Table 5 
Falsification test: Exclusion restriction 
This table presents the estimation results to examine whether the instruments do not violate the exclusion restriction. 
The data periods are between 1994 and 2001. The unit of analysis is business groups. We use the one-step system 
GMM for estimation. The regressand is either R&D expenses-to-assets ratio that is R&D expenses divided by lagged 
assets in percentage or R&D-Capex difference-to-assets ratio that is R&D expense minus capital expenditures divided 
by lagged assets in percentage. The regressors are PPSN dummy that is a dummy variable that takes one if the parents 
have positive income and one of their wholly-owned subsidiaries has past losses, PNSP dummy that is a dummy 
variable that takes one if the parents have past losses and one of their wholly-owned subsidiaries has positive income, 
SNSP dummy that is a dummy variable that takes one if one of the business group’s wholly-owned subsidiaries has 
positive income and one of the business group’s wholly-owned subsidiaries has past losses, and PN dummy that is a 
dummy variable that takes one if the parents have past losses. We use one-year lagged variables for these four dummy 
variables in regression. We use after-tax profits aggregated across the previous five years to calculate the positive 
income and the past losses. We include one year lagged dependent variables. We also include market to book ratio that 
is market value of stock plus total liabilities divided by lagged assets and cash flow that is after-tax profits plus 
depreciation expenses plus R&D expenses divided by lagged assets in percentage as regressors. We include firm-fixed 
effects and year dummy in all columns. GMM lag 3 to 4 refers to the models where we use lagged level dated t-3 and 
t-4 for the differenced equation and the lagged differences dated t-2 for the level equation as the GMM instruments. 
GMM lag 4 to 5 can be interpreted in a similar way. Joint significance p-value is the p-value of the test for the joint 
significance of the four instruments. Hansen p-value is the p-value of the Hansen test for overidentifying restrictions. 
AR 1 p-value, AR 2 p-value, and AR 3 p-value respectively report the p-value from the test of no first-order, second-
order, or third-order autocorrelation on the differenced residuals. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered 
at the firm-level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  R&D expenses-to-assets ratio 
R&D-Capex difference-to-
assets ratio 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lagged PPSN dummy 
-0.008 0.035 -0.300 -0.104 
(0.067) (0.071) (0.278) (0.285) 
Lagged PNSP dummy 
0.058 0.011 0.556** 0.399 
(0.064) (0.051) (0.278) (0.261) 
Lagged SPSN dummy 
0.120 -0.004 0.360 0.141 
(0.088) (0.074) (0.267) (0.281) 
Lagged PN dummy 
-0.067 0.137 0.047 0.168 
(0.121) (0.139) (0.421) (0.624) 
Lagged dependent variable 
0.768*** 0.910*** 0.416*** 0.669*** 
(0.078) (0.057) (0.098) (0.155) 
Market to book ratio 
0.013 -0.076 0.072 -0.758 
(0.149) (0.185) (0.339) (0.711) 
Cash flow 
0.037 0.057 0.010 0.105 
(0.039) (0.036) (0.090) (0.162) 
Firm-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
GMM lag 3 to 4 4 to 5 3 to 4 4 to 5 
Observations 4055 4055 4054 4054 
Joint significance p-value 0.473  0.211  0.175  0.317  
Hansen p-value 0.565 0.404 0.003 0.030 
AR 1 p-value 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
AR 2 p-value 0.241 0.227 0.059 0.018 
AR 3 p-value 0.930 0.993 0.606 0.445 
  
  
38 
 
 
Table 6 
The CTS and R&D 
This table presents the estimation results to examine whether the CTS increases R&D expenses. The data periods are between 1994 and 2012. 
We report the estimation results when the units of analysis are parents, subsidiaries, and business groups respectively in Panels A, B, and C. We 
use the one-step system GMM for estimation. The regressand is R&D expenses-to-assets ratio that is R&D expenses divided by lagged assets in 
percentage. The main regressor is either the CTS adoption dummy that is a dummy variable that takes one when the firms or the firms’ parents 
adopt the CTS or the CTS effective adoption dummy that is a dummy variable that takes one in 2002 and afterwards if the firms or the firms’ 
parents adopt the CTS in any of the years between 2002 and 2012. We instrument the CTS dummies with the following four instruments in some 
empirical specifications: PPSN dummy that is a dummy variable that takes one if the parents have positive income and one of their wholly-
owned subsidiaries has past losses; PNSP dummy that is a dummy variable that takes one if the parents have past losses and one of their wholly-
owned subsidiaries has positive income; SNSP dummy that is a dummy variable that takes one if one of the business group’s wholly-owned 
subsidiaries has positive income and one of the business group’s wholly-owned subsidiaries has past losses; and PN dummy that is a dummy 
variable that takes one if the parents have past losses. We classify that the firms have positive income when these firms’ accumulated after-tax 
profits across the previous five years are positive. We use information of tax loss carryforwards for the parents’ past losses. We use after-tax 
profits aggregated across the previous five years to calculate the subsidiaries’ past losses. The instruments take zero up to 2001, and they take 
the value evaluated in the year of 2001 in 2002 and afterwards. We include one year lagged dependent variables. We also include market to book 
ratio that is market value of stock plus total liabilities divided by lagged assets and cash flow that is after-tax profits plus depreciation expenses 
plus R&D expenses divided by lagged assets in percentage as regressors. We use the parent’s market to book ratio when the unit of analysis is 
subsidiaries or business groups. When the unit of analysis is subsidiaries, we include wholly-owned dummy that is a dummy variable that takes 
one if the subsidiaries stocks are completely held by their parents, and we include the interaction of the CTS dummies with the wholly-owned 
dummy. We include firm-fixed effects and year dummy in all columns. GMM lag 3 to 4 refers to the models where we use lagged level dated t-
3 and t-4 for the differenced equation and the lagged differences dated t-2 for the level equation as the GMM instruments. GMM lag 4 to 5 can 
be interpreted in a similar way. Hansen p-value is the p-value of the Hansen test for overidentifying restrictions. Diff-in-Hansen p-value is the p-
value of the difference-in-Hansen test to examine the validity of the four instruments. AR 1 p-value, AR 2 p-value, and AR 3 p-value respectively 
report the p-value from the test of no first-order, second-order, or third-order autocorrelation on the differenced residuals. Standard errors reported 
in parentheses are clustered at the firm-level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Continued-Table 6 
  Panel A: Parent 
 R&D expenses-to-assets ratio 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CTS adoption dummy 
0.103*** 0.669*** 0.083** 0.590***     
(0.040) (0.208) (0.041) (0.196)     
CTS effective adoption 
dummy 
    0.162*** 0.627*** 0.142*** 0.507*** 
    (0.037) (0.133) (0.041) (0.141) 
Lagged R&D expenses-to-
assets ratio 
0.894*** 0.893*** 0.893*** 0.892*** 0.882*** 0.860*** 0.884*** 0.868*** 
(0.022) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.023) (0.024) (0.026) (0.029) 
Market to book ratio 
0.051 0.056 0.210*** 0.198*** 0.044 0.033 0.202*** 0.166*** 
(0.063) (0.057) (0.069) (0.064) (0.063) (0.057) (0.069) (0.064) 
Cash flow 
0.034*** 0.030*** 0.022* 0.022** 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.024** 0.030*** 
(0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) 
Firm-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
GMM lag 3 to 4 3 to 4 4 to 5 4 to 5 3 to 4 3 to 4 4 to 5 4 to 5 
CTS dummy instrumented? No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 12356 12356 12356 12356 12356 12356 12356 12356 
Hansen p-value 0.011 0.042 0.209 0.303 0.009 0.027 0.188 0.237 
Diff-in-Hansen p-value  0.848   0.433   0.414   0.801  
AR 1 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR 2 p-value 0.066 0.068 0.038 0.042 0.074 0.094 0.042 0.056 
AR 3 p-value 0.658 0.668 0.766 0.754 0.639 0.610 0.747 0.691 
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Continued-Table 6 
  Panel B: Subsidiary 
 R&D expenses-to-assets ratio 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CTS adoption dummy×Wholly-
owned dummy 
-0.058 0.021 -0.049 0.018         
(0.038) (0.074) (0.031) (0.065)     
CTS adoption dummy 
0.112*** 0.255*** 0.086*** 0.176***     
(0.037) (0.076) (0.030) (0.066)     
CTS effective adoption 
dummy×Wholly-owned dummy 
    -0.063** 0.003 -0.046* 0.013 
    (0.032) (0.049) (0.026) (0.042) 
CTS effective adoption dummy 
    0.104*** 0.236*** 0.074*** 0.172*** 
    (0.032) (0.063) (0.026) (0.055) 
Lagged R&D expenses-to-assets 
ratio 
0.777*** 0.786*** 0.836*** 0.842*** 0.776*** 0.782*** 0.835*** 0.836*** 
(0.035) (0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) 
Wholly-owned dummy 
-0.047*** -0.055*** -0.031** -0.039** -0.041*** -0.059*** -0.027** -0.045*** 
(0.015) (0.018) (0.013) (0.016) (0.015) (0.019) (0.013) (0.017) 
Market to book ratio 
0.011 0.010 0.011 0.004 0.006 -0.013 0.007 -0.019 
(0.034) (0.032) (0.037) (0.034) (0.034) (0.032) (0.037) (0.035) 
Cash flow 
0.044*** 0.040*** 0.026** 0.025*** 0.045*** 0.042*** 0.026** 0.027*** 
(0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) 
Firm-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
GMM lag 3 to 4 3 to 4 4 to 5 4 to 5 3 to 4 3 to 4 4 to 5 4 to 5 
CTS dummy instrumented? No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 40383 40383 40383 40383 40383 40383 40383 40383 
Hansen p-value 0.150 0.202 0.081 0.118 0.159 0.226 0.088 0.145 
Diff-in-Hansen p-value  0.997   0.947   0.992   0.961  
AR 1 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR 2 p-value 0.085 0.075 0.040 0.039 0.087 0.081 0.040 0.042 
AR 3 p-value 0.701 0.708 0.734 0.731 0.694 0.690 0.728 0.716 
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Continued-Table 6 
  Panel C: Business group 
 R&D expenses-to-assets ratio 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CTS adoption dummy 
0.150** 0.611** 0.076** 0.429***     
(0.059) (0.253) (0.033) (0.159)     
CTS effective adoption 
dummy 
    0.212*** 0.675*** 0.125*** 0.452*** 
    (0.064) (0.169) (0.038) (0.133) 
Lagged R&D expenses-to-
assets ratio 
0.838*** 0.849*** 0.904*** 0.904*** 0.826*** 0.808*** 0.894*** 0.876*** 
(0.052) (0.049) (0.027) (0.025) (0.053) (0.052) (0.029) (0.032) 
Market to book ratio 
-0.091 -0.047 0.093 0.095 -0.096 -0.075 0.086 0.064 
(0.103) (0.084) (0.082) (0.071) (0.103) (0.087) (0.082) (0.071) 
Cash flow 
0.075** 0.061** 0.032** 0.029*** 0.077** 0.070*** 0.034** 0.037*** 
(0.032) (0.025) (0.014) (0.010) (0.032) (0.026) (0.014) (0.011) 
Firm-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
GMM lag 3 to 4 3 to 4 4 to 5 4 to 5 3 to 4 3 to 4 4 to 5 4 to 5 
CTS dummy instrumented? No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 12356 12356 12356 12356 12356 12356 12356 12356 
Hansen p-value 0.113 0.118 0.300 0.376 0.100 0.194 0.302 0.420 
Diff-in-Hansen p-value  0.901   0.720   0.284   0.704  
AR 1 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR 2 p-value 0.049 0.044 0.019 0.020 0.053 0.054 0.020 0.022 
AR 3 p-value 0.717 0.692 0.584 0.592 0.727 0.723 0.590 0.612 
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Table 7 
The CTS and R&D-Capex difference or the CTS and capital expenditures 
This table presents the estimation results to examine whether the CTS increases R&D-Capex difference or capital expenditures. The units of 
analysis are either parents, subsidiaries, or business groups. The regressand is either R&D-Capex difference-to-assets ratio that is R&D expense 
minus capital expenditures divided by lagged assets in percentage or capital expenditures-to-assets ratio that is capital expenditures divided by 
lagged assets in percentage. See Table 6 for the estimation procedures as well as variable definitions. 
  Parent Subsidiary Business group Parent Subsidiary Business group 
 R&D-Capex difference-to-assets ratio Capital expenditures-to-assets ratio 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CTS effective adoption dummy 
1.854*** 0.627** 1.674*** -0.242 -0.233 -0.116 
(0.454) (0.281) (0.470) (0.311) (0.262) (0.352) 
CTS effective adoption 
dummy×Wholly-owned dummy 
 0.318   -0.403*  
 (0.237)   (0.224)  
Lagged dependent variable 
0.560*** 0.567*** 0.532*** 0.498*** 0.519*** 0.450*** 
(0.043) (0.038) (0.054) (0.046) (0.040) (0.056) 
Market to book ratio 
0.148 -0.081 -0.032 -0.059 0.110 0.112 
(0.213) (0.203) (0.243) (0.197) (0.204) (0.238) 
Cash flow 
0.014 -0.102*** 0.041 0.099*** 0.194*** 0.081** 
(0.033) (0.037) (0.040) (0.031) (0.038) (0.037) 
Wholly-owned dummy 
 -0.317***   0.239**  
 (0.104)   (0.097)  
Firm-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
GMM lag 3 to 4 3 to 4 3 to 4 3 to 4 3 to 4 3 to 4 
CTS dummy instrumented? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12193 37469 12193 12193 37469 12193 
Hansen p-value 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Diff-in-Hansen p-value 0.167  0.103  0.062  0.026  0.107  0.014  
AR 1 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR 2 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR 3 p-value 0.589 0.176 0.741 0.547 0.194 0.593 
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Table 8 
The CTS and R&D physical capital or the CTS and R&D human capital 
This table presents the estimation results to examine whether the CTS increases R&D physical capital or R&D human capital. The units of 
analysis are either parents, subsidiaries, or business groups. The regressand is either R&D physical capital-to-assets ratio that is expenses for 
physical capital investments in R&D divided by lagged assets in percentage or R&D employees-to-employees ratio that is the number of 
employees engaging in R&D divided by the lagged number of total employees in percentage. See Table 6 for the estimation procedures as well 
as variable definitions. 
  Parent Subsidiary Business group Parent Subsidiary Business group 
 R&D physical capital-to-assets ratio  R&D employees-to-employees ratio 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CTS effective adoption dummy 
0.083** 0.015* 0.073** 1.138** 0.144 0.614* 
(0.036) (0.009) (0.035) (0.559) (0.124) (0.364) 
CTS effective adoption 
dummy×Wholly-owned dummy 
 0.004   0.089  
 (0.007)   (0.104)  
Lagged dependent variable 
0.481*** 0.720*** 0.471*** 0.905*** 0.926*** 0.907*** 
(0.050) (0.053) (0.053) (0.034) (0.025) (0.027) 
Market to book ratio 
0.044** -0.007 0.049** 0.664** 0.156* 0.254 
(0.022) (0.007) (0.023) (0.336) (0.086) (0.247) 
Cash flow 
0.016*** 0.007*** 0.015*** 0.087 0.041** 0.086* 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.053) (0.021) (0.047) 
Wholly-owned dummy 
 -0.009***   -0.110**  
 (0.003)   (0.051)  
Firm-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
GMM lag 3 to 4 3 to 4 3 to 4 3 to 4 3 to 4 3 to 4 
CTS dummy instrumented? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8467 26537 8467 11960 38398 11960 
Hansen p-value 0.053 0.563 0.070 0.803 0.413 0.773 
Diff-in-Hansen p-value 0.498  0.263  0.524  0.920  0.872  0.986  
AR 1 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR 2 p-value 0.195 0.000 0.136 0.019 0.086 0.059 
AR 3 p-value 0.464 0.462 0.771 0.708 0.243 0.471 
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Table 9 
The CTS and risk-sharing among business group members 
This table presents the estimation results to examine whether the CTS encourages risk-sharing among business group members. The data periods 
are between 1994 and 2012. The unit of analysis is business groups. We use the one-step system GMM for estimation. We respectively report 
the estimation results when the regressand is the differences in the following five variables between the parents and their subsidiaries: R&D 
expenses-to-assets ratio that is R&D expenses divided by lagged assets in percentage, R&D-Capex difference-to-assets ratio that is R&D expense 
minus capital expenditures divided by lagged assets in percentage, capital expenditures-to-assets ratio that is capital expenditures divided by 
lagged assets in percentage, R&D physical capital-to-assets ratio that is expenses for physical capital investments in R&D divided by lagged 
assets in percentage, and R&D employees-to-employees ratio that is the number of employees engaging in R&D divided by the lagged number 
of total employees in percentage. When we calculate the difference in R&D expenses-to-assets ratio between the parents and their subsidiaries, 
we first aggregate necessary variables across all the subsidiaries. We then subtract the subsidiaries’ R&D expenses-to-assets ratio from the 
parent’s R&D expenses-to-assets ratio. Other regressands are calculated in the same way. The main regressor is the CTS effective adoption 
dummy that is a dummy variable that takes one in 2002 and afterwards if the business groups adopt the CTS in any of the years between 2002 
and 2012. We instrument the CTS dummies with the following four instruments: PPSN dummy that is a dummy variable that takes one if the 
parents have positive income and one of their wholly-owned subsidiaries has past losses; PNSP dummy that is a dummy variable that takes one 
if the parents have past losses and one of their wholly-owned subsidiaries has positive income; SNSP dummy that is a dummy variable that takes 
one if one of the business group’s wholly-owned subsidiaries has positive income and one of the business group’s wholly-owned subsidiaries 
has past losses; and PN dummy that is a dummy variable that takes one if the parents have past losses. We classify that the firms have positive 
income when these firms’ accumulated after-tax profits across the previous five years are positive. We use information of tax loss carryforwards 
for the parents’ past losses. We use after-tax profits aggregated across the previous five years to calculate the subsidiaries’ past losses. The 
instruments take zero up to 2001, and they take the value evaluated in the year of 2001 in 2002 and afterwards. We include one year lagged 
dependent variables. We also include market to book ratio that is market value of stock plus total liabilities divided by lagged assets and cash 
flow that is after-tax profits plus depreciation expenses plus R&D expenses divided by lagged assets in percentage as regressors. We include 
firm-fixed effects and year dummy in all columns. GMM lag 3 to 4 refers to the models where we use lagged level dated t-3 and t-4 for the 
differenced equation and the lagged differences dated t-2 for the level equation as the GMM instruments. Hansen p-value is the p-value of the 
Hansen test for overidentifying restrictions. Diff-in-Hansen p-value is the p-value of the difference-in-Hansen test to examine the validity of the 
four instruments. AR 1 p-value, AR 2 p-value, and AR 3 p-value respectively report the p-value from the test of no first-order, second-order, or 
third-order autocorrelation on the differenced residuals. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the firm-level. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Continued-Table 9 
  
Difference in R&D 
expenses-to-assets 
ratio 
Difference in R&D-
Capex difference-to-
assets 
Difference in  
Capital expenditures-
to-assets ratio 
Difference in R&D 
physical capital-to-
assets ratio 
Difference in R&D 
employees-to-
employees ratio 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CTS effective adoption 
dummy 
0.288** 0.456 -1.174** 0.060* 1.393*** 
(0.115) (0.513) (0.511) (0.036) (0.533) 
Lagged dependent variable 
0.837*** 0.360*** 0.337*** 0.516*** 0.885*** 
(0.025) (0.055) (0.049) (0.064) (0.028) 
Market to book ratio 
0.049 0.524* 0.452 0.042* 0.478 
(0.072) (0.297) (0.296) (0.025) (0.366) 
Cash flow 
0.025** 0.097** 0.066 0.014*** 0.085* 
(0.011) (0.042) (0.041) (0.004) (0.047) 
Firm-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
GMM lag 3 to 4 3 to 4 3 to 4 3 to 4 3 to 4 
CTS dummy instrumented? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12356 12193 12193 8467 11960 
Hansen p-value 0.060 0.495 0.059 0.062 0.228 
Diff-in-Hansen p-value 0.589  0.678  0.531 0.397 0.576 
AR 1 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR 2 p-value 0.034 0.241 0.108 0.061 0.001 
AR 3 p-value 0.519 0.328 0.308 0.917 0.256 
 
  
  
46 
 
 
Table 10 
The CTS and risk-sharing by asset types  
This table presents the estimation results to examine whether the CTS encourages risk-sharing by asset types. The data periods are between 1994 
and 2012. The unit of analysis is business groups. Column (1) keeps business groups if the average of their R&D employees-to-employees ratio, 
which is the number of employees engaging in R&D divided by the lagged number of total employees in percentage, calculated using the data 
in 2002 and afterwards is higher than the average calculated from the data up to 2001. Column (2) keeps observations in the opposite case. 
Column (3) keeps business groups if the average of their R&D physical capital-to-assets ratio, which is expenses for physical capital investments 
in R&D divided by lagged assets in percentage, calculated using the data in 2002 and afterwards is higher than the average calculated from the 
data up to 2001. Column (4) keeps observations in the opposite case. We use the one-step system GMM for estimation. The regressand is either 
R&D physical capital-to-assets ratio or R&D employees-to-employees ratio. The main regressor is the CTS effective adoption dummy that is a 
dummy variable that takes one in 2002 and afterwards if the business groups adopt the CTS in any of the years between 2002 and 2012. We 
instrument the CTS dummies with the following four instruments: PPSN dummy that is a dummy variable that takes one if the parents have 
positive income and one of their wholly-owned subsidiaries has past losses; PNSP dummy that is a dummy variable that takes one if the parents 
have past losses and one of their wholly-owned subsidiaries has positive income; SNSP dummy that is a dummy variable that takes one if one 
of the business group’s wholly-owned subsidiaries has positive income and one of the business group’s wholly-owned subsidiaries has past 
losses; and PN dummy that is a dummy variable that takes one if the parents have past losses. We classify that the firms have positive income 
when these firms’ accumulated after-tax profits across the previous five years are positive. We use information of tax loss carryforwards for the 
parents’ past losses. We use after-tax profits aggregated across the previous five years to calculate the subsidiaries’ past losses. The instruments 
take zero up to 2001, and they take the value evaluated in the year of 2001 in 2002 and afterwards. We include one year lagged dependent 
variables. We also include market to book ratio that is market value of stock plus total liabilities divided by lagged assets and cash flow that is 
after-tax profits plus depreciation expenses plus R&D expenses divided by lagged assets in percentage as regressors. We include firm-fixed 
effects and year dummy in all columns. GMM lag 3 to 4 refers to the models where we use lagged level dated t-3 and t-4 for the differenced 
equation and the lagged differences dated t-2 for the level equation as the GMM instruments. Hansen p-value is the p-value of the Hansen test 
for overidentifying restrictions. Diff-in-Hansen p-value is the p-value of the difference-in-Hansen test to examine the validity of the four 
instruments. AR 1 p-value, AR 2 p-value, and AR 3 p-value respectively report the p-value from the test of no first-order, second-order, or third-
order autocorrelation on the differenced residuals. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the firm-level. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Continued-Table 10 
  
Increased R&D employees-
to-employees ratio 
Not Increased R&D 
employees-to-employees 
ratio 
Increased R&D physical 
capital investments-to-assets 
ratio 
Not Increased R&D 
physical capital 
investments-to-assets ratio 
 R&D physical capital investments-to-assets ratio R&D employees-to-employees ratio 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CTS effective adoption 
dummy 
-0.033 0.141*** -0.286 1.223*** 
(0.046) (0.043) (0.522) (0.471) 
Lagged dependent variable 
0.458*** 0.501*** 0.915*** 0.889*** 
(0.073) (0.051) (0.039) (0.027) 
Market to book ratio 
0.091*** -0.032 0.441 0.005 
(0.028) (0.029) (0.443) (0.269) 
Cash flow 
0.011** 0.018*** 0.021 0.144*** 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.065) (0.048) 
Firm-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
GMM lag 3 to 4 3 to 4 3 to 4 3 to 4 
CTS dummy instrumented? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4388 3751 3960 7452 
Hansen p-value 0.163 0.298 0.306 0.618 
Diff-in-Hansen p-value 0.549 0.737 0.397  0.900  
AR 1 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR 2 p-value 0.648 0.124 0.084 0.414 
AR 3 p-value 0.047 0.136 0.239 0.557 
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Table 11 
Restricting year periods 
This table presents the estimation results to examine whether we can find similar estimates when we exclude some 
year periods from our main regression. The unit of analysis is business groups. The regressand is R&D expenses-to-
assets ratio that is R&D expenses divided by lagged assets in percentage. The main regressor is the CTS adoption 
dummy that is a dummy variable that takes one when the business groups adopt the CTS or the CTS effective adoption 
dummy that is a dummy variable that takes one in 2002 and afterwards if the business groups adopt the CTS in any of 
the years between 2002 and 2012. Entire sample refers to our estimation results from Table 6. Excluding one year in 
the second row means that we exclude year of CTS adoption of the business groups when the regressor is the CTS 
adoption dummy, and it means that we exclude year of 2002 when the regressor is the CTS effective adoption dummy. 
Excluding two years in the third row means that we exclude year of CTS adoption as well as one year before adopting 
the CTS when the regressor is the CTS adoption dummy, and it means that we exclude years of 2002 and 2003 when 
the regressor is the CTS effective adoption dummy. Although we report only coefficient estimates of the CTS dummies, 
we include other variables in regression. See Table 6 for the details of the estimation procedures. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Regressor: CTS adoption dummy 
Regressor:  CTS effective adoption 
dummy 
 R&D expenses-to-assets ratio 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Entire sample 
0.611** 0.429*** 0.675*** 0.452*** 
(0.253) (0.159) (0.169) (0.133) 
Excluding one year 
0.615*** 0.552*** 0.808*** 0.543*** 
(0.193) (0.170) (0.203) (0.156) 
Excluding two 
years 
0.643*** 0.692*** 0.837*** 0.584*** 
(0.213) (0.220) (0.211) (0.168) 
 
 
 
Table 12 
Another year to evaluate the instruments 
This table presents the estimation results to examine whether we can find similar estimates when we change the year 
to evaluate the instruments. The unit of analysis is business groups. The regressand is R&D expenses-to-assets ratio 
that is R&D expenses divided by lagged assets in percentage. The main regressor is the CTS adoption dummy that is 
a dummy variable that takes one when the business groups adopt the CTS or the CTS effective adoption dummy that 
is a dummy variable that takes one in 2002 and afterwards if the business groups adopt the CTS in any of the years 
between 2002 and 2012. Instruments evaluated in 2001 refers to the original model from Table 6. The second row and 
the third row respectively change the year to evaluate the instruments in 2000 and 1999. Although we report only 
coefficient estimates of the CTS dummies, we include other variables in regression. See Table 6 for the details of the 
estimation procedures. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Regressor: CTS adoption dummy 
Regressor: CTS effective adoption 
dummy 
 R&D expenses-to-assets ratio 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Instruments 
evaluated in 2001 
0.611** 0.429*** 0.675*** 0.452*** 
(0.253) (0.159) (0.169) (0.133) 
Instruments 
evaluated in 2000 
0.327* 0.289** 0.387*** 0.302*** 
(0.177) (0.133) (0.104) (0.097) 
Instruments 
evaluated in 1999 
0.360** 0.354** 0.356*** 0.310*** 
(0.178) (0.142) (0.097) (0.098) 
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Table 13 
The CTS and R&D tax credit 
This table presents the estimation results to examine the relationship between the CTS and R&D tax credit. We include 
interaction terms of CTS dummies with 20% credit limit year dummy that takes one in 2006 and 2007, 30% credit 
limit year dummy that takes one in 2008 and 2012, and 40% credit limit year dummy that takes one in 2009, 2010, 
and 2011. We instrument each of the interaction terms by the interaction of the four instruments with the relevant year 
period dummies. See Table 6 for the estimation procedures as well as variable definitions. 
  R&D expenses-to-assets ratio 
  (1) (2) 
CTS effective adoption 
dummy 
0.584*** 0.395*** 
(0.163) (0.138) 
CTS effective adoption 
dummy× 
20% credit limit years 
0.227 0.165 
(0.254) (0.269) 
CTS effective adoption 
dummy× 
30% credit limit years 
0.455* 0.241 
(0.242) (0.203) 
CTS effective adoption 
dummy× 
40% credit limit years 
-0.013 -0.008 
(0.168) (0.168) 
Lagged R&D expenses-to-
assets ratio 
0.803*** 0.873*** 
(0.055) (0.032) 
Market to book ratio 
-0.071 0.075 
(0.087) (0.071) 
Cash flow 
0.071*** 0.036*** 
(0.027) (0.011) 
Firm-fixed effect Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes 
GMM lag 3 to 4 4 to 5 
CTS dummy instrumented? Yes Yes 
Observations 12356 12356 
Hansen p-value 0.268 0.439 
Diff-in-Hansen p-value 0.556 0.551 
AR 1 p-value 0.000 0.000 
AR 2 p-value 0.057 0.022 
AR 3 p-value 0.698 0.613 
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CHAPTER 2: Stock market listing and corporate tax aggressiveness: Evidence from legal reforms 
in squeeze out in Japan 
 
1. Introduction 
All firms appear to have an incentive to be tax aggressive to reduce tax liabilities.57 However, 
empirical studies provide evidence that there exists a considerable variation in individual firms’ 
tax aggressiveness.58 This observation raises a question on what tradeoff firms face when they 
choose their optimal level of tax aggressiveness. A clear cost of tax avoidance for firms is resources 
spent to establish tax avoidance schemes. Another cost is potential tax penalties imposed on firms. 
The literature points out that these costs are smaller than the benefits from tax sheltering in the 
U.S. (Desai and Dharmapala (2009a)). This argument is likely to be applied in Japan as well where 
the corporate tax rates are around 40% after 1990s, which are relatively high compared to other 
countries. More important, these costs do not explain the existing variation of tax aggressiveness 
given that all firms in the same countries are subject to the same tax systems. 
Recent literature since Crocker and Slemrod (2005) and Desai and Dharmapala (2006) links 
corporate tax aggressiveness with agency costs. They emphasize that managers, who are not 
necessarily owners of the firms, choose the level of tax aggressiveness. Since tax sheltering is 
obscured from the tax authority by its nature, it is obscured from outside investors as well. 
Investors can be skeptical whether the tax sheltering aims to enhance shareholder value or it is 
motivated by managers’ self-interests. If investors believe that the latter factor outweighs the 
former factor, tax sheltering reduces firm value among publicly-traded (listed) companies through 
a drop in stock prices. Public companies’ managers, predicting the negative responses from stock 
markets, choose to be less tax aggressive. In contrast, this tradeoff does not affect privately-held 
(unlisted) companies’ managerial incentives because their stocks are not traded in public markets. 
This argument does not conclude that a negative association between stock market listing and 
tax aggressiveness is causal. This is because the ownership of private companies is more highly 
concentrated than that of public companies on average. To eliminate this potential ownership effect, 
our main analysis uses a variation in stock listing among firms whose ownership is concentrated. 
                                                     
57 We use “tax aggressiveness”, “tax sheltering”, “tax evasion” and “tax avoidance” interchangeably in this paper. 
58 The literature in tax aggressiveness is surveyed in Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) and Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) 
among others. 
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Specifically, we compare tax aggressiveness between public subsidiaries and private subsidiaries. 
Subsidiaries refer to companies whose majority of shares are held by their parent companies. 
There remains a concern that OLS estimates are biased because the choice whether to list 
stocks is endogenous. We use a “sea change” in corporate law (Milhaupt (2006)) around 2000 as 
a quasi-natural experiment. These reforms provide parent companies legal rights to forcibly 
eliminate (or squeeze out) their subsidiaries’ minority shareholders. As a result of these legal 
reforms, a considerable number of partly owned subsidiaries’ minority shareholders were squeezed 
out, and these subsidiaries were changed into wholly owned subsidiaries. Firms must delist stocks 
when they become wholly owned. This is the variation in stock listing we use for identification. 
The exogeneity of this variation is questionable, however, since not all subsidiaries have 
become a target of squeeze out. We instrument the parents’ decision to implement squeeze out 
transactions. The corporate law requires parents to hold 2/3 of their subsidiaries’ stocks to squeeze 
out the subsidiaries’ minority shareholders. We argue that the costs for squeeze out decrease in the 
parents’ ownership, and that the costs are constant above 2/3 ownership. Based on this idea, we 
use past information of the parent’s ownership ratio to construct an instrument. We include the 
contemporaneous ownership ratio in regression to control for the direct effects of ownership on 
tax aggressiveness. We also conduct falsification tests to support that the exclusion restriction is 
not violated, using the data periods before the legal systems were introduced. In brief, we use a 
difference-in-differences framework with the IV strategy for identification. 
We combine three datasets: Financial Statements Statistics by Corporations collected by the 
Ministry of Finance; Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities collected by the 
Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry; Nikkei NEEDS FinancialQUEST collected by Nikkei 
Inc. The first two datasets cover both public companies and private companies. This feature allows 
us to use a variation in stock listing. This variation is not available in other widely used financial 
datasets such as Compustat because they mostly cover only public companies. The final sample 
consists of 39976 firm-year observations between 1994 and 2012. 17017 observations are private. 
3148 observations have either listed their stocks or delisted their stocks during the data periods. 
Thus, we observe both cross sectional variations and within-firm variations in stock listing. 
Estimation results are consistent with our hypothesis. We find evidence that stock market 
listing reduces tax aggressiveness among subsidiaries. We obtain robust evidence under the quasi-
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natural experiment with the IV strategy. The F-statistic of the excluded instrument at the first stage 
regression is over 30. Thus, the instrument is strong. The falsification test shows that the past 
ownership does not predict current tax aggressiveness before the legal systems were introduced. 
This evidence provides support that the instrument does not violate the exclusion restriction. The 
IV estimates are economically significant as well. The estimates show that stock market listing 
reduces tax aggressiveness by 0.58 – 1.09 standard deviations of the tax aggressiveness measure. 
Our findings have implications for tax policy. The vast literature investigating how taxes affect 
corporate behavior surveyed in Graham (2003) generally assumes that firms treat tax rates as given. 
We show that individual firms’ effective tax rates are endogenously determined by the choices to 
list stocks. This finding can be interpreted that stock markets monitor tax avoidance. In other words, 
our results suggest that financial developments help governments collect tax revenues effectively. 
This is a testable implication in the literature that studies various determinants of corporate tax 
revenues (Auerbach and Poterba (1987); Auerbach (2007); and Clausing (2007)). Furthermore, 
our finding sheds new light on the intense policy debate on tax avoidance.59 Our findings suggest 
that more attention can be needed on private companies than on public companies because private 
companies have stronger incentives to be tax aggressive. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and presents our 
hypothesis. Sections 3 explains the data and the research design. Section 4 shows our estimation 
results. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Hypothesis and literature 
The literature in tax aggressiveness is classified into two groups. One group of research motivated 
by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) interprets tax sheltering as an attempt to shift income from 
governments to individuals. These studies treat tax avoidance as one of various activities that 
increases after-tax profits. Thus, individuals engage in tax avoidance as long as tax costs, which 
depend on the frequency of tax audits and the magnitude of tax penalties, are lower than tax 
benefits. A characteristic of this line of literature is that they presume that those who evade taxes 
are individuals. Crocker and Slemrod (2005) argue that this framework is not suitable to analyze 
corporate tax avoidance. This is because agency conflicts resulting from the separation of 
                                                     
59  For example, OECD’s webpage “Fighting tax evasion” describes their policy measures against tax evasion 
<http://www.oecd.org/ctp/fightingtaxevasion.htm>. 
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ownership and control in corporations are not considered in this framework. 
The second group of relatively new literature relates this agency dimension to corporate tax 
aggressiveness. Tax avoidance inevitably needs to be obscured from the tax authority, which in 
turn creates information asymmetry between managers and outside investors. Consequently, 
managers may seek opportunities for rent diversion when they establish tax sheltering schemes. 
Predicting the possibility of managerial rent seeking, outside investors can discount firm value 
when the managers are tax aggressive. This argument implies that investors can make a distinction 
between income from regular business activities and that from tax avoidance, in contrast to the 
view discussed in the previous paragraph. If agency costs associated with a high level of tax 
aggressiveness are sufficiently large, shareholders do not prefer tax avoidance.  
There is ample support for the hypothesis that tax sheltering reduces market value of firms. 
Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) present event study evidence that stock prices react negatively to news 
that firms involve in tax sheltering. Kim, Li, and Zhang (2011) show that tax avoidance increases 
stock price crash risks. Anecdotal evidence reveals that complicated tax sheltering schemes 
contribute to managerial rent seeking, which has resulted in high-profile accounting scandals such 
as those by Enron or Tyco (Desai, 2005). These pieces of evidence suggest that the negative 
consequence of tax sheltering outweighs the positive aspect of tax sheltering. 
Investors’ negative responses to tax sheltering provide contrasting incentives to public 
companies’ managers and to private companies’ managers. Recent studies, which will be discussed 
later, provide evidence that public companies’ managers pay considerable attention to the potential 
impacts of their decisions on stock prices. Therefore, public companies’ managers have incentives 
to be less tax aggressive to maintain stock prices. On the other hand, private companies’ managers 
do not face this incentive problem because stocks of private companies are not traded on public 
markets. Thus, we expect that public companies are less tax aggressive than private companies 
through this stock market listing effect. 
A simple comparison in tax aggressiveness between public companies and private companies 
does not necessarily identify how the scrutiny from stock markets affects tax aggressiveness. This 
is because the ownership is more highly concentrated among private companies than among public 
companies in general. Owners with large stakes have incentives and abilities to monitor 
  
54 
 
 
managers.60 Thus, private companies’ shareholders may be able to detect managerial rent-seeking 
masked by tax avoidance more frequently than public companies’ shareholders. Such intensive 
monitoring in private companies makes their managers less tax aggressive. Another possibility is 
that private companies’ shareholders may be in a better position to ensure that their managers 
engage in tax sheltering for shareholder value than public companies’ shareholders. This higher 
degree of control in private companies can make their managers more tax aggressive. Although it 
remains inconclusive whether concentrated ownership increases or decreases tax aggressiveness, 
this argument suggests that ownership can have direct impacts on tax aggressiveness. 
Our estimation therefore treats the impacts of stock market listing on tax aggressiveness as a 
function of ownership structures. Alternatively, we restrict observations to companies whose 
ownership is concentrated. We use business group structures as a variation in ownership 
structures.61 The ownership of subsidiaries is concentrated by definition. Corporate law in Japan 
allows subsidiaries to list their stocks on stock exchanges.62 Therefore, we observe a variation in 
stock market listing among subsidiaries. The goal of this paper is to identify the causal impacts of 
stock market listing on tax aggressiveness among subsidiaries, in order to show that managers’ 
optimal choice of tax aggressiveness is affected by the observability of stock prices. 
The challenge for this paper is endogeneity of firms’ decisions to list stocks. Before turning to 
a discussion on our research design, we review the literature in the rest of this section. Building on 
the agency view of tax aggressiveness, several papers examine the relationship between various 
factors that affect agency costs and corporate tax aggressiveness. Chen, Chen, Cheng, and Shevlin 
(2010) show that family owned firms are less tax aggressive than non-family owned firms. Their 
argument is that minority shareholders of family firms are concerned that managers engage in tax 
avoidance not for shareholder value but for their own private benefits. Thus, managers of family 
                                                     
60 Desai and Dharmapala (2006) provide evidence that this argument is applied in the context of tax aggressiveness. 
They show that high-powered incentives reduce tax aggressiveness among companies whose ownership is dispersed. 
This evidence suggests that incentive contracts and concentrated ownership are complementary for the purpose of 
monitoring managers. 
61 A business group is a collection of a parent company and its subsidiaries. Subsidiaries refer to companies whose 
majority of shares are held by the parent company. The business group is a common corporate structure in Japan. For 
example, Toyota Motor Corporation is the parent company of Toyota Group that consists of Toyota Motor Corporation 
and its over 500 subsidiaries. Business group structures have been used in some papers that take advantages of 
Japanese economic environments for identification (for example, Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991)). 
62 For example, both Daihatsu Motor and Hino Motors are subsidiaries of Toyota Motor. They are listed on Tokyo 
Stock Exchange. 
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firms forgo tax benefits to prevent a drop in stock prices. Chyz, Leung, Li, and Rui (2013) show 
that labor unionization decreases tax aggressiveness. The authors attribute this result to unions’ 
ability in monitoring managers and to unions’ aversion to risks. 
A caveat of these two papers is that they use data that mostly cover public companies. The 
reason is that these papers, or more broadly many papers in corporate finance, use Compustat 
North America that are collected by Standard and Poor’s as a data source. They exploit publicly 
available financial statements to compile Compustat data files. As a result, most firms covered in 
Compustat are publicly-traded (listed) companies.63 This limitation in data availability implies 
that most studies cannot address agency costs created by the observability of stock prices.64 We 
need to have access to confidential data such as those collected by governments or accounting 
firms to study the impacts of stock market listing on corporate behavior or on financial policy. 
   Hanlon, Mills, and Slemrod (2007) are an exception that makes a comparison in tax 
aggressiveness between public companies and private companies. Their tax aggressiveness 
measure is the level of proposed tax deficiencies. Using tax return data in the U.S., they show that 
private companies have higher proposed tax deficiencies than public companies. There are three 
differences between Hanlon, Mills, and Slemrod (2007) and our paper. First, they use a cross 
sectional variation, while our paper uses both a cross sectional variation and a within-firm variation. 
Our paper shows that estimation results from cross sectional regression are not necessarily robust 
when including firm-fixed effects. Second, Hanlon, Mills, and Slemrod (2007) use a non-
experimental framework, while our paper uses a quasi-natural experiment as well. Our research 
design mitigates endogeneity concerns of stock listing. Third, Hanlon, Mills, and Slemrod (2007) 
do not consider the possibility that the relationship between stock market listing and tax 
aggressiveness depends on ownership structures. Our paper provides evidence that the impacts of 
stock market listing are substantially different between among concentrated companies and among 
                                                     
63 Compustat covers a limited number of private companies. This is because companies issuing public debts disclose 
financial statements. 
64 There is a small but growing literature in corporate finance that compares public companies with private companies 
in various aspects. Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist (2015) show that mangers of public companies in the U.S. are 
overly sensitive to stock prices when choosing the level of capital expenditures. This over-sensitivity causes 
underinvestment among public companies compared to private companies’ counterparts. Michaely and Roberts (2012) 
show that public companies in the U.K. pay dividends more smoothly than private companies. The authors argue that 
the scrutiny of public capital markets explains this difference in dividend policy. Brav (2009) shows that private 
companies are more highly leveraged than public companies in the U.K. The author argues that this is because issuing 
private equity is more costly than issuing public equity. 
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unconcentrated companies. 
3. Data and research design 
3.1. Data description 
The main data source is Financial Statements Statistics by Corporations (FS data). This dataset is 
collected annually by the Ministry of Finance Japan. It covers unconsolidated financial statements 
of non-financial corporations in Japan. We use the data between 1994 and 2012. A distinctive 
feature of the FS data is that the data sources are not publicly available financial statements. The 
Ministry requests corporations to submit their financial information under Statistics Act.65 This 
data collection process ensures that the FS data can cover both public companies and private 
companies. The FS data do not classify whether individual firms are public or private. We use 
another data, Nikkei NEEDS FinancialQUEST collected by Nikkei Inc., as a secondary source of 
information. FinancialQUEST includes all firms that are currently listed and those listed in the 
past. 66  We match observations in the FS data with those in FinancialQUEST based on the 
corporate name and accounting data. We classify those matched observations as public, and those 
unmatched observations as private.6768 
                                                     
65 The Ministry of Finance conducts a population survey for large corporations and a sample survey for small 
corporations. The target of the population survey is all large corporations whose legal capital, which is one component 
of net worth, is 500 million yen or higher. The threshold of legal capital is 600 million yen in certain years. The 
response rate is generally over 90% among large corporations. Thus, the data exhibit unbalanced panel structures. 
66 We evaluate whether the firms are public or private at the end of the fiscal year. We assume that fiscal year starts in 
April and it ends in next calendar year’s March, which is common in Japan. For example, we evaluate that the company 
is public in 2005 if the company’s stock is listed at the end of 2006 March. 
67  There exist discrepancies in the reported corporate name or financial information between the FS data and 
FinancialQUEST. We can match 90.9% of the observations that are classified as public companies in our final sample 
based on the company name, legal capital, and assets almost exactly, where we allow a plus or minus one difference 
in financial information. The naming of corporations is not always consistent between these two datasets. Thus, we 
match the remaining public observations in FinancialQUEST with those in the FS data based on legal capital, assets, 
sales, and ordinary income. We match 2.5% of the final public observations after this matching process. We then match 
the company identification number of the FS data with that in FinancialQUEST. Although this process helps us connect 
the unmatched observations in the two datasets, this process causes a problem. For example, suppose that a company 
in the FS data is matched with a company in FinancialQUEST before 2005. If this company established a holding 
company in 2006, the company recorded in the FS data can be a subsidiary of this holding company in 2006, and the 
company recorded in FinancialQUEST can be the holding company itself in 2006. We judge the accuracy of this data 
matching process by hand. We further match the remaining public observations in FiancialQUEST with observations 
in the FS data with weaker conditions such as allowing 10% differences in financial information between the two 
datasets. We also check the accuracy of this procedure by hand. Although this classification is conducted carefully, 
there might remain concerns in the accuracy regarding the 6.6% (100% - 90.9% - 2.5%) of the observations that are 
classified as public companies in the sample. We obtain almost identical results when we remove these observations. 
68 Note that not all public companies in FinancialQUEST are matched with some observations in the FS data. This is 
because financial corporations are not included in the FS data while they are included in FinancialQUEST, for example. 
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The FS data cover information on tax liabilities of individual corporations. 69  Available 
information on tax liabilities varies across years as follows: only corporate income taxes paid are 
available between 1994 and 1998; only corporate income tax expenses, which take account of 
deductible temporary differences, are available between 1999 and 2003; and both corporate 
income taxes paid and corporate income tax expenses are available after 2004. We use corporate 
income taxes paid as the measure of tax liabilities except for between 1999 and 2003. During these 
five years, we use corporate income tax expenses instead. The FS data do not include information 
on ownership structures of individual firms. We obtain this information from Basic Survey of 
Japanese Business Structure and Activities (BS data) collected by the Ministry of Economy, Trade, 
and Industry.70 The BS data also exhibit unbalanced panel structures like the FS data. The BS data 
tell information of parent companies’ ownership ratio. We define the firms’ ownership as being 
concentrated when their parents’ ownership is 50% or higher. We define these firms as subsidiaries. 
We merge the FS data with the BS data based on accounting information.71 
We merge these datasets and keep necessary observations as follows. First, we keep 
observations whose lagged assets are one billion yen or higher. Private companies are smaller than 
public companies on average, and therefore we keep comparable observations in terms of firm size. 
Second, we keep observations whose legal capital is over 100 million yen because various tax 
breaks are available for small corporations, which are firms whose legal capital is 100 million yen 
or less. Third, we keep observations whose before-tax profits are recorded for the past five 
consecutive years to approximate past accumulated losses.72 We keep observations both of whose 
                                                     
69 The Japanese tax system introduced a consolidated taxation system in 2002. This system provides business groups 
an option to file a consolidated tax return. In other words, this system allows business groups to offset losses with 
gains elsewhere in the business groups. We expect that firms that use the consolidated taxation system are more tax 
aggressive. Our tax aggressiveness measures are constructed based on individual tax returns even when the firms use 
the consolidated taxation system. Thus, our results are not affected by the introduction of the consolidated tax filing. 
70 The target of the BS data is corporations whose legal capital is 30 million yen or larger and whose number of 
employees is 50 or more. The BS data impose a restriction on the target companies in terms of the number of 
employees while the FS data do not. Firms used in the analysis are relatively large, and therefore this restriction on 
the BS data is not relevant when merging these two datasets. The BS data cover companies in almost all non-financial 
industries, with some exceptions such as those in the construction industry, while the FS data cover companies in all 
non-financial industries. 
71 We match the FS data with the BS data based on legal capital, assets, and sales. We adopt a similar data matching 
procedure with what we have used when merging the FS data with FinancialQUEST. 
72 The Japanese tax system allows firms to deduct past tax losses from their current or future corporate taxable income 
like in many other countries. We include a past loss dummy variable in the regression as a control variable. The time 
span for loss carryforwards changed over time as follows: five years up to 2003; seven years between 2004 and 2010; 
and nine years in 2011 and afterwards. 
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current before-tax profits and corporate tax liabilities are positive. This data restriction is necessary 
to define book tax differences, which will be discussed later. We keep observations whose lagged 
assets are non-missing since this variable is used as a denominator of some variables in regression 
such as leverage. We then replace missing values with zero.73 All variables used in regression are 
winsorized at 1% levels and at 99% levels. 
The final sample consists of 39976 firm-year observations. The number of public observations 
is 22959, and that of private observations is 17017. Thus, 42.6% of the observations are private. 
This percentage is smaller than that reported in Hanlon, Mills, and Slemrod (2007), which is 58.5%. 
One reason behind this difference in the data composition is that we keep observations with 
positive before tax income, while Hanlon, Mills, and Slemrod (2007) do not impose this restriction. 
In our data, non-positive profits are less common among public observations than private 
observations. As a result, private companies are less prevalent in our data than in their data. This 
observation suggests that public companies’ managers engage in earnings management to avoid 
reporting non-positive profits, in line with our discussion below. 
During the entire data periods, 20849 observations stay public, and 15979 observations stay 
private. The remaining 3148 observations experienced a change either from private to public or 
from public to private during the data periods. Therefore, we observe a considerable within-firm 
variation in stock listing or stock delisting. This within-firm variation plays key roles for 
identification. First, we use the firm-fixed effect models. Thus, we need a within-firm variation. 
Second, we use some firms that have changed from public to private as the treatment group in a 
quasi-natural experiment.  
3.2. Identification strategy 
We use a quasi-natural experimental research design with an IV strategy. The treatment in this 
experiment is two legal reforms that cause delisting among public subsidiaries, which will be 
explained in detail below. The treatment group consists of all subsidiaries that were public before 
the legal reforms because they have the potential to delist their stocks. The control group consists 
of subsidiaries that are private during the entire data periods because these companies are not 
                                                     
73 We interpolate missing values or zero for parent companies’ ownership ratio in the BS data. We first replace missing 
values with zero when we observe only either missing values or zeros during the entire data periods for the firm. We 
then replace missing values or zeros with the average value of previous period’s value and the next period’s value 
when these two values are exactly the same or the difference of these two values is 0.1 percentage point. We treat the 
remaining zeros as missing values, and we drop these observations. Main findings are not affected by this interpolation.   
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affected by the treatment that causes delisting. A concern in this research design is that not all 
public subsidiaries delisted stocks, which leads to a selection problem. We use an IV approach to 
deal with this endogeneity. 
Our identification strategy takes advantages of a series of corporate law reforms around 2000. 
These reforms involve fundamental changes in legal environments which Milhaupt (2006) calls a 
“sea change”. Two of the legal reforms allow parent companies to forcibly eliminate (or squeeze 
out) their subsidiaries’ minority shareholders. These reforms are important to our paper since they 
provide an exogenous variation in stock listing. The first legal reform is the share exchange system 
introduced in 1999. This system provides parent companies legal rights to eliminate their 
subsidiaries’ minority shareholders by granting the parent companies’ stocks to their subsidiaries’ 
minority shareholders. In other words, squeeze out is implemented by exchanging parents’ stocks 
with their subsidiaries’ stocks. The second reform is an introduction of a class shares subject to 
wholly call system introduced in 2006. This legal system has similar economic function to the 
share exchanges for the purpose of squeeze out.74 
If these reforms are effective, we expect to see a considerable change in ownership structures 
of Japanese business groups after 1999. More specifically, a large number of partly owned 
subsidiaries should have changed into wholly owned subsidiaries as a result of the legal reforms 
that have made squeeze out less costly. When companies change from partly owned subsidiaries 
to wholly owned subsidiaries, these subsidiaries must delist their stocks from stock exchanges 
because of the limited supply of their stocks on markets.75 Therefore, this change in ownership 
will increase the number of subsidiaries that go from public to private. This is the variation in stock 
delisting we use in the quasi-natural experiment. 
It is questionable, however, whether this delisting can be treated as an exogenous variation 
because not all partly owned subsidiaries are squeezed out. In other words, there is a concern about 
                                                     
74 The outline of the legal procedure for squeeze out through the class shares subject to wholly call system is as follows. 
Companies first alter their articles of incorporation at the shareholders meetings, and all the common stocks are 
changed into class shares subject to wholly call. Next, the companies acquire all stocks from the shareholders. The 
companies redeem shares in a way that their minority shareholders receive shares less than one unit. This procedure 
leaves the minority shareholders with no alternative but to receive cash in exchange of their stocks. As a result, the 
minority shareholders are squeezed out. 
75 At least 5% of stocks must be traded for firms to stay listed at Tokyo Stock Exchange, which is the largest stock 
exchanges in Japan. Tokyo Stock Exchange has additional regulations that restrict subsidiaries whose parents’ 
ownership is high to list their stocks. 
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a selection bias. Institutional details of the legal systems provide an exogenous source of variation 
in the likelihood concerning which subsidiaries are to be squeezed out. Using this information, we 
can construct an instrument to explain the cross sectional variation in squeeze out after the legal 
reforms. In principal, these two legal systems require extraordinary resolution that must be passed 
by a 2/3 of the vote casts at shareholders meetings of both acquirers and acquired companies.76 
Thus, it is sufficient for parents to own 2/3 of their subsidiaries’ stocks to eliminate the subsidiaries’ 
minority shareholders. If the parents’ ownership is lower than 2/3, they need to issue tender offers 
before using the legal systems. This two-stage strategy in squeeze out is common in practice. For 
example, Panasonic squeezed out Sanyo in 2011 following this two-stage procedure. Sanyo was 
one of Panasonic’s partly owned, public subsidiaries. Panasonic’s ownership of Sanyo was 50.2% 
in 2010 March. Panasonic issued a tender offer during 2010, and its ownership became 80.1% in 
2010 December. Panasonic then exploited the share exchanges, and Sanyo became a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Panasonic in 2011 April. Sanyo delisted their stock as a result of this process. 
The possibility of using this two-stage strategy allows us to construct an instrument of a private 
observation dummy variable. The private observation dummy takes one when the observation is 
private. The literature demonstrates that tender offers involve a considerable amount of takeover 
premium. For example, Rossi and Volpin (2004) report that the average takeover premium is 40%. 
Therefore, total takeover premium that parents are required to pay at the first stage of the two-
stage strategy is a decreasing function in their ownership. Our argument implies that the likelihood 
that the subsidiaries are squeezed out is kinked at 2/3 ownership, and this function is flat beyond 
this threshold because 2/3 ownership is sufficient to pass proposals for squeeze out at the 
shareholders meetings. 
We construct an instrument based on this idea.77 The instrument takes zero for all observations 
before the legal reforms in squeeze out. Thus, a variation in the instrument is observed only after 
the legal reforms. The instrument can take non-zero values only when the observations were public 
                                                     
76 There is an exception to this rule. When the target subsidiaries are considerably smaller than the parents, the 
extraordinary resolution at acquirers’ shareholders meetings can be bypassed when using the share exchanges. 
Specifically, this simplified share exchange system is available when parent companies’ net worth is at least five times 
as large as these parents’ payments to the subsidiaries’ minority shareholders. 
77 We can also exploit the condition for which parent companies can follow the simplified share exchanges explained 
in the previous footnote to construct an instrument. These parents can save costs associated with the regular share 
exchange procedures such as legal fees. Thus, we expect that subsidiaries of these parents are more likely to be 
squeezed out. Using this information as an instrument generates similar estimation results. 
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subsidiaries before the legal reforms, that is, only when the firms are in the treatment group. This 
is because the purpose of using the instrument is to explain the variation in stock delisting among 
firms in the treatment group. Thus, the instrument can take non-zero value only after the legal 
reforms and only when the firms are in the treatment group.  
The instrument cannot be time-dependent after the subsidiaries in the treatment group delist 
their stocks. For example, if we choose the subsidiaries’ lagged ownership ratio as an instrument, 
this instrument is increased to 100 if the subsidiaries become private as a result of being squeezed 
out. Therefore, this instrument and the private dummy variable can exhibit a mechanical, positive 
correlation after being squeezed out. Using this instrument brings another problem because parent 
companies can adjust their subsidiaries’ ownership stakes some years before using the legal 
systems. This ownership adjustment creates a positive correlation between this instrument and the 
private observation dummy before being squeezed out. 
We construct an instrument to avoid these issues. We evaluate the ownership ratio of the 
subsidiaries in one year before the introduction of the legal reforms. This instrument captures the 
likelihood that the public subsidiaries are squeezed out when the legal systems are not available. 
As long as the legislation of these systems is not anticipated, parent companies do not have 
incentives to adjust ownership of their subsidiaries before the reforms. According to the following 
newspaper articles, official discussions on the introduction of the legal systems started in 1998 
July. The Nikkei on July 9, 1998 reported that the commercial law committee of the legislative 
council of the Ministry of Justice released an interim report suggesting an introduction of the share 
exchange system. The Nikkei on November 26, 1998 reported that the government decided to 
introduce the share exchanges in 1999. Therefore, the legal reform might have been anticipated 
one year before the actual introduction of the legal system. Although the main IV regression uses 
1998 as the year to evaluate the ownership ratio, we alternatively use the information of two or 
more years before the legal reforms to construct an instrument to check the robustness of our 
findings. 
Because of the unbalanced panel structure, which is relatively salient in the context of tax 
aggressiveness since we remove observations with non-positive profits, we may not know the 
ownership ratio in 1998. In this case, we use the ownership ratio in 1997. We repeat this procedure 
when the ownership of the year of interest is not observed. Another issue raised from the 
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unbalanced panel structure is that we cannot classify subsidiaries that exist only in 1999 and 
afterwards either into the treatment group or into the control group because the group classification 
is based on information before the legal reforms. We remove these subsidiaries from the sample 
used for the quasi-natural experiment. 
Another concern about this research design is that the instrument reflects information of past 
ownership structures before the legal reforms. This IV strategy might violate the exclusion 
restriction because we argue that ownership is a factor that can affect tax aggressiveness. In 
addition, there exists a qualitative difference between subsidiaries included in the treatment group 
and those in the control group. This is because subsidiaries in the treatment group are listed and 
thus their ownership structure is likely to be more dispersed than that in the control group. We 
include the contemporaneous ownership ratio as a control variable to mitigate these concerns. 
There remains a possibility that past ownership has direct impacts on the current level of tax 
aggressiveness even after controlling for the contemporaneous effects. We conduct falsification 
tests by regressing past ownership on current tax aggressiveness using the data periods before the 
introduction of the legal reforms. Insignificant estimates from this test provide support that the 
exclusion restriction is not violated. 
3.3. Estimation model and variable definition 
We turn to the explanation of estimation models. The main independent variable is a private 
company dummy variable, which takes one when the observation is private. Since stock market 
listing is firms’ choice, we instrument this variable as we have discussed in the previous subsection. 
The literature uses a book tax difference to evaluate corporate tax aggressiveness. A standard book 
tax difference is defined by income before taxes minus estimated taxable income, which is tax 
liabilities divided by corporate tax rates, normalized by lagged assets (Manzon and Plesko (2002)). 
Larger Manzon and Plesko book tax difference (MP book tax difference) implies that the firms pay 
less corporate taxes relative to their accounting profitability. Thus, firms take an aggressive tax 
position when the MP book tax difference is large. 
Recent studies do not necessarily accept the MP book tax difference as an adequate measure 
of corporate tax aggressiveness. This is because public companies’ managers have incentives to 
manage earnings to exceed analysts’ forecasts. Therefore, earnings management can increase the 
MP book tax difference in the absence of tax avoidance. Isolating the earnings management effects 
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from the MP book tax difference is especially important for our purpose because analysts do not 
generally make forecasts of private companies’ performance. Even when forecasts of private 
companies are available, a lack of publicly observable stock prices provides private companies’ 
managers weaker incentives to manage earnings than public companies’ managers. As a result, 
earnings management affects public companies’ MP book tax difference more than private 
companies’ MP book tax difference. 
To eliminate the earnings management effects from the MP book tax difference, we use another 
type of book tax difference that was first introduced by Desai and Dharmapala (2006). Desai and 
Dharmapala book tax difference (DD book tax difference) removes the earnings management 
effects from the MP book tax difference to isolate the tax avoidance effects. More specifically, 
Desai and Dharmapala (2006) first regress the MP book tax difference on total accruals with firm-
fixed effects, where total accruals measure the degree to which firms can manage earnings.78 The 
residuals from this regression are the DD book tax difference. Formally, Desai and Dharmapala 
(2006) use the regression represented by 
 
MPBTDit = βTotalAccrualit + μi + εit 
 
where index i represents company, index t represents year, MPBTD is the MP book tax difference, 
TotalAccrual is total accruals, μ is firm-fixed effects, and ε is error terms. The DD book tax 
difference is the residuals from this regression. Larger DD book tax difference implies that the 
observations are more tax aggressive. Our argument implies that the DD book tax difference is the 
most appropriate measure of corporate tax aggressiveness especially in our context, and thus we 
use this variable as the dependent variable in regression. 
This paper uses three estimation techniques. First, we use cross sectional regression. We 
observe a considerable cross sectional variation in stock market listing. Thus, starting with cross 
sectional regression is a useful step to understand our topic of interest. In addition, since three of 
the closely related papers (Hanlon, Mills, and Slemrod (2007); Chen, Chen, Cheng, and Shevlin 
(2010); and Chyz, Leung, Li, and Rui (2013)) use only cross sectional regression, this analysis 
                                                     
78 This paper defines total accruals based on the balance sheet approach suggested by Hribar and Collins (2002). This 
variable is defined by ((change in current assets) - (change in cash) - (change in current liabilities) + (change in short 
term debt) - depreciation) divided by lagged assets. 
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allows us to compare our results with those in previous studies. Second, we use firm-fixed effect 
models. This framework mitigates concerns that an observed correlation between stock market 
listing and tax aggressiveness is caused by time-invariant, firm-level heterogeneity. Some of the 
related studies in tax aggressiveness use firm-fixed effect models (Desai and Dharmapala (2006, 
2009b)). This framework also allows us to examine the robustness of Hanlon, Mills, and Slemrod 
(2007)’s findings where only cross sectional regressions are used. The cross sectional model and 
the firm-fixed effect model are represented by 
 
TAit = β1Priateit × Subit + β2Privateit + β3Subit + γXit + μi + ηjt + ϵit     (1) 
 
where index i represents company, index t represents year, index j represents industry, TA is DD 
book tax difference, Sub is a subsidiary dummy variable, Private is a private company dummy 
variable, X is a matrix that includes various control variables that are explained below, μ represents 
firm-fixed effects and μ does not depend on i when we use cross sectional models, η is industry-
year fixed effects, and ε is error terms. 
   β1 evaluates whether private observations are more tax aggressive than public observations 
given that the firms’ ownership is concentrated. We expect a positive sign on this estimate. β2 
tests whether tax aggressiveness depends on stock market listing when the ownership is not 
concentrated. To compare our results with Hanlon, Mills, and Slemrod (2007)’s results, we run 
regression (1) without Private×Sub or Sub. This model estimates the average differences in tax 
aggressiveness between public observations and private observations. We use robust standard 
errors clustered at the firm level. 
The third methodology takes advantages of the legal reforms in squeeze out that provide an 
exogenous variation in stock market delisting. This methodology seeks to eliminate a potential 
bias in OLS estimates associated with endogeneity of stock market listing. For example, 
corporations that are planning to go from private to public typically sign a multi-year contract with 
accounting firms to prepare for listing their stocks. These private companies are likely to have 
various opportunities to learn tax avoidance schemes from the accounting firms. As a result, newly 
listed companies can be more likely to be tax aggressive. OLS estimates on private company 
dummy exhibits an upward bias in this case. The third methodology uses a difference-in-
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differences framework with the IV method explained above to mitigate endogeneity concerns. 
   A difference in the data composition between the previous two methodologies and this third 
methodology is that the former two models include all firms while the latter includes only 
subsidiaries because the legal reforms used in the third methodology are relevant only for 
subsidiaries. We use both cross sectional models and firm-fixed effect models in this third 
methodology to compare our results with those obtained from the non-experimental framework. 
The first stage regression and the second stage regression are respectively represented by 
 
Privateit = δPast ownership IVit + γXit + μi + ηjt + ϵit     (2) 
TAit = βPrivateit̂ + γXit + μi + ηjt + ϵit     (3) 
 
where equation (2) is the first stage regression, equation (3) is the second stage regression, index i 
represents company, index t represents year, index j represents industry, Private is a private 
company dummy variable, Past ownership IV is ownership ratio evaluated principally in 1998 that 
is capped at 66.67, X is a matrix that includes various control variables that are explained below, 
μ represents firm-fixed effects and μ does not depend on i when we use cross sectional models, η 
is industry-year fixed effects, ε is error terms, TA is DD book tax difference, and Privatê  is 
imputed value of Private from the first stage regression. 
   The X matrix in the third methodology includes a treatment dummy variable, which takes one 
when the subsidiaries are in the treatment group, in addition to other variables. This group dummy 
is absorbed by the firm-fixed effects when including them in regression, while the group dummy 
can be estimated in the cross sectional models. Note that Private×Treat is redundant as an 
independent variable because a variation in stock market listing is observed only among firms in 
the treatment group and we include the treatment dummy in regression. In other words, a variation 
in Private×Treat is identical to that in Private in the regression models. We use robust standard 
errors clustered at the firm level. 
   Control variables included in the X matrix are taken from related studies such as Chen, Chen, 
Cheng, and Shevlin (2010). These variables are as follows: leverage that is liabilities divided by 
lagged assets; profitability that is operating profit divided by lagged assets; PPE that is fixed 
tangible assets divided by lagged assets; intangibility that is intangible assets divided by lagged 
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assets; log of lagged assets; and accumulated loss dummy that takes one when firms’ before tax 
income aggregated across the past five years is negative. We also include contemporaneous 
ownership ratio. Furthermore, we include an industry-year dummy to absorb industry-year level 
economic shocks. 
We include these control variables for the following reasons. Leverage captures the degree of 
available debt tax shields. This aspect of leverage makes firms with a higher level of leverage more 
tax aggressive. However, in our context, leverage is also likely to capture differences in financing 
environments because only public companies’ stocks are traded at stock exchanges. Thus, signs of 
leverage coefficients are not theoretically clear. Profitability is expected to be positively associated 
with tax aggressiveness because profitable firms have larger before tax income, and therefore they 
have a stronger incentive to avoid taxes. PPE captures capital intensity, which reflects the 
importance of the different treatments of depreciation between in tax statements and in financial 
statements. Highly capital intensive firms have an incentive to take tax avoidance measures, and 
therefore we expect a positive association between PPE and tax aggressiveness. Intangibility is 
expected to be positively associated with tax aggressiveness because firms with high intangibility 
can engage in income shifting for tax benefits more easily. The accumulated loss dummy is 
expected to be positively associated with tax aggressiveness because firms with past losses can 
deduct them from their current taxable income. Parents’ ownership captures monitoring intensity 
as we have discussed. 
Table 14 reports mean and standard deviation of individual variables used in regression. We 
separately report the statistics among public companies and among private companies. The second 
row shows that 11% of the public observations are subsidiaries. These observations play key roles 
in identification given that the treatment group in the quasi-natural experiment consists of 
subsidiaries that were public before 1999. This table supports the argument that private 
observations are more concentrated than public observations as we have presumed; the parent’s 
average ownership is 61.9% among private observations, and it is 7.1% among public observations. 
There is also a large difference in leverage between public observations and private observations. 
Private observations are 16 percentage points more highly leveraged than public observations. This 
difference in leverage is likely to reflect a difference in cost of capital since only public companies 
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have access to the public equity market (Brav (2009)).79 
4. Result 
4.1. Non-experimental framework 
We first present estimation results under the non-experimental framework. Although regression 
based on this framework can suffer from endogeneity associated with the choices to list stocks, 
these models are useful to compare our results with those in related studies, especially those in 
Hanlon, Mills, and Slemrod (2007). We can also compare estimation results from this framework 
with those from the experimental framework. This comparison can highlight the advantages of the 
quasi-natural experiment especially when we obtain different estimation results from different 
frameworks. 
   Table 15 shows estimation results under the non-experimental framework. Columns (1) – (4) 
use the cross sectional models. Columns (5) – (8) use the firm-fixed effect models. Even numbered 
columns include the parent’s ownership ratio as a control variable. Columns (3), (4), (7), and (8) 
include the subsidiary dummy as well as the interaction term of the private dummy and the 
subsidiary dummy. All the models are estimated using the OLS. 
Private coefficient in column (1) shows that private companies are more tax aggressive than 
public companies on average, without considering the ownership structures. This result is 
qualitatively the same with that reported in Hanlon, Mills, and Slemrod (2007). In contrast, we 
observe a quantitative difference in the magnitude of the estimates. Table 5 in Hanlon, Mills, and 
Slemrod (2007) reports that the coefficients on private observation dummy on their tax 
aggressiveness measure are 0.0011 - 0.0013, depending on the measure’s denominator that is either 
sales or assets. Table 4 of their paper reports that the standard deviation of their tax aggressiveness 
measures is 0.0055 - 0.0068. Thus, stock market listing decreases tax aggressiveness by about 0.2 
standard deviations of the dependent variables. Our estimates of 0.059 in column (1) imply that 
stock market listing makes 0.03 standard deviation differences in tax aggressiveness, given that 
the standard deviation of the DD book tax difference is 2.03 in our paper. Hanlon, Mills, and 
Slemrod (2007) use the Tobit model, but a crude comparison between their estimates and our 
                                                     
79 This difference in leverage between public observations and private observations is consistent with Brav (2009)’s 
finding in the U.K. Brav (2009) reports that the difference in leverage is 10 percentage points. Thus, the difference in 
leverage between public companies and private companies is larger in Japan than in the U.K. 
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estimates in column (1) implies that our estimates are 3/20 of their estimates in magnitude.80 
This result from column (1) is not robust under the non-experimental framework. Column (2) 
shows that the sign of the private coefficient has been reversed after controlling the parent’s 
ownership ratio. Although column (3) shows that private observations are more tax aggressive 
than public observations when the ownership is concentrated, the statistical significance disappears 
when we control the parent’s ownership ratio in column (4). These results imply that ownership 
structures are important factors behind the correlation between stock market listing and tax 
aggressiveness. This result is in line with recent finding that ownership structures play key roles 
in the relationship between agency conflicts and tax aggressiveness (Desai and Dharmapala 
(2006)). 
Our estimation results with the firm-fixed effects provide clearer evidence that the finding from 
column (1) is not robust. All the models with firm-fixed effects show that neither the coefficients 
on the private dummy, the subsidiary dummy, nor the interaction term of these two variables are 
statistically significant. One possible implication of this result is that the finding by Hanlon, Mills, 
and Slemrod (2007) is not robust when we control firm-heterogeneity. Alternatively, we can 
interpret that this insignificance is a consequence of endogeneity of stock market listing. We 
provide evidence based on the experimental framework to address the endogeneity in the next 
subsection. 
4.2. Experimental framework 
4.2.1. Main finding 
Tables 16 and 17 present estimation results under the experimental framework. Note that the 
number of observations decreases to 8432 because we only include subsidiaries in the experimental 
framework. The treatment group consists of 1866 observations and the control group consists of 
                                                     
80 The sign of other independent variables is broadly consistent with our predictions as well as with the sign reported 
in the previous studies such as Chen, Chen, Cheng, and Shevlin (2010). PPE, intangibility, and past accumulated losses 
have positive impacts on tax aggressiveness. This is in line with Chen et al. (2010)’s findings in Panel A of Table 4 of 
their paper. Firm size measured by lagged assets is positively associated with tax aggressiveness, which suggests that 
larger firms have more opportunities to avoid taxes. However, the sign is reversed when we include firm-fixed effects. 
The negative sign of the leverage coefficient is not consistent with our prediction based on the tax benefits of debt. In 
our context, leverage is likely to capture the difference in financing environments between public companies and 
private companies because only public companies have access to public equity markets. Thus, this coefficient might 
not have clear interpretation compared to previous studies. The negative sign on profitability coefficient is inconsistent 
with our prediction as well as with Chen et al. (2010)’s finding. However, the statistical significance of the coefficient 
disappears when we include firm-fixed effects. Furthermore, we obtain positive and significant estimates when we 
use the experimental framework as we will show below. 
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6566 observations. Among the observations in the treatment group, 327 observations are private 
companies. 
Table 16 presents the first-stage results to explain which factors affect the firms’ decisions to 
go private. Column (1) uses the cross sectional framework, and column (2) includes firm-fixed 
effects. The F-statistic of the excluded instrument is 35.64 in column (1) and it is 34.31 in column 
(2). Therefore, the instruments are sufficiently strong. The sign of the past ownership IV 
coefficients are positive and significant at the 1% level in both models. Therefore, subsidiaries are 
more likely to be squeezed out when their parent’s past ownership is higher. Since our models 
include the parent’s current ownership ratio as a control variable, this table provides evidence that 
the past ownership itself explains a variation in stock delisting. 
Table 17 presents second stage estimation results of the IV strategy. Columns (1) and (2) use 
the cross sectional models. Columns (3) and (4) use the firm-fixed effect models. We use the IV 
strategy for columns (1) and (3). We use OLS for columns (2) and (4) for comparison. 
The cross sectional models show that private observations are more tax aggressive than public 
observations. This finding is consistent with our prediction. A notable difference between the IV 
estimates and the OLS estimates is their magnitude; it is 1.65 under the IV strategy, and it is 0.60 
under the OLS. Models including firm-fixed effects provide a sharper contrast between in OLS 
estimates and in IV estimates. Private coefficient is insignificant in the OLS model, while it is 
positive and significant in the IV model. Thus, our IV strategy provides consistent evidence that 
stock market listing reduces tax aggressiveness. 
The estimate of 2.22 of the imputed private dummy in column (3) suggests that stock market 
listing has economically significant impacts on tax aggressiveness. The magnitude of this estimate 
implies that the difference in tax aggressiveness between public companies and private companies 
is more than one standard deviation of the DD book tax difference (2.03). We can interpret that the 
estimate is five times larger than that reported in Table 5 in Hanlon, Mills, and Slemrod (2007) if 
we measure the estimate by the standard deviation of the dependent variable. Therefore, we find a 
sizable impact of stock market listing on tax aggressiveness, compared to that found in Hanlon, 
Mills, and Slemrod (2007). 
4.2.2. Robustness 
In this subsection, we discuss concerns that may cause biases in IV estimates: weak instruments 
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and a violation of exclusion restrictions. We have provided evidence that the instrument is strong 
by showing that F-statistic of the excluded instrument is over 10 in Table 16. To support the 
hypothesis that the exclusion restriction is not violated, we conduct two tests that show past 
ownership does not predict current tax aggressiveness. 
The first test uses the data periods before the introduction of the legal systems for squeeze out. 
Without the legal systems, the indirect effect of the parent’s past ownership on tax aggressiveness 
through a change in the costs for squeeze out does not exist. Therefore, zero coefficients on the 
past ownership IV when we use the data periods before the legal reforms provide support for the 
hypothesis that the exclusion restriction is not violated. Specifically, we restrict the data periods 
from 1994 to 1998, from 1994 to 1997, and from 1994 to 1996, respectively. Using a sample that 
consists of each of the data periods, we estimate the equation represented by 
 
TAit = δPast ownership IVit−n + γXit + μi + ηjt + ϵit   
 
where index i represents company, index t represents year, index j represents industry, index n 
represents the number of lags of the past ownership IV that is the ownership ratio capped at 66.67, 
TA is the DD book tax difference, X is a matrix that includes control variables, μ represents firm-
fixed effects and μ does not depend on i when we use cross sectional models, η is industry-year 
fixed effects, and ε is error terms. 
Table 18 reports coefficients on the past ownership IV. The first row represents the data periods 
and the first column represents the number of lags of the past ownership IV. In each year period, 
we use both cross sectional models and firm-fixed effect models. Regression includes other 
covariates, but we do not report their estimates for simplicity of exposition. Note that each 
regression includes only one of the past ownership IV variables. For example, the second column 
of this table does not mean that we include four past ownership IV variables at the same time. 
Table 18 shows that 13 of the 15 estimates of the past ownership IV coefficients are not 
statistically significant. Two of the models exhibit negative, significant estimates at the 5% level 
when we use one-year lagged past ownership IV. These results suggest that the exclusion 
restriction is not violated as long as we use two or more years lagged ownership as the instrument. 
These findings also cause a concern that our estimates reported in Table 17 are biased. This is 
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because we use the parent’s ownership ratio evaluated in one-year before the legal reforms as the 
instrument. Consequently, the exclusion restriction might have been violated among subsidiaries 
that are squeezed out in 1999.  
The second test to examine the possibility of a violation of the exclusion restriction is related 
to this point. The base IV regression uses past ownership evaluated principally in 1998 as the 
instrument. This choice of the year can be problematic as suggested in the previous paragraph. In 
addition, we have discussed that the introduction of the share exchanges might have been 
anticipated at least one year before its actual introduction. This implies that parents might have 
started to adjust ownership stakes of their subsidiaries before their actual introduction. Therefore, 
we evaluate the past ownership structure in over one year before 1999 to construct the instruments. 
We estimate equations (2) and (3) using the instruments. When the data do not tell the ownership 
ratio of the year of interest (for example, 1997) due to the unbalanced panel structures, we use one 
year before the year (that is, 1996) as we have conducted in our main IV regression. 
Table 19 shows the estimation results. Columns (1) - (2), (3) - (4), (5) - (6), and (7) - (8) 
respectively evaluate the past ownership ratio principally in 1997, 1996, 1995, and 1994. Odd 
numbered columns use the cross sectional models, and even numbered columns include the firm-
fixed effects. 
All the models show that the estimates of the imputed private dummy coefficients are positive 
and statistically significant at least at the 10% level. Estimates from the firm-fixed effect models 
are consistently significant at the 5% level. F-statistic of the excluded instruments is over 30 across 
all columns. Therefore, the instruments are strong when we use older information to construct the 
instruments as well. It is noteworthy that the F-statistic is relatively large when we use older 
information such as that in 1996. This observation can suggest that the estimates from these models 
using older information might be more reliable to evaluate the economic significance. 
From Tables 17 and 19, the estimates of the imputed private dummy variable range from 1.17 
to 2.22. These estimates correspond to 0.58 – 1.09 standard deviations of the DD book tax 
difference. The 0.58 standard deviation differences are more than twice as large as those found in 
Hanlon, Mills, and Slemrod (2007) based on the crude comparison. From the discussion in this 
subsection, we confirm that the impacts of stock market listing on tax aggressiveness are 
considerably larger than previously documented.  
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5. Conclusion 
The existing firm-level variation in corporate tax aggressiveness has been puzzling in public 
economics and corporate finance. Recent literature focuses on agency conflicts in corporations as 
a crucial factor that reduces managerial incentives to take tax aggressive measures. Few studies 
have examined how the scrutiny from stock markets affects tax aggressiveness due to difficulties 
in having access to data that cover both public companies and private companies. We use unique 
datasets of Japanese corporations to test whether agency costs associated with stock market listing 
reduce tax aggressiveness. 
A challenge in estimation is that stock market listing is a firms’ choice. To mitigate this 
endogeneity concern, we use legal reforms in squeeze out as a quasi-natural experiment. Our main 
models compare observations that changed from public subsidiaries to private subsidiaries as a 
result of these legal reforms. We also use subsidiaries that were private before the legal reforms as 
the control group. Therefore, this paper takes a difference-in-differences approach. Furthermore, 
we deal with the selection problem concerning which subsidiaries are to be squeezed out using an 
IV strategy.  
   We show that private companies are more tax aggressive than public companies among 
subsidiaries. This result is consistent with our prediction. We also provide evidence that the 
instrument is strong and that the exclusion restriction is not violated. Our findings suggest that 
stock markets monitor corporate tax avoidance. In other words, financial developments can 
encourage corporations to pay taxes. Our findings also imply that closer supervision over private 
companies can be necessary because private companies have stronger incentives to be tax 
aggressive than public companies. 
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Table 14 
Summary statistics 
This table separately reports summary statistics among public observations, among private observations, and among 
total observations. The data periods are between 1994 and 2012. Private dummy is a variable that takes one when the 
observation is a private company. Subsidiary dummy is a variable that takes one when the firm’s majority of shares 
are held by another company (parent company). Parent’s ownership is the ownership ratio of the parent company when 
the observation has a parent. This value is zero when the observation does not have a parent. Leverage is liabilities 
divided by lagged assets. Profitability is operating profit divided by lagged assets. PPE is fixed tangible assets divided 
by lagged assets. Intangibility is intangible assets divided by lagged assets. Ln(assets) is natural log of lagged assets. 
Past loss dummy is a variable that takes one when firms’ before tax income aggregated across past five years is 
negative. DD (Desai-Dharmapala) book tax difference is the residuals from the regression of MP (Manzon-Plesko) 
book tax difference on total accruals and firm-fixed effects. MP book tax difference is before tax profits minus 
estimated taxable income, which is corporate tax liabilities divided by corporate income tax rates, divided by lagged 
assets. 
  
Public observation 
(22959 observations) 
Private observation 
(17017 observations) 
Total observation 
(39976 observations) 
 mean  sd mean sd mean sd 
Private dummy 0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.43  0.49  
Subsidiary dummy 0.11  0.32  0.70  0.46  0.36  0.48  
Parent's ownership 7.05  18.94  61.94  42.82  30.42  41.51  
Leverage 49.51  21.03  65.51  24.02  56.32  23.71  
Profitability 4.89  4.10  5.40  5.17  5.10  4.59  
PPE 27.94  15.84  32.60  21.18  29.93  18.45  
Intangibility 0.81  1.44  0.87  1.84  0.84  1.63  
Ln(assets) 10.71  1.33  9.93  1.17  10.38  1.32  
Past loss dummy 0.13  0.34  0.17  0.37  0.15  0.35  
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Table 15 
Estimation results from the non-experimental framework 
This table presents estimation results to examine whether private observations are more tax aggressive than public observations. The data periods 
are between 1994 and 2012. We use the entire sample. We use OLS for estimation. The dependent variable that measures tax aggressiveness is 
DD (Desai-Dharmapala) book tax difference. DD book tax difference is the residuals from the regression of MP (Manzon-Plesko) book tax 
difference, which is before tax profits minus estimated taxable income (that is corporate tax liabilities divided by corporate income tax rates) 
divided by lagged assets, on total accruals and firm-fixed effects. Private dummy is a variable that takes one when the observation is a private 
company. Subsidiary dummy is a variable that takes one when the firm’s majority of shares are held by another company (parent company). 
Parent’s ownership is the ownership ratio of the parent company when the observation has a parent. This value is zero when the observation does 
not have a parent. Leverage is liabilities divided by lagged assets. Profitability is operating profit divided by lagged assets. PPE is fixed tangible 
assets divided by lagged assets. Intangibility is intangible assets divided by lagged assets. Ln(assets) is natural log of lagged assets. Past loss 
dummy is a variable that takes one when the firms’ before tax income aggregated across past five years is negative. Standard errors reported in 
parentheses are clustered at the firm-level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 15 - Continued 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 DD book tax difference 
Private dummy× 
Subsidiary dummy  
  0.193*** 0.091   -0.158 -0.082 
  (0.053) (0.063)   (0.209) (0.237) 
Private dummy 
0.059** -0.063** -0.092*** -0.093*** 0.052 0.098 0.134 0.139 
(0.027) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.110) (0.126) (0.157) (0.158) 
Subsidiary dummy 
  0.038 -0.155**   0.274 0.297 
  (0.043) (0.073)   (0.231) (0.235) 
Parent's ownership 
 0.002***  0.003***  -0.002  -0.002 
 (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
Leverage 
-0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Profitability 
-0.012** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
PPE 
0.002** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Intangibility 
0.029*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.065*** 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Log(assets) 
0.090*** 0.092*** 0.091*** 0.091*** -0.532*** -0.532*** -0.528*** -0.529*** 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) 
Past loss dummy 
1.621*** 1.615*** 1.617*** 1.614*** 1.178*** 1.178*** 1.178*** 1.178*** 
(0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) 
Firm-fixed effect No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Observations 39976 39976 39976 39976 39976 39976 39976 39976 
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Table 16 
Estimation results from the experimental framework: The first stage estimation 
This table presents the first stage estimation results of the IV strategy to examine whether private observations are 
more tax aggressive than public observations. The data periods are between 1994 and 2012. The sample includes only 
subsidiaries. The dependent variable is private dummy, which is a variable that takes one when the observation is a 
private company. The past ownership IV is constructed from the parent’s ownership ratio evaluated principally in 1998 
that is capped at 66.67. The past ownership IV takes this ownership ratio when the subsidiaries are in the treatment 
group and the year periods are in 1999 and afterwards. Otherwise, the past ownership IV takes zero. Treatment dummy 
takes one in 1999 and afterwards if the firms were listed before 1999. Parent’s ownership is the ownership ratio of the 
parent company when the observation has a parent. This value is zero when the observation does not have a parent. 
Leverage is liabilities divided by lagged assets. Profitability is operating profit divided by lagged assets. PPE is fixed 
tangible assets divided by lagged assets. Intangibility is intangible assets divided by lagged assets. Ln(assets) is natural 
log of lagged assets. Past loss dummy is a variable that takes one when firms’ before tax income aggregated across 
past five years is negative. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the firm-level. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) 
 Private observation dummy 
Past ownership IV 
0.003*** 0.002*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Treatment dummy 
-0.832***  
(0.020)  
Parent’s ownership 
0.004*** 0.010*** 
(0.000) (0.001) 
Leverage 
0.000 0.000** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Profitability 
-0.001* -0.001* 
(0.001) (0.001) 
PPE 
-0.000** -0.001** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Intangibility 
0.002 0.002 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Ln(assets) 
0.002 -0.001 
(0.004) (0.016) 
Past loss dummy 
0.011 0.016** 
(0.008) (0.008) 
Firm-fixed effect No Yes 
Industry-year dummy Yes Yes 
F-statistic of excluded instrument 35.64 34.31 
Observations 8432 8432 
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Table 17 
Estimation results from the experimental framework: The second stage estimation 
This table presents the second stage estimation results of the IV strategy to examine whether private observations are 
more tax aggressive than public observations. The data periods are between 1994 and 2012. The sample includes only 
subsidiaries. We use OLS or IV for estimation. The dependent variable that measures tax aggressiveness is DD (Desai-
Dharmapala) book tax difference. DD book tax difference is the residuals from the regression of MP (Manzon-Plesko) 
book tax difference, which is before tax profits minus estimated taxable income (that is corporate tax liabilities divided 
by corporate income tax rates) divided by lagged assets, on total accruals and firm-fixed effects. Imputed private 
dummy is a variable that is obtained from the first stage estimation. Treatment dummy takes one in 1999 and 
afterwards if the firms were listed before 1999. Parent’s ownership is the ownership ratio of the parent company when 
the observation has a parent. This value is zero when the observation does not have a parent. Leverage is liabilities 
divided by lagged assets. Profitability is operating profit divided by lagged assets. PPE is fixed tangible assets divided 
by lagged assets. Intangibility is intangible assets divided by lagged assets. Ln(assets) is natural log of lagged assets. 
Past loss dummy is a variable that takes one when firms’ before tax income aggregated across past five years is 
negative. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the firm-level. ***, **, and * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 DD book tax difference 
Imputed private dummy 
1.653** 0.596*** 2.219** 0.291 
(0.768) (0.229) (0.906) (0.246) 
Treatment dummy 
1.225** 0.437**   
(0.606) (0.218)   
Parent’s ownership 
-0.005 -0.001 -0.023** -0.002 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.010) (0.004) 
Leverage 
-0.005*** -0.005*** -0.011*** -0.010*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Profitability 
0.016** 0.015* 0.021** 0.019 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) 
PPE 
0.008*** 0.007*** 0.005 0.004 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) 
Intangibility 
-0.003 -0.000 0.082* 0.088 
(0.031) (0.032) (0.050) (0.055) 
Ln(assets) 
-0.018 -0.017 -0.408*** -0.405*** 
(0.030) (0.030) (0.126) (0.141) 
Past loss dummy 
1.767*** 1.780*** 1.531*** 1.568*** 
(0.100) (0.102) (0.113) (0.123) 
Firm-fixed effect No No Yes Yes 
Industry-year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OLS or IV? IV OLS IV OLS 
Observations 8432 8432 8432 8432 
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Table 18 
Robustness: Data periods before the legal reforms 
This table presents estimation results to examine whether past ownership predicts current tax aggressiveness. We 
restrict the data periods to either 1994 - 1998, 1994 - 1997, or 1994 - 1996. The sample includes only subsidiaries. We 
use OLS for estimation. The dependent variable that measures tax aggressiveness is DD (Desai-Dharmapala) book 
tax difference. DD book tax difference is the residuals from the regression of MP (Manzon-Plesko) book tax difference, 
which is before tax profits minus estimated taxable income (that is corporate tax liabilities divided by corporate income 
tax rates) divided by lagged assets, on total accruals and firm-fixed effects. The past ownership IV is constructed from 
the parent’s ownership ratio that is capped at 66.67. The past ownership IV takes this ownership ratio when the 
subsidiaries are in the treatment group and the year periods are in 1999 and afterwards. Otherwise, the past ownership 
IV takes zero. The number in the parenthesis added after the past ownership IV in the table refers to the number of 
lags of the past ownership IV (for example, (t-1) refers to one year lag). We include the following variables as other 
covariates, but we only report the estimates of the past ownership IV coefficients. Treatment dummy takes one in 1999 
and afterwards if the firms were listed before 1999. Parent’s ownership is the ownership ratio of the parent company 
when the observation has a parent. This value is zero when the observation does not have a parent. Leverage is 
liabilities divided by lagged assets. Profitability is operating profit divided by lagged assets. PPE is fixed tangible 
assets divided by lagged assets. Intangibility is intangible assets divided by lagged assets. Ln(assets) is natural log of 
lagged assets. Past loss dummy is a variable that takes one when firms’ before tax income aggregated across past five 
years is negative. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the firm-level. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  1994 – 1998 1994 - 1997 1994 – 1996 
Past ownership IV (t-1) 
0.000 -0.071** -0.002 -0.073** -0.004 -0.081 
(0.010) (0.031) (0.010) (0.031) (0.013) (0.091) 
Past ownership IV (t-2) 
0.010 0.035 0.008 0.002 0.001  
(0.010) (0.043) (0.010) (0.063) (0.013)  
Past ownership IV (t-3) 
0.014 0.023 0.022    
(0.012) (0.115) (0.014)    
Past ownership IV (t-4) 
0.014      
(0.020)      
Other variables included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-fixed effect No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Industry-year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OLS or IV? OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
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Table 19 
Robustness: Past ownership evaluated in before 1998 
This table presents the second stage estimation results of the IV strategy to examine whether private observations are more tax aggressive than 
public observations. The data periods are between 1994 and 2012. The sample includes only subsidiaries. We use IV for estimation. The 
dependent variable of the first stage estimation is private dummy, which is a variable that takes one when the observation is a private company. 
The instrument is constructed from the parent’s ownership ratio evaluated principally either in 1997, 1996, 1995, or 1994 that is capped at 66.67. 
This instrument takes this ownership ratio when the subsidiaries are in the treatment group and the year periods are in 1999 and afterwards. 
Otherwise, it takes zero. “Instrument evaluated year” in the table represents the year in which we principally evaluate the past ownership ratio. 
“F-statistic of excluded instrument” represents the F-statistic of the excluded instrument at the first stage estimation. In the second stage IV 
estimation, the dependent variable that measures tax aggressiveness is DD (Desai-Dharmapala) book tax difference. DD book tax difference is 
the residuals from the regression of MP (Manzon-Plesko) book tax difference, which is before tax profits minus estimated taxable income (that 
is corporate tax liabilities divided by corporate income tax rates) divided by lagged assets, on total accruals and firm-fixed effects. Imputed 
private dummy is a variable that is obtained from the first stage estimation. We include the following variables as other covariates (treatment 
dummy, parent’s ownership, leverage, profitability, PPE, ln(assets), and past loss dummy), but we report only the estimates of the imputed private 
dummy coefficients. Treatment dummy takes one in 1999 and afterwards if the firms were listed before 1999. Parent’s ownership is the ownership 
ratio of the parent company when the observation has a parent. This value is zero when the observation does not have a parent. Leverage is 
liabilities divided by lagged assets. Profitability is operating profit divided by lagged assets. PPE is fixed tangible assets divided by lagged assets. 
Intangibility is intangible assets divided by lagged assets. Ln(assets) is natural log of lagged assets. Past loss dummy is a variable that takes one 
when firms’ before tax income aggregated across past five years is negative. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the firm-
level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 DD book tax difference 
Imputed private dummy 
1.480* 2.104** 1.408** 1.846*** 1.171** 1.664** 1.244** 1.627** 
(0.770) (0.901) (0.566) (0.645) (0.578) (0.658) (0.582) (0.659) 
Other variables included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-fixed effect No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Industry-year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OLS or IV? IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV 
Instrument evaluated year 1997 1997 1996 1996 1995 1995 1994 1994 
F-statistic of excluded instrument 36.87  34.27  71.43  85.27  63.20  79.22  60.24  74.39  
Observations 8341 8341 8157 8157 8001 8001 7643 7643 
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CHAPTER 3: Taxes, stock ownership, and payout policy: Evidence from a 2011 tax reform in 
Japan81 
 
1. Introduction 
Recent studies provide evidence that tax incentives affect individual investors’ stock holdings and 
trading (Poterba (2001, 2002)). The primary focus of these studies is on the behavior of households 
or retail investors, and little is known about whether taxes affect large individual investors’ stock 
transactions. Studying this link is important because a change in stock holdings by large investors, 
which can be induced by a change in a tax code, has the potential to alter corporate policies 
(Cronqvist and Falenbrach (2009)). In his paper, we provide evidence that taxes affect stock 
trading and in turn change payout policy, using a tax reform in Japan. 
   The Japanese tax system makes a distinction between large individual shareholders (LISs) and 
non-large individual shareholders (non-LISs). LISs refer to individual shareholders who own 3% 
or higher stakes of the corporation under the tax system in 2012. This 3% threshold is effective 
after a 2011 October tax reform, and the threshold was 5% before this tax reform. Non-LISs’ 
dividend income is taxed at a flat rate of 10%, while LISs’ dividend income is taxed at progressive 
personal income tax rates. The top tax rate in 2012 is 43.6% after claiming a deduction for 
dividends. To avoid this tax increase, individual shareholders whose ownership is in between 3% 
to 5% have an incentive to sell stocks before 2011 October to restrict their ownership ratio below 
3% after the tax reform. We test whether we observe this stock selling. 
  We take a triple-differences approach for this analysis, taking advantages of three 
characteristics of the tax reform. First, the tax reform applies only to individuals. Second, the tax 
reform changes marginal tax rates on dividends only when their ownership is in between 3% to 
5%. Third, the tax reform reduces dividend tax rates, and therefore it affects investors’ incentives 
only when the firms pay dividends. We construct dummies for each condition and use the 
interaction term of the three dummies as the main regressor. 
   We use Nikkei NEEDS Large Shareholder Database. This data set discloses information of the 
maximum of the top 30 largest shareholders of firms in Japan. There is no minimum ownership 
threshold under which firms need not disclose the ownership ratio of the large shareholders, such 
                                                     
81 This chapter is the product of collaborative research with Kazuki Onji at Osaka University. 
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as the 5% ownership threshold in the U.S. We also use Nikkei NEEDS FinancialQUEST for 
financial information of individual companies. The main analysis uses the data in 2011 and 2012. 
The final sample consists of 23540 large investors and 1534 firms. 
   We find evidence that is consistent with our hypothesis. Over a half of the individual investors 
that are affected by the tax reform sell stocks so that they can maintain their status as non-LISs 
after the tax reform. This incentive is stronger among individual investors whose ownership is 
relatively close to 3%. When the ownership is in between 3% to 3.5%, 64.0% of the large 
individual shareholders sell stocks to restrict their ownership ratio below 3%. The percentage 
increases to 86.1% for those individual investors whose ownership is in between 3% to 3.1%. 
These results support that taxes affect stock selling. 
The 2011 tax reform allows us to examine how taxes affect payout policy. Given that not all 
the investors that are affected by the tax reform sell stocks, the change in the tax code creases a 
cross sectional variation in investors’ tax preferences on payout policy. Those investors who retain 
ownership ratio of 3% to 5% after the tax reform have an incentive to encourage managers to 
reduce dividends because the after-tax value of the dividends decreases. We find evidence for this 
hypothesis. However, the impacts are not economically large: a one point increase in dividend tax 
rate leads to a decline in the dividend-to-market capitalization ratio by 0.005 points. 
   Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, various empirical studies show 
that taxes affect stock transactions.82 However, none of these papers focus on stock transactions 
by large individual investors. Studying their tax incentives is important because they have 
considerable influence to change payout policy possibly for their own benefits. In addition, this is 
the first paper to use a natural experiment for identification to study the relationship between taxes 
and stock transactions. Second, we find evidence that tax incentives affect payout policy. This 
finding is in line with the findings in the U.S. (Chetty and Saez (2005); Pérez-González (2003)).83 
                                                     
82  Related papers include the followings: Barber and Odean (2004); Callaghan and Barry (2003); Desai and 
Dharmapala (2011); Hu, McLean, Pontiff, and Wang (2014); Ivković, Poterba, and Weisbenner (2005); Jin (2006); 
Korkeamaki, Liljeblom, and Pasternack (2010); Poterba and Samwick (2003); Poterba and Weisbenner (2001); and 
Starks, Yong, and Zheng (2006). 
83 Barclay, Holderness, and Sheehan (2009) study trades of large shares from individuals to corporations. Since the 
variation used in our paper is a reduction in stock holdings by individual shareholders, the authors use similar variation 
with ours. They find no evidence that the change in ownership caused by these transactions affects payout policy. 
Brown, Liang, and Weisbenner (2007) use the 2003 dividend tax cut in the U.S. as a source of exogenous change in 
after-tax value of dividends. They test whether a change in dividend policy in 2003 is a function of managerial 
ownership. They provide evidence that firms with higher managerial ownership are more likely to increase dividends. 
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We use a time-series variation in investors’ tax preferences to identify the tax clientele effect.84 
Thus, our paper is relatively immune to criticism that the observed correlation is caused by third 
factors such as managerial quality. 
   The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains background information and 
develops hypothesis. Section 3 explains research design and describes data. Section 4 shows the 
estimation results. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Background and hypothesis 
The tax system in Japan makes a distinction among three types of shareholders: large individual 
shareholders (LISs); non-large individual shareholders (non-LISs); and institutional investors. The 
difference between LISs and non-LISs is a key in this paper. LISs refer to individual investors who 
own 3% or a higher level of corporate stocks under the current tax system. This 3% threshold is 
effective from a 2011 October tax reform. The threshold was 5% from 2003 March to the end of 
2011 September. In other words, the tax reform changes the tax status of individual shareholders 
whose ownership is in between 3% to 5% from non-LISs into LISs. 
   The distinction between LISs and non-LISs has an important implication on the marginal tax 
rates on dividend income and capital gains income. Table 20 describes the tax rates for each class 
of investors as of 2012.85 Table 20 shows that the top marginal tax rates on dividends for non-
LISs (10%) are considerably lower than those for LISs (43.6%).86 
   This unique tax schedule leads to several hypotheses. First, LISs have an incentive to become 
                                                     
However, they do not find evidence that the impact of the dividend tax cut is a function of individual investors’ 
ownership, although the tax cut can benefit all individual investors. Our finding is not consistent with the survey 
evidence by Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005) that taxes do not have first-order importance in payout policy. 
84 Recent papers that discuss tax clientele effects include the followings: Allen, Bernardo, and Welch (2000); Baker 
and Wurgler (2005); and Graham and Kumar (2006). 
85 There are no considerable time-series variations in the tax rates between 2003 and 2012. An example of a change 
in the tax rates is observed in 2007 when the top personal income tax rates are increased by three percentage points. 
86 This disparity in tax rates is caused by a difference in the availability of two types of tax accounts between non-
LISs and LISs. The first tax account is used for ordinary income. Income on this account is subject to the personal 
income taxes whose top rate is 50%. The second tax account is prepared to eliminate progressivity of tax schedules 
for a certain type of income, and a flat tax rate of 10% is applied. Among non-LISs, both dividend income and capital 
gains income are eligible on this tax account. Therefore, non-LISs do not pay the ordinary personal income taxes for 
dividend income. In contrast, among LISs, only capital gains are eligible on this second tax account. Consequently, 
LISs’ dividends are taxed as ordinary income. Although a dividend tax deduction of maximum 6.4% is available, the 
resulting top dividend tax rates for LISs are 43.6%. One might be concerned of the validity of the assumption that the 
top tax rates apply to large individual shareholders. Our data show that the average total dividend payments of 
individual firms are 2.66 billion yen in our final sample. Therefore, large individual investors whose ownership ratio 
is 3% receive 79.8 million yen of dividends. This amount exceeds the minimum income level at which the top tax 
rates apply (18 million yen). Thus, using the top tax rates in our analysis is appropriate. 
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non-LISs to reduce tax burden on dividend income. We test this prediction by examining whether 
non-LISs whose ownership is in between 3% to 5% before the tax reform sell stocks to maintain 
their tax status as non-LISs after the tax reform. Given that the tax reform is relevant only for 
dividend income, we expect that the change in tax code affects investors’ incentives to sell stocks 
only when the firms pay dividends. Therefore, we test whether those individual investors sell 
stocks conditional on that the firms pay dividends. 
   The 2011 tax reform allows us to further examine hypotheses about the tax clienteles. Suppose 
that some LISs do not sell stocks, and therefore they remain in the company as LISs after the tax 
reform. Those LISs have an incentive to encourage managers to decrease dividends because the 
after-tax value of dividends declines after the tax reform.87 In addition, LISs have an incentive to 
encourage managers to increase share repurchases. This is because share repurchases are more tax 
advantageous than dividends. More specifically, the dividends tax rates increase from 10% to 
43.6% while the tax rate on capital gains remain the same and it is 10%. 
3. Research design and data 
Our main hypothesis examines if non-LISs maintain their tax status after the 2011 October tax 
reform by selling stocks. The unit of observations in this analysis is investors. The regressand is a 
dummy variable that takes one when the investor’s ownership ratio is less than 3%. The main 
regressor is the interaction term of the following three dummies: a dummy variable that takes one 
when the ownership ratio is 3% or higher and lower than 5%; a dummy variable that takes one 
when the investors are individuals; and a dummy variable that takes one when the firms pay 
dividends. About the ceiling of the second dummy variable, we also use 3.5%, or 3.1% instead of 
5%. The regression equation is represented by 
 
𝑜𝑤𝑛3𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑜𝑤𝑛3𝑡𝑜𝑁𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 × 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 × 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐹𝐸𝑘 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡     (1) 
 
where subscript i represents firm, subscript j represents investor, subscript t represents year, 
                                                     
87 Alternatively, these LISs can encourage managers to increase dividends to maintain their after tax gains from 
dividends. However, this behavioral response appears not to be rational because such behavior decreases firm value. 
Thus, we do not consider this possibility in our paper. 
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subscript k represents investor type88, own3low is a dummy variable that takes one when the 
investor’s ownership ratio is less than 3%, own3toN is a dummy variable that takes one when the 
investor’s ownership ratio is 3% or higher and less than N% (N=5, 4, or 3.1), ind is a dummy 
variable that takes one when the investor is an individual, div is a dummy variable that takes one 
when the firm pays positive dividends, X include other variables (own3toN×ind, own3toN×div, 
ind×div, own3toN, and div)89, investorFE represents investor type fixed effect, and ε represents 
error terms. We use the linear probability model and the Probit model for estimation.90 
   We also test whether LISs that retain over 3% of the ownership stakes after the tax reform 
encourage managers to change payout policy that is tax favorable for the investors. Note that the 
unit of observations is firms in this analysis because we are interested in individual firms’ decisions 
on payout policy rather than investors’ decisions. One of the main regressors in this analysis is a 
dummy variable that takes one when there remain LISs that retain their stakes of between 3% and 
5% after the tax reform. More specifically, the dummy variable takes one when there exist LISs 
that hold ownership stakes of between 3% and 5% both in before the tax reform and in after the 
tax reform. We also include a dummy variable that takes one when the firms pay dividends, and 
the interaction of these two dummies because the tax reform is relevant for dividend income. 
   The regressand represents a change in payout ratio. The payout variable can be either dividends 
or share repurchases divided by lagged market capitalization. We use the first difference of the 
payout-to-market capitalization ratio as the regressand because we are interested in a change in 
payout policy before and after the tax reform. Other variables that can affect a change in payout 
policy is taken from Brown, Liang, and Weisbenner (2007). The variables are as follows: market 
to book ratio that is market capitalization plus liabilities divided by assets; cash flow that is after-
tax profit plus depreciation divided by lagged assets; cash holdings that is cash on hand divided 
by lagged assets; leverage that is liabilities divided by lagged assets; past stock return that is stock 
return of past two years; monthly stock price volatility that is monthly stock price volatility of 
across previous five years; and log of market capitalization. We use a change in these variables as 
                                                     
88 Investor type refers to either individuals, business corporations, banks, insurance companies, securities companies, 
financial holding companies, other financial institutions, trust accounts, foreigners, governments, stock holding 
association, public entities, or others. 
89 Note that we do not include the variable “ind” in the matrix X because it is captured by the investor fixed effect. 
90 Because we include interaction terms in non-linear models, we use the estimation methods developed by Cornelißen 
and Sonderhof (2009) and Ai and Norton (2003) to interpret the coefficients from the Probit model as appropriate 
partial effects. 
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regressors because the regressand is a change in payout policy. The regression equation is 
represented by 
 
𝐷. 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛3𝑖𝑡,𝑡−1 × 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐷. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡     (2) 
 
where subscript i represents firm, subscript t represents year, “D.” represents the one-year 
difference operator, payout represents either dividends divided by lagged market capitalization or 
share repurchases divided by lagged market capitalization, indown3 is a dummy variable that takes 
one if the firm has an LIS both in before the tax reform and in after the tax reform, div is a dummy 
variable that takes one when the firm pays positive dividend, X include control variables (market 
to book ratio, cash flow, cash holdings, leverage, past stock return, monthly stock price volatility, 
and log of market capitalization), and ε represents error terms. 
We use Nikkei NEEDS Large Shareholder Database collected by Nikkei Digital Media Inc. 
This dataset discloses ownership information of maximum of the top 30 largest shareholders.91 
The average number of investors reported in the data per firm is 22.8.92 We create an identification 
code using the name of the large investors to construct a panel data set. We keep observations 
whose fiscal year ends in March, which is most common in Japan, to make a fair comparison of 
the impacts of the tax reform in 2011 October. In other words, the years of 2011 and 2012 
respectively refer to 2011 March and 2012 March in our paper.93 The total numbers of investors 
and that of firms in 2012 are respectively 23540 and 1534. 
An advantage of this data set is that it does not impose any restriction on the lower bound of 
the ownership ratio of investors about which firms must disclose. This is in contrast to the data in 
the U.S., where corporations need to disclose the ownership information of only those investors 
whose ownership stakes are 5% or higher. Our data show that the average lowest ownership stakes 
of the large shareholders across firms is 0.94%. Thus, this database discloses more detailed 
                                                     
91 We therefore drop investor-level observations when we cannot make a distinction based on the names of the 
investors. This issue happens for example when the data report the name of the investors as just an “Individual 
Investor”. 
92 The Japanese law requires firms to report information on the top ten largest investors. The Nikkei Digital Media 
collect more information by sending questionnaires to corporations. This procedure causes a difference in the number 
of large investors reported in the data.  
93 Our findings are not affected when we include firms whose fiscal year end is not March. 
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information than commonly used data sets in the U.S. We also use Nikkei NEEDS 
FinancialQUEST as the sources of other information on financial statements. 
We present several graphs to provide suggestive evidence that ownership structure is affected 
by the tax reform. Graphically, we expect to see a bunching just below the thresholds where non-
LISs change into LISs. Graph 1 presents evidence supporting our hypothesis. The left graph and 
the right graph respectively show the distribution of individual investors’ ownership in 2011 and 
in 2012. The width of each bin is 0.02%. In the left graph, we see a bunching just below 5% 
ownership. On the other hand, we see that the bunching point is moved from 5% to 3% in the right 
graph. This comparison suggests that the tax reform encourages individual investors to sell stocks. 
A potential concern is that this change in ownership is observed among non-individual 
investors as well. In this case, it is suspicious whether the tax reform has the impact that is 
consistent with our hypothesis, because the tax reform should affect only individual investors’ 
incentives. Graph 2 presents the distribution of non-individual investors’ ownership in 2011 and 
in 2012. These graphs suggest that the distribution is almost identical in these two years. These 
observations suggest that the tax reform affects incentives to sell stocks only among individual 
investors. 
Table 21 describes summary statistics. Panel A reports summary statistics when the unit of 
observations is investors. This sample is used for equation (1). Panel B reports statistics when the 
unit of observations is firms. This sample is used for equation (2). Panel A shows that 8.3% of the 
total investors are individuals. Given that the total number of observations is 23540, the number 
of individual investors is close to 2000. In the total sample, the ratio of investors whose ownership 
is in between 3% and 5% is 16.4%. An unreported table shows that the number of individual 
investors whose ownership is in between 3% to 5% is about 350. In addition, nearly 90% firms 
pay dividends. Therefore, we have a considerable variation in the main regressor. 
4. Results 
Table 22 presents the estimation results. Columns (1) - (2) use the dummy variable that takes one 
when the ownership is between 3% and 5% as the main element of the regressor. Columns (3) - 
(4) and (5) - (6) respectively use the dummy variable that takes one when the ownership is in 
between 3% to 3.5% and in between 3% to 3.1% as the main element of the regressor. The odd 
numbered columns use the linear probability model and the even numbered columns use the Probit 
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model. 
   Columns (1) - (2) show that about a half of the individual investors whose ownership is 
between 3% and 5% sell stocks so that their ownership ratio becomes below 3% when the firms 
pay dividends. Other columns show that the likelihood that investors sell stocks increases as the 
ownership ratio becomes closer to 3%. Column (4) and (6) show that 64.0% of the investors sell 
stocks when the ceiling of ownership ratio is 3.5%, and the ratio further increases to 86.1% when 
the ceiling is 3.1%. These results support that the tax reform encourages investors that are affected 
by the reform to sell stocks. This table also shows that the individual investors do not sell stocks 
when the firms do not pay dividends. This finding provides an additional support that the tax 
reform affects stock selling. Table 23 shows the estimation results of the falsification tests when 
we use year of 2010 in Panel A and year of 2012 in Panel B. None of the coefficients on the triple-
interaction terms are positive and significant. These results provide a stronger support that the tax 
reforms affects stock selling. 
Table 24 shows the estimation results on the relationship between the change in ownership 
induced by the tax reform and payout policy. Columns (1) - (2) use dividends as the regressand 
and columns (3) - (4) use share repurchases as the regressand. Columns (2) and (4) include an 
interaction term of an individual top dummy variable, which takes one when the individual 
investors who retain stakes between 3% - 5% after the tax reform are the largest investors, with 
the main interaction term used in columns (1) and (3). 
Column (1) provides support that the change in ownership reduces dividends. This finding is 
consistent with the tax clientele hypothesis. Column (1) suggests that those firms that are affected 
by the tax reform reduce the dividends-to-market capitalization ratio by 0.165 point. Given that 
the top tax rates on dividend income are increased by 33.6 point, one point increase in dividend 
tax rate reduces the dividends-to-market capitalization ratio by 0.005 point. This finding suggests 
that the economic significance is not necessarily large. 
In contrast, these firms do not change their policy on share repurchases. This might be because 
these individual investors are less likely to sell stocks in the near future and therefore the capital 
gains are not realized, given that these investors do not sell stocks as a result of the tax increase.  
Column (2) provides evidence that whether the individual investors who retain the 3% - 5% of 
stakes are the largest investors or not do not affect our finding in column (1). This result suggests 
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that the control power over future dividend policy does not yield our findings. This argument 
supports that the tax incentives affect payout policy. 
5. Conclusion  
We use a tax reform in Japan that raised the dividend tax rates for individual investors whose 
ownership ratio is in between 3% to 5% to test whether taxes affect stock selling and payout policy. 
We first provide clear evidence that these investors sell stocks to avoid the increase in tax burden. 
We then provide evidence that firms change their tax policy to consider the tax incentives of the 
investors who maintain their ownership ratio of 3% or higher. However, the impacts of taxes on 
dividends are not economically large. This second finding poses a question on what can explain 
this small impact of taxes on payout policy. 
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Table 20 
Tax rates in 2012 
This table reports top marginal tax rates on dividend income and capital gains income for large individual shareholders 
(LISs), non-large individual shareholders (Non-LISs), and institutional investors, respectively. The year periods are 
in 2011-2012. LISs refer to individual investors who own 3% or a higher level of corporate stocks. This 3% threshold 
is effective from a 2011 October tax reform. The threshold was 5% from 2003 March to the end of 2011 September. 
 Dividend income Capital gains 
Large individual shareholders (LISs) 43.6% 10% 
Non-large individual shareholders (Non-LISs) 10% 10% 
Institutional investors 19.5% 38% 
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Graph 1 
Ownership of individual investors 
These graphs describe the distribution of ownership ratio among individual investors. The left panel uses the data in 
2011 and the right panel uses the data in 2012. The width of bin is 0.02. 
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Graph 2: 
Ownership of non-individual investors 
These graphs describe the distribution of ownership ratio among non-individual investors. The left panel uses the 
data in 2011 and the right panel uses the data in 2012. The width of bin is 0.02. 
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Table 21 
Summary statistics 
This table reports summary statistics in 2012. Panels A and B respectively report summary statistics at the investor-
level observations and at the firm-level observations. The definition of the four dummy variables in Panel A is self-
explanatory. In Panel B, market to book ratio refers to market capitalization plus liabilities divided by assets, cash 
flow refers to after-tax profit plus depreciation divided by lagged assets, cash holdings refer to cash on hand divided 
by lagged assets, leverage refers to liabilities divided by lagged assets, past stock return refers to stock return of past 
two years, and monthly stock price volatility refers to monthly stock price volatility of across previous five years. The 
term “difference” refers to the difference of the variable between in 2012 and in 2011. 
Variable Mean SD 
Panel A (investor level observation: N = 23540) 
Ownership ratio less than 3% dummy 0.712  0.453  
Individual investor dummy 0.083  0.275  
Ownership ratio 3%-5% dummy 0.164  0.370  
Dividend paid dummy 0.876  0.329  
      
Panel B (firm level observation: N = 1534) 
Difference in divided by market capitalization 0.190  1.426  
Difference in share repurchases divided by market capitalization -0.028  1.411  
dividend divided by market capitalization 2.239  1.756  
share repurchases divided by market capitalization 0.367  1.227  
Individual with 3%-5% ownership dummy 0.124  0.330  
Dividend paid dummy 0.870  0.337  
Difference of market to book ratio 0.004  0.167  
Difference of cash flow -0.215  5.284  
Difference of cash on hand -0.038  5.287  
Difference of leverage 1.501  9.593  
Difference of market capitalization 0.038  0.245  
Difference of market volatility -1.388  3.528  
Difference of five-year stock return 12.099  28.697  
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Table 22 
Taxes and stock selling 
This table presents estimation results to examine whether individual investors sell stock as a result of the tax reform. 
We use the data in 2012. The unit of observations is investors. We use either the linear probability model or the probit 
model developed by Cornelißen and Sonderhof (2009) and Ai and Norton (2003). The regressand is a dummy variable 
that takes one when the investor’s ownership ratio is less than 3%. The regressors include the following variables: 
own3toN that is a dummy variable that takes one when the investor’s ownership ratio is 3% or higher and less than 
N% (N=5, 4, or 3.1); ind that a dummy variable that takes one when the investor is an individual; div that is a dummy 
variable that takes one when the firm pays positive dividends; and the interaction terms of the dummies (own3toN×ind, 
ind×div, own3toN, and div). We do not report the coefficient estimates of the interaction terms or the dummy variables. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
  Ownership ratio less than 3% dummy 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
own3to5*ind*div 
0.459*** 1.962***     
(0.049) (0.352)     
own3to3.5*ind*div 
  0.562*** 5.134***   
  (0.071) (0.224)   
own3to3.1*ind*div 
    0.787*** 5.681*** 
    (0.142) (0.423) 
own3to5*div 
-0.036 -0.223**     
(0.022) (0.110)     
own3to3.5*div 
  -0.038 -0.179   
  (0.044) (0.158)   
own3to3.1*div 
    -0.075 -0.287 
    (0.106) (0.319) 
Other variables included? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Investor type fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Partial effect 0.459*** 0.519*** 0.562*** 0.640*** 0.787*** 0.861*** 
Estimation methold Linear Probit Linear Probit Linear Probit 
N 23540 23540 23540 23540 23540 23540 
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Table 23 
Taxes and stock selling: Falsification test 
This table presents estimation results to examine whether individual investors sell stock as a result of the tax reform 
in the framework of the falsification test. We use the data of 2010 in Panel A and the data of 2012 in Panel B. The unit 
of observations is investors. We use either the linear probability model or the probit model developed by Cornelißen 
and Sonderhof (2009) and Ai and Norton (2003). The regressand is a dummy variable that takes one when the 
investor’s ownership ratio is less than 3%. The regressors include the following variables: own3toN that is a dummy 
variable that takes one when the investor’s ownership ratio is 3% or higher and less than N% (N=5, 4, or 3.1); ind that 
a dummy variable that takes one when the investor is an individual; div that is a dummy variable that takes one when 
the firm pays positive dividends; and the interaction terms of the dummies (own3toN×ind, ind×div, own3toN, and 
div). We do not report the coefficient estimates of the interaction terms or the dummy variables. Robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: year of 2010 
  Ownership ratio less than 3% dummy 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
own3to5*ind*div 
0.008 -0.431     
(0.050) (0.279)     
own3to3.5*ind*div 
  -0.008 -0.330   
  (0.112) (0.414)   
own3to3.1*ind*div 
    -0.269 -1.130 
    (0.368) (1.049) 
own3to5*div 
0.020 0.080     
(0.017) (0.106)     
own3to3.5*div 
  0.006 -0.010   
  (0.039) (0.149)   
own3to3.1*div 
    -0.029 -0.187 
    (0.088) (0.317) 
Other variables included? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Investor type fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Partial effect 0.008 -0.039  -0.008 -0.034  -0.269 -0.300  
Estimation methold Linear Probit Linear Probit Linear Probit 
N 22783 22783 22783 22783 22783 22783 
 
 
  
  
95 
 
 
Table 23 – Continued 
Panel B: year of 2012 
  Ownership ratio less than 3% dummy 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
own3to5*ind*div 
0.033 0.071     
(0.065) (0.265)     
own3to3.5*ind*div 
  0.013 0.001   
  (0.146) (0.428)   
own3to3.1*ind*div 
    -0.241 -0.669 
    (0.299) (0.848) 
own3to5*div 
0.002 0.044     
(0.021) (0.115)     
own3to3.5*div 
  -0.006 0.016   
  (0.043) (0.160)   
own3to3.1*div 
    0.068 0.227 
    (0.093) (0.339) 
Other variables included? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Investor type fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Partial effect 0.033 0.010  0.013 -0.011  -0.241 -0.232  
Estimation methold Linear Probit Linear Probit Linear Probit 
N 23258 23258 23258 23258 23258 23258 
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Table 24 
Taxes and payout policy 
This table presents estimation results to examine whether the investors that are affected by the tax reform but that do 
not sell stocks change payout policy. We use the data in 2012. The unit of observations is firms. We use OLS for 
estimation. The regressand is the first difference of either dividends or stock repurchases. Both of them are divided by 
lagged market capitalization. The main regressor is a dummy variable that takes one when the firm has individual 
investors that maintain their status as non-LISs both in before the tax reform and in after the tax reform, and the firm 
pays dividends. We also include an interaction term of this variable with an individual top dummy variable, which 
takes one when the individual investors who retain the stakes after the tax reform are the largest investors, in some 
columns. We include the first difference of the following variables as controls: market to book ratio that is market 
capitalization plus liabilities divided by assets; cash flow that is after-tax profit plus depreciation divided by lagged 
assets; cash holdings that are cash on hand divided by lagged assets; leverage that is liabilities divided by lagged assets, 
log of market capitalization, past stock return that is stock return of past two years; and monthly stock price volatility 
that is monthly stock price volatility of across previous five years. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Diff of Dividends/Marketcap 
Diff of 
Repurchases/Marketcap 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Individual top*Individual with 3%-5% 
ownership*Dividend paid 
 -0.034  0.037 
 (0.170)  (0.197) 
Individual with 3%-5% 
ownership*Dividend paid 
-0.165** -0.158* -0.139 -0.146 
(0.080) (0.086) (0.132) (0.157) 
Dividend paid 
-0.103 -0.103 -0.119 -0.119 
(0.102) (0.102) (0.091) (0.091) 
Diff of market to book ratio 
-0.812** -0.812** 0.021 0.020 
(0.325) (0.325) (0.475) (0.476) 
Diff of cash flow 
0.029*** 0.029*** 0.006 0.006 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) 
Diff of cash on hand 
0.006 0.006 -0.023*** -0.023*** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) 
Diff of leverage 
0.005 0.005 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Diff of ln(market capitalization) 
1.779*** 1.778*** 0.448 0.450 
(0.266) (0.266) (0.293) (0.294) 
Diff of stock volatility 
-0.026*** -0.026*** -0.019** -0.019** 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
Diff of 5-year stock return 
0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
N 1534 1534 1534 1534 
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